



A common perception of global resource scarcity holds that it is inevitably a catalyst for 
conflict among nations; yet, paradoxically, incidents of such scarcity underlie some of 
the most important examples of international cooperation. This volume examines the 
wider potential for the experience of scarcity to promote cooperation in international 
relations and diplomacy beyond the traditional bounds of the interests of competitive 
nation states. 
The interdisciplinary background of the book’s contributors shifts the focus of the 
analysis beyond narrow theoretical treatments of international relations and resource 
diplomacy to broader examinations of the practicalities of cooperation in the context 
of competition and scarcity. Combining the insights of a range of social scientists with 
those of experts in the natural and bio-sciences—many of whom work as ‘resource 
practitioners’ outside the context of universities—the book works through the tensions 
between ‘thinking/theory’ and ‘doing/practice’, which so often plague the process of 
social change. These encounters with scarcity draw attention away from the myopic 
focus on market forces and allocation, and encourage us to recognise more fully the 
social nature of the tensions and opportunities that are associated with our shared 
dependence on resources that are not readily accessible to all. 
The book brings together experts on theorising scarcity and those on the scarcity of 
specific resources. It begins with a theoretical reframing of both the contested concept 
of scarcity and the underlying dynamics of resource diplomacy. The authors then out­
line the current tensions around resource scarcity or degradation and examine existing 
progress towards cooperative international management of resources. These include 
food and water scarcity, mineral exploration and exploitation of the oceans. Overall, 
the contributors propose a more hopeful and positive engagement among the world’s 
nations as they pursue the economic and social benefits derived from natural resources, 
while maintaining the ecological processes on which they depend. 
Marcelle C. Dawson is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Gender and 
Social Work, University of Otago, New Zealand, and a Senior Research Associate at the 
Centre for Social Change, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. 
Christopher Rosin is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Tourism, Sport and 
Society at Lincoln University, New Zealand. 
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Resource scarcity between conflict and 
cooperation 




Why scarcity and cooperation? 
As indicated by its title, this is a book about the relationship between what are 
perceived to be scarce natural resources and the tendency for access to them to 
lead to international conflict or cooperation. It is apparent from our reading of 
existing literature and from the contributions to this book that experts are often 
situated in positions that find little opportunity to engage or interact outside 
of academic disciplines or geographically and resource-specific practice. This 
diversity of forms and levels of engagement with resource scarcity and its impli­
cations for international relations poses particular problems when one attempts 
to provide a summary, but insightful, overview to those with more general 
interests in scarcity or politics. This book—in its structure and content—is the 
result of just this sort of exercise, having roots in the organisation of the 2014 
University of Otago Foreign Policy School, an annual conference directed at 
early career staff from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
It was soon apparent that the invited speakers (many of whom are contribu­
tors to the following chapters) did not always share a similar epistemology or 
ontology in their treatment of scarcity, as its use ranged from that of a physical 
reality to an element of discourse. Whereas the implied lack of cohesion might 
have laid the framework for a failed conference, participants emerged with a 
strong sense of the common theme regarding the potential to engage or move 
towards cooperative relations in response to scarcity, irrespective of how it 
was conceived. It is on this premise that we organised the book as a collation 
of outwardly disparate manifestations and interrogations of ‘scarcity’ with the 
intention of directing our readers’ attention to the potential for international 
collaboration. 
On one hand, the scarcity of resources and the likelihood of such scarcity
leading to international conflict (economic, political or military) is a common
feature of public discourse and speculation. On the other, the potential for scar­
city (or perceptions thereof) to initiate forms of international collaboration or
cooperation is a much less common element of how we understand the world.
This seems to us to be an unfortunate situation. Existing examples of international
cooperation around such resources as fresh water, biodiversity conservation and






ocean fisheries suggest that a common concern for the viability of a resource that
extends beyond political boundaries can provide the basis for peaceful interac­
tions among otherwise competing countries. It is just such positive examples
that provide hope for a world that is defined less by bellicose confrontation over
essential resources and more by a shared interest in the ability for greater equality
in access to those resources and their societal benefits to facilitate cooperation— 
and potentially even peace. 
In the remainder of the introduction, we will provide an explanation of the 
pathway we have navigated in assembling this collection. It will begin with a 
brief engagement with some of the literature on resource scarcity and its part in 
international relations. This review necessarily begins with—and is dominated 
by—the vast literature on the threats of scarcity to humanity more generally 
and its potential to initiate conflict between and within countries. It concludes 
with more recent literature on successful experiments with collaboration and 
coordination of resource access and use where the location and benefits of 
the resource extend beyond political boundaries. We suggest that our naviga­
tion of this literature helps us to get to grips with the diverse perspectives of 
scarcity (some more overtly stated than others) found in the chapters from our 
contributors. It also provides the rationale for the division of the book into 
three parts. This includes providing roughly parallel chapters, which present 
the potential tensions related to a situation of scarcity and specific examples of 
cooperation. We will conclude with an invitation to read the book as a whole 
in order to develop a broader understanding of scarcity and its relevance to 
international relations. 
Scarcity and conflict 
The predominance of the linkage between instances of resource scarcity and 
potential conflict is by no means surprising. In a global context framed by 
increasing attention to environmental issues and concerns with readily appre­
ciated international implications and the heightened economic and political 
competition among nations, scarcity portends an unavoidable escalation in ten­
sions among already hostile or would be hostile actors. Examples from the 
Middle East and Central Asia provide vivid examples of the potential for access 
to oil and natural gas to lead to armed conflict and to create situations in which 
regional and global powers insert themselves with the likelihood of for wider 
scale conflict. Conflict over resources is not limited to military confrontation, 
with indications that the dominance of supply and processing chains can be 
used to impose economic pressure and constraints on competing economies 
(see the chapters on rare earth minerals and phosphorus in this volume). In yet 
other contexts, the perception of potential scarcity can lead to continued or 
renewed exertion of colonial forms of exploitation in the Global South as dem­
onstrated in the ‘land grabbing’ investments that divert the productive capacity 
of large tracts in Africa, South America and elsewhere to meet consumption 








3 Resource scarcity between conflict and cooperation 
instances of conflict that grab public attention—especially to the extent that 
they elicit spectres of global war, hidden economic agendas and exacerbated 
inequalities between global haves and have nots. This association between scar­
city and conflict is deeply embedded on our social consciousness. 
By comparison, the achievements in cooperative efforts to manage and
regulate resources receive less attention. This is probably most notable in
the case of fresh water where the resource crosses the borders of countries
that, often, already experience tensions due to cultural, religious or ideologi­
cal differences. Whereas conflicts over resources are presented as potentially
escalating to even higher levels, the efforts at cooperation are commonly seen
as tenuous at best given the underlying tensions involved. In this context,
there is little expectation that cooperation is a viable and sustainable response
to scarcity. 
The relative emphasis on the association between resource scarcity and 
conflict is also a feature of the academic literature. In this case, the argument 
revolves around the assumption that social relations are strongly influenced by 
competition and any form of scarcity will exacerbate existing tensions between 
countries or among class, cultural or ethnic divisions within countries. This 
position is commonly based on theorised impacts of projected scarcity or on 
more vivid case studies of conflict in which resource scarcity is identified as a 
contributing factor. A less recognised literature on the potential for scarcity to 
galvanise pursuit of peaceful relations has been constructed within peace and 
conflict studies, which focus on the need for common goals and benefits as the 
basis for facilitating cooperation. 
Scarcity (and environmental degradation) as a threat to 
security 
The association between resource scarcity and social conflict and strife has an 
ancient history. It is common for such treatments of scarcity to reflect political 
economic perspectives with the assumption of competitive relations between 
political rulers and nation states (at an international scale) or social groups such 
as class, race or religion (at a regional scale). Implicit to this perspective is the 
expectation that increasing demand for resources (attributable to population 
growth, changing consumer preferences, etc.) will outpace supply and gen­
erate tensions around access to and availability of resources that can only be 
addressed from the perspective of a zero-sum game. The assumption that any 
gains by one group of resource users necessarily involve a loss among others 
creates the circumstances in which conflict becomes an inevitable feature. 
In more recent and current debates, this conception of scarcity has become 
more tightly focused, most notably through the framing introduced by the 
British clergyman and economist Thomas Malthus and his warning that, if left 
unchecked, population growth would outstrip food production and lead to 
catastrophe and societal collapse. In 1798, Malthus anonymously published his 
prophetic thesis under the title, An Essay on the Principles of Population, in which 
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he identified three principles of population. The first two principles stipulate 
that the population cannot grow without the necessary means of subsistence, 
and that growth will take place when such means become available. Malthus 
saw these principles as established ideas, which he attributed to Adam Smith, 
David Hume and others. His main contribution in the Essay was the third 
principle, where he argued that population growth stays in check vis-à-vis
the means of subsistence ‘by the periodical or constant action of misery or vice’ 
(Malthus, 1798: 144). For Malthus, this is inevitable because population, which 
grows exponentially, will always outpace increases in food production, which 
can only grow linearly. Checks will thus come into play and these can be either 
‘positive’, such as higher mortality rates, or preventative, in the form of birth 
control. Both, nevertheless, necessitate misery or vice (Winch, 2013). 
The resultant view of scarcity as a natural law is also known as the ‘scarcity 
postulate’ and is rooted in classical liberalism and classical economics, with 
which Malthus was affiliated. The scarcity postulate positions scarcity as a 
nearly ubiquitous condition affecting human society. It recognises the social 
dimension of human needs and desires, but sees their pursuit as rational and 
socially desirable. This view of scarcity, which underpins the field of eco­
nomics, is essentially a modern conceptualisation. Periods during which vital 
resources were scarce are common historical events; but, prior to modernity, 
these were often anticipated and provision could be made to mitigate their 
effect by diverse means, including cooperation and conflict. These scarcities 
were furthermore perceived as spatially and temporally confined, in compari­
son to modern representations of scarcity as an omnipresent condition that 
encompasses all aspects of human life and wellbeing (Xenos, 1987). Thus, 
modern scarcity, where need and desire are inseparable and where the spread 
of desire is pivotal for sustaining society, is manifested in a paradoxical relation­
ship between abundance and scarcity. An ever-accumulating society has more 
and more, but cannot fulfil its ever-increasing desires, which in turn propel 
even greater accumulation. This paradox of modernity, Xenos (1987; 2010) 
argues, results in a society living with perpetual scarcity. 
In spite of the shared philosophical roots of the Malthusian principles and 
classical economics, over the latter decades of the twentieth century a nota­
ble division developed between neo-Malthusian and neoclassical economic 
theories and their proponents. At that time, nearly 200 years had passed since 
Malthus’s gloomy prophesy in which substantial population growth did eventu­
ate but without outpacing food production. For neoclassicists this was evidence 
of the ability of the free market—and its signalling mechanism of price related 
to supply and demand—to efficiently allocate resources and incentivise inno­
vation so that Malthusian misery is largely avoided. For neo-Malthusians, in 
contrast, Malthus’s prediction still looms large as a Cassandra syndrome; that 
is, Malthus may have got the timing wrong but the essence of his prediction 
stands. Neo-Malthusians, therefore, maintain that overpopulation will lead to 
resource scarcity and environmental degradation, and subsequently to com­
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environmental damage caused by the accelerating production needed to meet 
humanity’s growing needs and desires. Their conclusion is that there are limits 
to growth. In spite of the notable differences between these perspectives, both 
apply similar philosophical underpinnings regarding the inevitability of scarcity 
in their policy recommendations (Matthaei, 1984). 
Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999), a notable proponent of the resource
scarcity–conflict nexus, identified three main positions in the ongoing
debate around the outcomes of environmental scarcity. Neo-Malthusians,
as noted above, still propagate the idea that having finite natural resources
means there is a limited capacity for sustaining human society, which, if
exceeded, will result in poverty and social unrest. Economic optimists are a
second group that includes neoclassical economists and others who believe
in the capacity of efficient markets and functioning institutions to effectively
‘guide’ conservation, substitution and investment so that capacity limits are
not exceeded. Homer-Dixon calls the third group in the debate the ‘dis­
tributionists.’ This group believes that the real issue involves unequal and
inadequate distribution of resources and wealth, and thus poverty and ine­
quality should be seen as causes of population growth and resource depletion,
and not their result. This view, which was relatively influential in the Global
South during the 1970s and 1980s and particularly popular among Marxists,
has had less purchase since then. Homer-Dixon recognised that this typol­
ogy, while useful, carries the risk of oversimplification. Nonetheless, these
positions became so entrenched that the debate became sterile. 
Frerks, Dietz and van der Zang (2014) contend that the binary between
the pessimism of the neo-Malthusians and the optimism of neoclassical eco­
nomics no longer dominates debates around resource scarcity as they have
in the past. Rather, these authors suggest that it has become widely accepted
that environmental degradation and resource scarcity may be contributing
factors to conflicts, but that such conflicts are rarely solely resource-driven.
This position essentially combines elements of the otherwise distinctive per­
spectives of the neo-Malthusians, economic optimists and the distributionists.
For example, such an approach accepts that, in a particular case, degradation
could be a result of conflict, and not the other way around, while also recog­
nising the importance of strong institutions for environmental management
and peacebuilding. But, even if such a convergence between the different
positions has indeed taken place, it does not automatically render the previ­
ous typology redundant. Having a more nuanced approach towards instances
of scarcity and conflict is important, but it is often still possible to identify a
commentator’s worldview or ideological inclination. The debate may thus
have become less sterile, and we share the sentiment that ‘[i]nstead of over-
arching theories, there is presently a need for contextualised knowledge, and
complexity needs to be explicitly acknowledged’ (Frerks, Dietz and van der
Zang, 2014: 14), but as the chapters in this volume suggest, Homer-Dixon’s
(1999) typology still provides a useful analytical tool for assessing dominant
views within the debate. 




Notwithstanding the argument in the literature that the debate around envi­
ronmental or resource scarcity has become more nuanced and context specific, 
it is the association of scarcity with conflict, violence and insecurity that has for 
a long time been the more visible facet of the debate. The relationship between 
resource scarcity and conflict has been well recognised and has received exten­
sive attention, especially in the fields of international relations, environmental 
studies and security studies (Dinar, 2011). That the combination of scarce 
resources and growing population is a threat to national security and human 
wellbeing is largely taken for granted; it is merely common sense. One notable 
example is Homer-Dixon’s (1999) Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, which 
analyses links between environmental scarcity and violent conflict and predicts 
that violent conflict is likely to become more common as access to renewable 
resources becomes increasingly scarce. Michael Klare’s (2001) Resource Wars
is a similar example, in which he argues that increased demand for resources, 
coupled with shortages and contestation over ownership, is likely to create new 
pressures leading to conflict. Neighbouring countries who share resources are 
at a higher risk of such tensions escalating into conflict. More recently, Klare 
(2012) extended his analysis of resource competition in The Race for What’s Left. 
Whereas the race for resources often involves commercial corporations, ‘[f]or 
nation-states’, Klare (2012: 214–215) argues, ‘the fight for resources has equally 
high stakes: those that retain access to adequate supplies of critical materials will 
flourish, while those unable to do so will experience hardship and decline.’ 
Another notable author linking natural resources with violence is Philippe Le 
Billon (2004; 2005). Unlike Homer-Dixon (1999), Le Billon does not dedicate 
much attention to the concept of scarcity, but his focus on the role of natural 
resources as an underlying factor in war and violent conflict is similar. 
Scarcity as an impetus for peacebuilding 
In contrast to arguments that associate scarcity with conflict, another set of 
authors suggests that scarcity (especially around shared resources) can be a cata­
lyst for peace (Brock, 1991; Carius, 2012). This literature approaches scarce 
resources from the perspective of peacebuilding, that is, with the examination 
of projects and policies promoting peaceful relations among international or 
domestic actors who are otherwise in conflict. It is also largely populated by 
applied, as opposed to theoretical, analysis with the objective of providing 
recommendations for more successful promotion of peace in the context of 
scarcity. The underlying argument is that a shared interest in the current and 
future benefits of access to resources—or ecosystem services deriving from 
them—provides a basis for engagement within which cooperation is a more 
viable and advantageous response than conflict. Currently, the most common 
areas for such peacebuilding involve transboundary management of water, 
nature conservation parks and international or global governance agreements. 
Whereas observers such as Homer-Dixon, Klare and Le Billon interpret





















7 Resource scarcity between conflict and cooperation 
point of contention that can (or inevitably will) trigger conflict, there is
emerging evidence of collaboration in such situations. Perhaps the most
notable examples involve progress in efforts to develop cooperative govern­
ance and management arrangements between otherwise belligerent groups
in the Middle East. Kramer (2008) reports on the progress and achievements
of the Regional Water Data Banks and Good Water Neighbors projects
involving participants from Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian community.
She identifies significant areas of cooperation around the allocation of water
in the region. In addition to these projects, in his review of mechanisms
and practices leading to successful peacebuilding efforts, Carius (2012) lists
similar efforts in the Nile and Okavango River Basins in Africa and there
is a growing literature on collaborative governance of the Mekong Basin
in Southeast Asia (Jacobs, 2002). While these reviews of the achievements
associated with transboundary water management emphasise the potential
for appreciable positive outcomes and benefits to both regional societies
and environment, Zeitoun et al. (2014) caution that the narrow focus on
cooperation may overlook the ability for some participants to exploit their
relative power to negotiate agreements that favour their position in com­
parison to weaker neighbours. 
A further area of emphasis for peacebuilding is nature conservation, high­
lighted by the development of peace parks located in areas of contested resource 
access or transboundary regions (often in the context of challenges to national 
sovereignty). In making a claim for the relationship between nature conserva­
tion and debates about scarcity, Ali (2007a) states that scarcity should be viewed 
as being measurable in terms of quality—that is, a degraded resource is also a 
source of scarcity—as well as quantity. In that context, Matthew et al. (2002) 
review a series of case studies in which conservation efforts have been used to 
mitigate tensions around poverty and resource access in areas of highly biodi­
verse tropical rainforest. From the case studies, contributors to the book offer 
insight to policies and practices with the potential to reduce tensions caused by 
restraints on land and resource use imposed through conservation, while also 
identifying income potential for local communities through managed exploita­
tion and ecotourism. Similar connections between biodiversity conservation 
and shared benefits for locally impacted communities are identified in parks 
that traverse international boundaries (Ali, 2007b). In his introduction to a col­
lection of peacebuilding case studies, Ali (2007a) argues that the potential for 
conservation to facilitate peaceful relations is often sidelined by the more dom­
inant theoretical arguments linking environmental issues to conflict. While not 
in evidence in the literature, the cautions identified by Zeitoun et al. (2014) are 
likely as much in play in the development of international peace parks. 
A further arena for international cooperation around resources lies in the
growing number of international treaties and agreements related to the govern­
ance of resources, including such diverse agreements as the Montreal Protocol (to
mitigate the scarcity of ozone), the Convention of Biological Diversity, Regional
Fisheries Management Organisations (see Jollands and Fisher, this volume) and







the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) negotiated climate
change mitigation agreements. Such agreements demonstrate the power of scar­
city (whether understood as actual or created) to impel more collaborative actions
among international participants. That said, the extent to which the negotia­
tion of international agreements is frequently reliant on the willingness of a small
number of more powerful states (including the US, China, and large European
powers), and often pivots around the recognition of ‘special conditions’ in weaker
countries of the Global South, points to similar issues of power inequalities as
noted above. 
Alternative approaches to understanding scarcity 
Beyond perspectives that emphasise the peacebuilding potential of actual or 
perceived scarcity, there are numerous other approaches that seek to challenge 
the dominant view of an inevitable relationship between resource scarcity 
and conflict. In contrast to the fear-inducing Malthusian approach, growing 
numbers of commentators are promoting the idea of scarcity as a socially con­
structed concept, exposing the ability of powerful groups (e.g. government and 
industry) to craft certain resources as scarce, while simultaneously promoting 
their own interests by offering political or commercial solutions to the ‘scarcity 
problem’ (see, for instance, Lyla Mehta’s chapter in this volume). 
Notably, from a political ecology perspective, scholars such as Theisen (2008) 
and Bretthauer (2015), suggest that evidence in favour of Malthusian-inspired 
claims about a causal relationship between resource scarcity and conflict is 
inconsequential. In their work, they have identified other factors such as poor 
governance, corruption, institutional instability and other location-specific 
and structural conditions as confounding variables in the spurious relationship 
between resource scarcity and conflict. For instance, Peluso and Watts (2001: 
5) argued that ‘violence [is] a site-specific phenomenon rooted in local histories 
and social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation 
and power relations.’ Deepening these findings, Bretthauer’s (2015) research— 
a comparison of 31 resource-scarce countries, in which 15 displayed high levels 
of armed conflict and 16 were conflict free—shed light on some of the specific 
social, economic and political conditions under which violence or conflict are 
likely to occur. She concluded that the absence of education—or what she 
called ‘low levels of ingenuity’—is the most significant necessary condition 
for conflict, followed by high levels of dependence on agriculture and exces­
sive poverty (Bretthauer, 2015: 604–605). Moreover, challenging the view 
of the economic optimists, Bretthauer (2015) noted that a low or no conflict 
outcome was more strongly associated with lower reliance on agriculture than 
with economic development. 
There has been much criticism of market solutions to ‘the scarcity problem’ 
that have been proposed in the form of resource substitution, technologi­
cal innovation, increased investment, labour intensification and all manner 
of ‘efficiencies’ packaged as ‘development’ or ‘progress’. As discussed earlier, 
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rampant resource exploitation in the name of growth or prosperity, coupled 
with an exponential increase in the world’s population, led to a momentary 
revival of Malthusian-esque trepidation in the 1970s. However, unlike the 
earlier phase of panic about running out of resources, new anxieties were 
articulated around the long-term consequences of soaring levels of pollu­
tion and environmental degradation. Meadows et al. (1972), authors of the 
widely-publicised Limits to Growth (LtG) thesis, referred to these outcomes as 
‘negative feedback loops’ in the global system. According to them, unchecked 
population growth and resource depletion could lead to ‘a sudden and uncon­
trollable collapse’ of the global system, which would ultimately scupper the 
positive feedback loops of capital expansion and population growth (Meadows 
et al., 1972: 158). 
Critics of the LtG thesis censured its seemingly woeful conclusions, argu­
ing that it was possible to introduce measures to ‘weaken the loops or to 
disguise the pressures they generate so that growth can continue’ (Meadows 
et  al., 1972: 157). However, Meadows et  al. were firm in their view that 
‘[s]uch means may have some short-term effect in relieving pressures caused 
by growth, but in the long run they do nothing to prevent the overshoot 
and subsequent collapse of the system’ (p. 157). Unlike the pessimistic and 
over-deterministic overtones of Malthusian claims, the LtG thesis contained a 
message of hope; a call to action that could potentially avert disaster. Meadows 
et al. (1972: 24) argued that 
[i]t is possible to alter these growth trends and to establish a condition of 
ecological and economic stability that is sustainable far into the future. 
The state of global equilibrium could be designed so that the basic material 
needs of each person on earth are satisfied and each person has an equal 
opportunity to realize his or her individual human potential. 
The term, ‘equilibrium’ alludes to the possibility of encouraging economic 
development without overshooting the earth’s limited carrying capacity (see 
Randers, 2000). However, this concept failed to impress policymakers and 
captains of industry in the western world, who equated it with stagnation. 
Nevertheless, in 1986, when the Brundtland Commission (renamed the 
World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987) repack­
aged this idea as ‘sustainable development’, it soon became ubiquitous. The 
commission defined the term as ‘development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs’ (WCED, 1987: 43). The resemblance to the term ‘equilibrium’ is 
clearly discernible, but in the early 1990s it was ‘sustainable development’ that 
became the ‘watchword for international aid agencies, the jargon of develop­
ment planners, the theme of conferences and learned papers, and the slogan of 
developmental and environmental activists’ (Lélé, 1991: 607). 
Despite extensive uptake of the word, conceptual fuzziness and myriad 
interpretations continue to hamper efforts to achieve the stated objectives 
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of sustainable development. In the minority are those who regard sustain­
able development as a contradiction in terms; an impossible objective, as 
well as those who have tended to (mis)interpret ‘sustainable’ as ‘sustained’. 
For example, Nigerian academic Francis Idachaba (1987: 18) claimed in an 
address to the World Bank’s seventh symposium on the agriculture sector, that
‘[s]ustainability in agricultural development . . . refers to the ability of agricul­
tural systems to keep production and distribution going continuously without 
falling. It refers to how agricultural growth and development can be sustained 
into the future.’ When challenged by an audience member about his lack of 
consideration for the environment, Idachaba responded with a suggestion that 
environmental concerns—while understandably a preoccupation of the devel­
oped world—were ‘second generation problems that tend to give way to more 
immediate concerns’ in the developing world (Hopcraft, 1987: 54). 
Notwithstanding these outliers, Robinson (2004) has grouped the majority 
of the perspectives of environmentalist responses to resource scarcity into two 
camps (see Table 1.1). The first regards sustainable development as compat­
ible with growth, while the second bases its views on the critical assumption 
that development is not synonymous with growth. It follows, then, that the 
first camp endorses technical fixes as part of the solution to scarcity, while the 
second promotes value change as the way forward. Robinson (2004: 372) also 
noted the first group’s preference for the term ‘sustainable development’, while 
the second camp tended to use ‘sustainability’, entirely dropping the notion of 
‘development’ because of its conflation with growth. Robinson (2004: 371) 
admitted that his typology was ‘suggestive, not definitive’, but even so, con­
trasting the views in this way highlights the vexed and contested nature of 
sustainable development as an approach to dealing with resource scarcity. 
Several commentators have condemned the hijacking of the term ‘sustainable 
development’ by government officials and industry representatives, who seem 
intent on ramping up growth efforts under the guise of sustainable develop­
ment. Critics have labelled their efforts variously as ‘market environmentalism’ 
(Anderson and Leal, 1991; Bailey, 2007), ‘cosmetic environmentalism’ or 
‘fake greenery’ (Robinson, 2004: 374), ‘green neoliberalism’ (Bakker, 2010) 
or ‘green capitalism’ (Heartfield, 2008; Tienhaara, 2014), which Prudham 
(2009: 1595) defines as ‘a set of responses to environmental change and envi­
ronmentalism that relies on harnessing capital investment, individual choice, 
and entrepreneurial innovation to the green cause.’ Such a view, promoted 
by the ‘technical fixers’, is distinctly at odds with the ‘value changers’, who 
Table 1.1 Forms of environmentalist response 
Technical fix Value change 
Natural area management Conservation (utilitarian) Preservation (romantic) 
Pollution and resources Technology (collective policies) Lifestyles (individual values) 
Preferred language Sustainable development Sustainability 
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distinguish between development and growth. For example, as Daly (1990: 1) 
explained, ‘growth is quantitative increase in physical scale, while development 
is qualitative improvement or unfolding of potentialities. An economy can 
grow without developing, or develop without growing, or do both or neither.’ 
While the sustainable development approach implies some degree of growth,
sustainability sits more comfortably with the idea of what Meadows et  al.
(1972) referred to as a non-growth equilibrium state. This notion—also
known by the term ‘steady-state economy’—has some purchase among
environmentalists in the US today. However, it has been dismissed in cer­
tain European circles, where a strategy of ‘degrowth’ is being promoted
(Martínez-Alier et al., 2010). Pioneered in 1971 by French economist and
statistician Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, ‘degrowth’ has recently been res­
urrected by European scholars and activists. Despite ostensible parallels
with the LtG thesis—particularly with regard to the shared disdain for the
solutions proposed by the economic optimists—Georgescu-Roegen’s disa­
greement with the notion of a steady-state economy became increasingly
apparent (Levallois, 2010). For him, the only viable response to resource
scarcity lay in ‘retracting consumption levels in countries such as the US
which he understood was already consuming excessively’ (Martínez-Alier
et al., 2010: 1743). It is clear that proponents are not proposing degrowth as a
global strategy to address resource scarcity and environmental degradation, but
instead are suggesting that ‘Southern countries or societies, where ecological
impacts are low relative to their biocapacity, [be allowed] to increase their
material consumption and thus their ecological footprint’ (ibid.). The mutu­
ally influential relationship between the burgeoning scholarly literature on
degrowth and the increasingly energetic degrowth movement, signals a new,
and potentially quite exciting, direction with regard to resource scarcity.
Although not pursued in this book, it is a line of thinking and action that
centres global inequality in the scarcity debate and questions what the world
might look like if there were ‘prosperity without growth’ (Jackson, 2017) in
advanced economies. 
Overview of chapters 
As noted above, the contributions to the book have been purposefully organ­
ised in order to reflect the tensions and the hopefulness attributed to resource 
scarcity both in the academic literature and policy orientations. We look to 
achieve this by arranging the contributions into three parts based on their 
treatments of scarcity. Part I specifically challenges readers to rethink their con­
ceptions of scarcity in a manner that eliminates the sense of inevitable conflict. 
Parts II and III are intended to offer paired accounts of scarcity in particular 
resource categories—agriculture, mining, fresh water and marine—framed in 
terms of the tensions that develop or the examples of cooperation achieved. 
The contributions to these parts are neither wholly alarmist nor uncritically 
optimistic; but each pair allows readers to gaze over the edge of the abyss, 
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while also glimpsing the safe (if perhaps indistinct) footholds and pathways for 
navigating the crossing. As a whole, the contributors propose a more hopeful 
engagement among the world’s nations as they pursue the economic and social 
benefits derived from natural resources while maintaining the ecological pro­
cesses on which they depend. 
The presentations of scarcity within the contributions vary significantly, 
highlighting the diverse professional backgrounds of our contributors—from 
academics to policy analysts, consultants and activists. As a result, the book does 
not offer a coherent theoretical treatise on the relevance of specific elements 
or aspects of scarcity. We suggest, however, that the diverse voices, styles of 
argument and focuses of analysis more accurately represent the breadth of 
engagements with scarcity in our global society—and the collection has value 
precisely because it forces each of us to confront scarcity in its multiplicity of 
meanings, implications and applications. 
Contributors to Part I use the examples of water (Mehta, Chapter 2) and 
regional energy pools (Lindström, Granit and Rosner, Chapter 3) to re-evaluate 
the concept and boundaries of ‘scarcity’. Both chapters challenge the scarcity 
postulate, where scarcity is regarded as a universal and permanent condition 
that underlies human existence. These two chapters are quite different in their 
approach to scarcity, which is telling of the epistemological and ontological 
diversity that can be found in this volume. The explicit conceptual analysis 
of scarcity that is presented in Chapter 2 reflects a critical approach prevalent 
in the social sciences, while the more implicit understanding of scarcity in 
Chapter 3 is more typical of a practice-oriented public policy approach. Lyla 
Mehta’s chapter in this collection is a continuation of her critique of scarcity 
as a seemingly meta-level value-neutral reasoning for actions that, in effect, 
are laden with ideological dispositions. Mehta focuses on fresh water as an 
example of a renewable resource that is often being portrayed as dangerously 
scarce. This dominant discourse on water scarcity tends to emphasise eco­
nomic problems and (market-led) solutions that are of importance to powerful 
groups over social, cultural and political concerns. Mehta promotes a critical 
lens that incorporates elements from both post-structural deconstruction and 
structuralist Marxist analysis. 
The chapter by Andreas Lindström, Jakob Granit and Kevin Rosner 
examines regional energy cooperation as a strategy for achieving sustain­
able economic development and peace through the formation of stronger 
ties among neighbouring countries. The increasing demand for a stable sup­
ply of electricity has prompted transboundary cooperation in areas where 
energy resources are unevenly distributed. The authors note the potential 
for ‘regionalism’ and regional collaboration to generate political, economic 
and social benefits. They also emphasise deregulation and the mechanisms of 
the market as being instrumental for achieving a transboundary energy pool. 
Scarcity appears in this chapter, not as a theoretical concept, but in the form 
of constraints on electricity production imposed by costs of infrastructure and 
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The chapters in Part II address some of the key tensions resulting from
scarcity and the potential for response. As they demonstrate, scarcity of a nat­
ural resource may be influenced by various physical as well as socio-political
factors, of which limited supply and growing demand are only two. In
Chapter 4, Stuart White and Dana Cordell examine tensions surrounding the
increasing global demand for phosphorus (phosphate rock), a non-renewable
natural resource with a relatively low profile in popular debates about resource
scarcity. This is in spite of phosphorus being an essential element for plant
growth and thus for agriculture production and global food supply. In this
chapter, the authors outline the key issues concerning this resource, including
its sensitive geopolitical context and the absence of an international govern­
ance framework. The authors maintain that phosphorus is not scarce solely
because there is a fixed amount of it in the earth’s crust, but rather because
of a number of factors affecting supply and demand that combine to limit its
availability. The authors argue that because phosphorus security is directly
linked to food security, and because there are many stakeholders involved,
there is a dire need to establish an international body to coordinate collabora­
tive solutions. 
In Chapter 5, Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt focuses on the logic and practice of 
extractivism (as opposed to a particular natural resource), which refers to the 
accelerated exploitation of resources for fast economic growth. Under neo­
liberalism, extractivism is often framed and legitimised through discourses of 
crisis and scarcity. These concepts are perceived as politically shaped and as 
reflecting a materialist worldview where natural resources and human needs 
are closely related. The chapter draws attention to the effects of this economic 
logic and strategy on peasants, who, in many countries in the Global South, 
have become artisanal, small-scale miners. Through their mining activities, 
they have—to varying degrees—contributed to the degradation of the envi­
ronment on which they depend for subsistence. The peasant-miners operate 
at the margins of the mining industry, often as part of the informal economy, 
and tend to be ignored. 
Doug Hill adopts a multi-scalar lens in Chapter 6 to examine how issues 
of water security in South Asia have been understood and constructed by dif­
ferent stakeholders. The discursive rationale for the use and management of 
water in this region commonly preferences a particular notion of scarcity and 
security that privileges a supply-side approach in the form of a volumetric 
understanding of water, and ignores other possible understandings. The par­
ticular geopolitics of the Indus Basin adds another layer of complexity, where 
water security is deemed to be of national importance to both India and 
Pakistan, who share the basin. Hill also mentions the secrecy around water 
data, which shuts down debate and obstructs possible alternative actions that 
may entail greater cooperation between stakeholders. He acknowledges the 
region’s history of international and intra-national disputes over water, but calls 
for alternative understandings of water that do not solely serve the interests of 
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Chapter 7, by Todd Capson, examines the scarcities associated with the
degradation of marine environments, including fisheries, as an important
source of protein for many people. As with fresh water, marine resources
may not be confined within a single political territory and are thus of inter­
est to a broader range of stakeholders. Capson argues that the sustainability
of this resource in the face of growing demand and environmental pressures
necessitates transboundary cooperation and bold action, such as the formation
of marine protected areas. Scarcity enters the discussion in its most conven­
tional economic form as the result of demand exceeding a limited supply.
Capson does not, however, regard it as a universal or permanent situation
and posits sustainable management as the opposite of scarcity. However, high
and growing demand will result in higher prices, with increasing numbers
of consumers being unable to enjoy this resource. Scarcity, therefore, may
refer to the quantity of fish stock available in the ocean or to the availability
of these stocks for human consumption. The two are closely interrelated but
not identical. 
In Part III, our contributors shift to a more explicit focus on the potential 
for scarcity to act as the impetus for collaboration and a de-escalation of the 
tensions identified in Part II. The chapters reflect some of the existing work 
on peacebuilding noted above in relation to transboundary water management, 
but also extend the scope to a broader set of resources, including food, rare 
earth minerals and marine fisheries. In addition, they draw attention to the 
diverse forms and scales of coordination that use scarcity as a means to organise 
collaborative action across political, cultural and social boundaries. As a whole, 
they offer hopeful perspectives on resource use and access, which—while tem­
pered by real world challenges—help to belie the inevitably of conflict. 
Alana Mann addresses the concept of food scarcity as a threat to food secu­
rity at both local and global scales in Chapter 8. She argues that the efforts of La 
Via Campesina to champion the capacities and rights of small-scale agricultural 
producers internationally is rooted in a vision of promoting increased self-
sufficiency for societies and cultures. These efforts are encapsulated in the con­
cept of food sovereignty, which promotes the right for self-determination in 
food production and consumption. Food sovereignty also involves the implicit 
rejection of a focus on scarcity and hunger in international food policy, with a 
concerted emphasis on the productive capacity of small farmers. The potential 
of La Via Campesina’s efforts is apparent in its ability to draw together diverse 
peoples (from Latin America, to Africa, Asia, Europe and North America) and 
interests (across social strata, gender positions and other subjectivities). 
Whereas the consumption of food is a shared experience that can lead 
to mutual interest in promoting socially and culturally appropriate means of 
production, Chapter 9 exposes the tendency for consumption of high-tech 
electronic goods to lead to the concentration of access. In this chapter Elliot 
Brennan shows that the potential for collaboration is more tenuous, emerging 
from realisation that control over the supply chain for rare earth minerals— 











Resource scarcity between conflict and cooperation 15 
dependent economies. In this case, scarcity has had implications for conflict, 
but it has also provided the impetus for the development of alternative sources 
(through recycling and new mining areas), resources (through substitution) and 
demand. Because of the dispersed nature in which rare earth minerals are dis­
tributed globally, these solutions offer the potential for collaboration, especially 
among those countries less endowed with their own reserves. 
In Chapter 10, David Tickner focuses more squarely on the role of inter­
national relations and diplomats in promoting transboundary management of 
water resources. He argues that the foreign policy community can raise aware­
ness of the need for collaboration by focusing on the ecosystem health of rivers 
and the associated benefits to human and environmental wellbeing. He sug­
gests further that greater collaboration is an achievable goal, which can be 
facilitated through a set of ‘six streams’ of interventions. The implication of the 
model for improved collaboration around water management is that scarcity is 
not alleviated through conflict, but can certainly be mitigated through shared 
governance focused on the ecological role of rivers beyond the quantity of 
water they contain. 
The emphasis on the potential for international diplomacy to enable coop­
erative governance of scarce resources is also apparent in Chapter 11 by 
Victoria Jollands and Karen Fisher. In their case, the scarcity of the resource 
(tuna species) is the result of its furtive nature (many tuna species traverse large 
expanses of ocean) and the accelerating demand in the marketplace. As the 
pressures of exploitation have impacted on the availability and size of the tuna 
fisheries, there is growing awareness of the need to regulate the activities of 
the fishing boats. Rather than a source of conflict among large and wealthy 
consuming nations, Jollands and Fisher demonstrate how these characteris­
tics have facilitated the empowerment of the small South Pacific island states 
that have banded together to enable collaborative governance of fisheries. The 
experiences of these efforts points to both the potential and the challenges of 
cooperation related to resource scarcity. 
The value and significance of diverse views on scarcity 
As a whole, the contributions to this book offer a distinctive insight into the
role of scarcity in the relations among social actors who share an interest in
and a desire to exploit a natural resource. Whereas, individually, the chapters
may orient attention to specific resources, they do not provide an encyclopae­
dic introduction to the scarce resources of the world. Similarly, none of the
contributors offers an all-encompassing explanation of or solution to conflicts
related to contested resource access. They do, however, introduce a variety
of engagements with and uses of scarcity as a localised reality, a dispersed or
geographically uneven constraint on unfettered demand, a strategically cre­
ated bottleneck on supply, or a more universal manipulation of access and
regulated exploitation. These encounters with scarcity shift attention away
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recognise more fully the social nature of the tensions and opportunities that
are associated with our shared dependence on resources that are not readily
accessible to all. We are confident that, read as a collection, this book will
persuade readers to pursue cooperation—across the boundaries of disciplines,
professions and institutional positions as well as those of nation states and social
divisions—as a mechanism for more equitable and sustainable exploitation
of resources that simultaneously mitigates tensions. 
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2 Taking the scare out of scarcity 
The case of water1  
Lyla Mehta 
Introduction 
Ideas about resource scarcity and their implications for human wellbeing,
economic growth and human security lie at the heart of global policy debates.
Yet scarcity remains a contested concept, meaning different things to different
groups. In this chapter, I demonstrate that spreading fear about the planet’s
diminishing resources serves the status quo and can result in keeping poor
people poor (see Rayner, 2010). I argue that the assumption that needs and
wants are unlimited and the means to satisfy them are scarce has led to scarcity
emerging as a totalising discourse in both the North and South (see Hildyard,
2010). The ‘scare’ of scarcity has led to scarcity emerging as a political strat­
egy for powerful groups. But scarcity is not a natural condition: the problem
lies in how we see scarcity and the ways in which it is socially generated (see
Mehta, 2010). Thus, we need to focus on the fundamental issues of resource
allocation, access, entitlements and social justice, rather than drawing on sim­
plistic, neo-Malthusian and universalising notions of scarcity. These issues are
developed in this chapter through the case of water in the context of global
debates and experiences from the Global South. 
Since the mid-1990s, I have been working on the politics and social con­
struction of water scarcity and questioning how it has been naturalised in policy 
debates as well as programmes. This work began in western India in Kutch, 
Gujarat, where I looked at how large dams were made out to be the panacea of 
water scarcity (see Mehta, 2005). A few years later I was concerned with exam­
ining the intellectual history of scarcity and its application to current policy and 
practice (see Mehta, 2010). I will draw on both of these as well as more recent 
work. The discussion begins by providing a background of recent scarcity 
narratives. It then turns to mainstream debates of scarcity within econom­
ics, namely the scarcity postulate and alternative perspectives. It unpacks these 
issues within the water domain before ending with thoughts on ways forward. 
The scare of scarcity 
Of late, there has been a flurry of scarcity reports and concerns. In the late 
2000s, the global financial crises, as well as dramatic increases in world food 
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and fuel prices, were accompanied by growing concerns over climate change, 
population growth and increasing global inequalities in wealth and access to 
crucial resources. Dramatic increases in world food prices, causing much social 
unrest in both the South and North, coupled with processes of large scale land 
acquisitions—so called land and water grabs—have led to massive changes in 
local lives, livelihoods and reallocation of limited and life-sustaining resources 
(see Borras et al., 2012; Mehta et al., 2012). Since the 2008 World Economic 
Forum, key global players, including members of the corporate sector, have 
highlighted growing water, food, climate and energy security and scarcity 
threats and the need to resolve them through the so called ‘nexus’ approach 
(see Allouche et al., 2014; Hoff, 2011; SABMiller and WWF, 2014; World 
Economic Forum, 2014). 
The past few years have also witnessed growing concerns about water 
scarcity and its threat to human wellbeing and livelihoods, economic and agri­
cultural production, as well as the threat of ‘water wars’ having both national 
and international dimensions. Does all this suggest a déjà vu perhaps of the 
1970s, where resource scarcity was a prominent political concern due to the oil 
shocks and accompanying financial crises? The 1970s raised critical questions 
regarding the existence of scarcity among plenty and abundance, about the 
need to set ‘limits’ to growth (cf. Meadows et al., 1972) and about the impera­
tive for all humankind to coexist on ‘spaceship earth’, our one planet, which 
was increasingly being viewed as fragile and vulnerable. More than 40 years 
on, and in the midst of another global financial crisis, climate change poses 
new challenges to both human existence and resource availability. ‘Water wars’ 
and food shortages still appear as news stories. Resource scarcity continues to 
be linked with population growth and growing environmental conflicts, and 
science and technology or innovation are usually evoked as the appropriate 
‘solutions’. Scarcity remains an all-pervasive fact of our lives. 
Take water scarcity, for instance. Water resources are under pressure from 
a number of competing uses, which cause different resource stress dynamics in 
different regions. These competing uses include domestic consumption, use 
in food production processes, urban demand, and use in industrial processes. 
According to the European Commission (2012), pressures on water availability 
will continue to grow, not only through the need to feed and hydrate a grow­
ing global population, but also as a result of changing patterns of consumption. 
Chatham House (2012) predicts that by 2030 global water demand could out­
strip supply by 40 per cent. The Earth Security Group (2015) predicts that 
India will reach severe water stress by 2025, and that by 2030 both India and 
China will face severe water deficits. The OECD (2012) estimates that by 2050 
there will be a 55 per cent increase in global water demand. Broken down 
by sector, that means a 400 per cent increase in demand for manufacturing, a 
140 per cent increase for electricity generation and a 130 per cent increase for 
domestic use. All these reports call for innovative technologies, policy changes, 
regulation or water pricing as solutions to facilitate the market access of inno­
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to step back and ask how the problem of scarcity is being framed in the first 
place. I now turn to the intellectual history of scarcity before moving on to 
scarcity debates in the water domain. 
The legacy of the scarcity postulate: from scarcities 
to scarcity 
…the whole human existence, at least up to now, has been a bitter struggle 
against scarcity.2 
(Jean-Paul Sartre) 
Jean-Paul Sartre sums up nicely what is taken to be a given in dominant aca­
demic and policy thinking: scarcity is an all-pervasive fact of our lives and 
much of human existence has been caught up in struggles against scarcity. 
According to popular opinion, scarcity is the creation of economists. In 
part, this has to do with Lionel Robbins’ famous definition: ‘Economics is 
the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between given 
ends and scarce means which have alternative uses’ (Robbins, 1932: 16). But 
his conception was highly misleading for the 1930s when resources were not 
scarce but unavailable. 
The scarcity postulate (i.e. that human wants are unlimited and the means 
to achieve these are scarce and limited) underpins modern economics, which, 
in turn, has helped promote a universalised notion of scarcity. Nicholas Xenos 
in Scarcity and Modernity (1989) systematically shows how certain attributes of 
modernity have given rise to the universal notion of scarcity. The etymological 
roots of the word ‘scarcity’ go back to the Old Northern French word escarcté, 
which meant insufficiency of supply. Until the late nineteenth century, scar­
city connoted a temporally bounded period of scarcity or a dearth. Scarcity 
was experienced cyclically, dependent usually on poor yields. After the indus­
trial revolution—which led to cataclysmic changes creating new needs, desires 
and the frustration of desires—the concept acquired a new meaning, which 
culminated in its ‘invention’ in neoclassical economic thought of the eight­
eenth century (Xenos, 1989: 7). From scarcities, which were temporally bound 
and spatially differentiated, came the scourge of scarcity, ‘a kind of open-ended 
myth’ (ibid: 35) from which deliverance was sought. Scarcity, not a scarcity or
scarcities, was essentialised and its simplistic universalisation led to the obscuring 
of ambiguities and regional variations. In modernity, the elusive twin of scar­
city is abundance, making scarcity ‘the antagonist in the human story, a story 
with a happy ending; vanquishing of the antagonist and a life of happiness ever 
after and abundance for all’ (ibid: 35). 
Universal notions of scarcity legitimise the need to allocate and manage 
property either through the means of the market or through formalising rights 
regimes (formalisation of water rights, for example, has gained much currency 






It is thus economic goods, that is, goods that are scarce, that are made the 
objects of systematic human action. Of course, it is highly contested whether 
all ‘resources’ or goods can be viewed unproblematically as ‘economic’ goods. 
The declaration of water as an ‘economic good’ in 1992 at the Dublin confer­
ence on water and the environment (ICWE, 1992) is still deeply controversial 
in the water domain since many still feel that this legitimises the commodifica­
tion of a life-giving resource and justifies its privatisation. This is because access 
may depend on one’s ability to pay (see Dawson, 2010 and Nicol et al., 2011 
for a further discussion of these debates). 
Dominant definitions tend to privilege certain material aspects of resources 
over other cultural and public good aspects. Moreover, aggregate and tech­
nical assessments of resources rarely capture their multifaceted nature and 
embeddedness in culture, history and politics. All of this has a bearing on how 
resources are valued and thus rendered scarce or not. For example, water is 
simultaneously a natural element or H2O, essential for the ecological cycle, a 
spiritual resource for millions who worship at holy river banks and oceans, a 
commodity which can be tapped, bottled, sold and traded, and a life-giving 
element without which human survival is not possible. These multiple pur­
poses of water are rarely captured in global water assessments or dominant 
water scarcity and ‘water wars’ debates (which I will turn to shortly). 
In the environmental security discourse, analysts such as Homer-Dixon 
(2001) and Baechler (1999) have made powerful links between resource 
scarcity, population growth and conflict. Often resource scarcity is seen as a 
constant variable in the context of environmental change and the cause for 
social and political conflicts. However, as argued by Dalby (2014) and Peluso 
and Watts (2001) the real problem may lie in distributional issues and ethnic 
rivalries as well as socio-political factors. Also, as the development literature 
suggests, violence often arises from resource abundance rather than scarcity. 
This is particularly true in regions where apart from resource extraction there 
are few other economic and livelihood options (see Le Billon, 2001). 
Challenges to the scarcity postulate 
These powerful framings of scarcity have been challenged by diverse thinkers 
and disciplines that I now briefly explore. I demonstrate that there are different 
ways to view scarcity from economic, institutional, socio-political and human 
development perspectives. 
Karl Polanyi (1944; 1957) stands out as one of the few economists who 
argued that economic theory and several of its core tenets (such as scarcity) are 
not universally applicable. Instead, Polanyi underscores the principles of the 
distinction between ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ commodities, the latter being linked to 
human existence and not produced for sale (e.g. land, labour, water). Thus, mar­
ket mechanisms cannot be the sole regulators of these ‘fictitious commodities’.
Crucial is the distinction between the formal and substantive meaning of
‘economic’. Substantive economics is concerned with ‘man’s dependence for 
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his living upon nature and his fellows. It refers to the ways in which people
interact with each other and nature to satisfy their basic material wants. By 
contrast, the formal meaning of economics draws on the choice between 
the alternative uses of insufficient means’ (Polanyi, 1957: 243). According to 
Polanyi, the two are quite distinct. While the formal meaning implies choice 
between alternate uses of scarce means, the substantive meaning need nei­
ther contain choice nor insufficiency of means. He then goes on to caution 
that the current concept of economic fuses the ‘subsistence’ and the ‘scarcity’ 
meanings of economic without a sufficient awareness of the dangers to clear 
thinking inherent in that merger (ibid: 244). These debates are very relevant 
for the water domain where the multiple characteristics of water (e.g. social, 
cultural, symbolic resource) are often negated in favour of promoting water as 
an economic good. 
From anthropology, Marshall Sahlins (1972) has offered a series of critiques 
of the use of the universalist scarcity postulate. In his Stone Age Economics, 
Sahlins questions the assumption that material wants are limitless and can never 
be satisfied. He begins with the postulate that human wants can be limited and 
few. People, he claims, can enjoy material abundance and plenty with a low 
standard of living and are thus free from market obsessions with scarcity and 
instead operate under different rationalities (e.g. leisure and mobility). Hunter-
gatherers as ultimate uneconomic man! 
While both Sahlins’ and Polanyi’s contributions in debunking the scarcity 
postulate have been immense, I should also briefly mention some of the prob­
lems with their work. They have tended to overly romanticise ‘pre-modern’ 
societies in ancient Greece, Mesopotamia and those of so called tribals and 
hunter-gatherers. They also have downplayed issues such as internal conflict, 
gender imbalances, acquisitiveness and so on. This notwithstanding, their work 
highlights the importance of focusing on non-economic rationalities that shape 
human behaviour and the embeddedness of economic action in social rela­
tions, history and culture. 
Powerful critiques have also emerged from institutional perspectives. An 
impressive body of work by common property theorists has successfully dis­
credited neo-Malthusian notions concerning population growth, resource 
availability and environmental degradation. Many empirical studies from 
Europe, Africa and Asia have shown how people cooperate in times of resource 
pressure and scarcity (Berkes, 1989; Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Ostrom, 
1990). They have also shown how Hobbesian notions of anarchy, where states, 
regions and people fight over scarce resources, may not be an accurate or pre­
dictable scenario. 
In his seminal study of starvation and famines, Sen (1981; 1983) argued that 
the fixation with the per capita food availability decline (FAD) is a misleading 
way to look at hunger and famine, since hunger is more about people not hav­
ing access to food due to wider social and political arrangements as opposed to 
there not being enough food to eat. Thus, looking at per capita availability of a 
resource lacks relevant discrimination and is even more gross when applied to 
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the population of the world as a whole (Sen, 1981). Water scarcity is also often 
misleadingly perceived as per capita water availability rather than inequality in 
access to water supply (see below). 
Finally, socio-political perspectives and the focus on discourses by draw­
ing on political ecology, science studies and Foucauldian analysis urge us to 
ask how scarcity is perceived at different levels and also to explore the nature 
of relations of power and production at global and local levels (see Peet et al., 
2011). Within this approach, contestations take place at two levels: first, over 
meaning and text in the very conception of how we define water scarcity; and 
second, in competing claims and conflicts over resources. Here the focus is 
both discursive and materialist (cf. Escobar, 1996), where the nexus of power, 
ideas and social relations is the centrepiece of enquiry. Such an analysis tries 
to marry an ecological phenomenon (i.e. a shortage of food, water etc.) with 
political economy. 
All these different approaches challenge the scarcity postulate through their 
focus on meaning and culture as well as specific institutional, economic and 
socio-political contexts. Rather than seeing scarcity as a phenomenon ‘out 
there’ over which humans have no control that consequently leads to stand­
ardised responses (e.g. either conflict or cooperation), it is important to look at 
local-specific contingencies in culturally-specific meanings and traditions and 
how these are mediated by power, politics and a wider political economy. 
These issues have a bearing on scarcity politics in the water domain to which 
I now turn. 
Conventional approaches to water scarcity 
Water scarcity has emerged as one of the most pressing problems in the 
twenty-first century. Against a growing alarmism of ‘water wars’, several global 
agencies, national governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
have been concerned with emerging water ‘crises’ and the causality and solu­
tions around water scarcity. International meetings around water are regular 
occurrences. Even though the water Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
to halve the number of people without access to potable water was met in 
2012, 700 million people around the globe still lack access to safe drinking 
water. This includes 18 per cent of the rural population worldwide, of which 
47 per cent are in Sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated 2.4 billion people lack 
access to improved sanitation, with more than one billion defecating in the 
open (see HLPE, 2015). 
While annual renewable fresh water resources are adequate at global levels 
to meet human water needs (HLPE, 2015), these resources are very unevenly 
distributed across the globe. Per capita, annual renewable water resources 
are particularly low in the Middle Eastern, North African and South Asian 
regions. There are also significant variations in water availability within regions 
and countries. Uneven water resource distribution can translate into uneven 
capacity to grow food and affect food availability and access. Poor access to 
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water and access to water of poor quality also leads to adverse health outcomes 
leading to water-borne diseases that particularly affect babies and children in 
poor countries. 
In recent years, think tanks and corporate players have argued that fresh 
water scarcity presents one of the most pressing crosscutting challenges in the 
future (Chatham House, 2012; SABMiller and WWF, 2014). The European 
Commission estimates that nearly one billion people globally have no safe 
water and that, at current rates, the demand for water will have grown by 40 
per cent globally by 2030 (European Commission, 2012). The OECD predicts 
that globally more than 240 million people are expected to be without safe 
water access by 2050 (OECD, 2012). Amidst this projected increasing demand 
and the need for trade-offs among competing uses of water resources, climatic 
change means that rainfall and water availability are likely to become more 
uncertain (Steffen et  al., 2015). Many of the solutions put forward concern 
resource management, infrastructure investment and technical improvements 
that increase production efficiency or substitutability as well as mitigation and 
policymaking for resilience. 
From a nexus perspective, the use and management of water requires 
an integrated approach that takes into account both land and energy issues 
(European Commission, 2012). Since the 1990s, water sector reforms have 
been influenced by the concept of Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM), which calls for ‘co-ordinated development and management of 
water, land and related resources, in order to maximize welfare in an equitable 
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’ (GWP, 
2000: 22). IWRM is thus broadly in line with a water-energy-land (WEL) 
nexus perspective (European Commission, 2012). However, as a vast literature 
has revealed, IWRM has tended to be idealised, abstract and difficult to imple­
ment, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where complex formal and informal 
rights, as well as customary land and water arrangements, prevail (see Mehta 
et al., 2016). IWRM implementation, in fact, may have resulted in an unwar­
ranted policy focus on managing water instead of improving poor people’s 
access to water. Furthermore, the newly created institutional arrangements 
have often been prone to elite capture and failed to address historically rooted 
inequalities (ibid). 
Other dominant solutions to scarcity involve technical and market-driven 
approaches. As discussed, since the Dublin Declaration of 1992, water is increas­
ingly seen as having economic value in all its competing uses. Accordingly, 
efficient resource management is equated with water having a price and the 
price signal is thus evoked as a way to solve water scarcity problems (see 
Finger and Allouche, 2002). Thus, in the past two decades, water has moved 
away from being viewed as a common good (however impure) and a pub­
lic service to a commodity being managed according to economic principles 
(ibid). In part, this has to do with the growing influence of powerful players, 
such as the World Bank and transnational corporations that have paved the 
























‘efficiency’ and ‘scarcity’, solutions have included water reallocation through 
water markets, water permits and different privatisation models. Private sec­
tor involvement in water provision was also imposed on many debt-ridden 
countries in the course of the economic restructuring of the 1990s. There 
are strong arguments claiming that poor people are willing to pay for water 
(Altaf et al., 1992) and, relatively speaking, poor people pay far more than the 
rich for water (see below). Still, experiences with privatisation of water have 
not always been poor friendly (see Bakker 2010; Finger and Allouche, 2002: 
McDonald and Ruiters, 2005; Dawson, 2010). One reason has to do with 
the nature of water markets. The high level of monopoly and low competi­
tion do not naturally lead to high responsiveness to user needs, and there is 
often no incentive to service non-profit-making sectors (such as rural areas 
and the urban poor) or to invest in unprofitable sectors (such as wastewater 
and sanitation) (see Finger and Allouche, 2002). Often prices have been raised 
beyond agreed levels within a few years of privatisation, and people who 
could not pay have been cut off (for South African examples, see McDonald 
and Ruiters, 2005; Dawson, 2010). 
In this section, I have focused on the dominant portrayals of and ‘solutions’ 
to water scarcity and some of the negative impacts on poor people. I now turn 
to alternative framings and perspectives. 
The value of alternative perspectives on water access and 
scarcity 
Water resources have particular characteristics that make them distinct from
other natural resources. Water is fluid in nature and mostly a renewable
resource. This means that the availability of water fluctuates in space and
time and this is relevant when assessing water allocation and actual water
distribution. Water scarcity is a complex phenomenon and can be analysed
differently from social, political, meteorological, hydrological and agricultural
perspectives (Falkenmark and Lannerstad, 2005). Scarcity of water is typically
examined through two lenses. The first is ‘physical water scarcity’, which
compares the amount of renewable water annually available per capita in
a particular area with pre-determined thresholds to identify water-stressed
and water-scarce areas, respectively (Falkenmark and Widstrand, 1992). The
second lens is ‘economic water scarcity’ (CA, 2007). This refers to the fact
that physical availability of water does not necessarily mean that water is
available for use or is accessed. In some areas, while there may be abundant
water available, the lack of infrastructure means that the water is not avail­
able where it is needed, or of an appropriate quality for use. For example,
according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2011),
an estimated 51 million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo— 
around three quarters of the population—had no access to safe drinking water
in 2011, even though the country is considered water rich, with more than
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economic water scarcity or lack of investment, appropriate infrastructure or
management—rather than physical water scarcity—to provide for the needs
of the population, including water for food security and nutrition. It must,
however, be stated that both these portrayals of scarcity tend to direct atten­
tion to natural and economic forces rather than addressing human-induced
land and water use practices, socio-political considerations and how scarcity
can be socially mediated or constructed (Mehta, 2005; UNDP, 2006). 
These lenses do not necessarily consider the way in which the distribution 
of and control over water is socially differentiated by gender, caste, race, occu­
pation and other categories. Sen’s (1981; 1993) entitlements approach, when 
applied to water, indicates that some people’s lack of water does not necessarily 
imply that water is scarce. Instead, it has more to do with the fact that certain 
parts of the population are unable to gain access to water for one reason or 
another, be it that water is too highly priced, lack of infrastructure or due to 
social exclusion. Some groups may suffer from lack of water even when there 
is no decline in water availability in the region. Thus, water shortages (like 
famines) are entitlement failures. 
Aggregate views of water scarcity can, therefore, be problematic because 
they could hide real inequalities in water access determined by property rights, 
social and political institutions, and cultural and gender norms. People’s lack 
of access to water might have little to do with physical scarcity, per se, but 
may instead be due to exclusions arising from social positioning, gender or 
because of the way water is managed, priced and regulated (Mehta, 2014; 
UNDP, 2006). For example, deeply rooted traditional or historical inequalities 
can limit women’s and other vulnerable groups’ access to land and thereby to 
water for agricultural uses, which hampers livelihood strategies and negatively 
impacts food security. 
Gender and other markers of identities continue to mould water allocation 
and access among users. Cultural norms in much of the developing world 
dictate that women and girls are responsible for water collection, and they 
may spend several hours per day collecting water. Unequal power relations 
within the household, and women’s minimal control over household finances 
or spending, can force women into a daily trudge (taking precious time) for 
fetching cheaper or free untreated water, which may result in health prob­
lems or increased poverty and destitution. This time could instead be used to 
focus on livelihood and agricultural activities, attending school and improving 
maternal and infant health (Mehta, 2014; WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring 
Programme, 2012). This situation is worsened by the fact that women are 
often excluded from decision-making processes regarding water management 
projects or natural resource allocation (FAO, 2012). 
According to the 2006 Human Development Report, which focuses in 
depth on water scarcity from a human development perspective, the global 
water crisis is overwhelmingly a crisis for the poor. The distribution of water 
access in many countries mirrors the distribution of wealth, and vast inequali­










lack access to clean water, and more than 660 million people without adequate 
sanitation, live on less than two dollars per day. Furthermore, not only do the 
poorest people get access to less water, and to water that is less clean and safe, 
but they also pay some of the world’s highest water prices (UNDP, 2006: 7). 
It notes that ‘the poorest 20 per cent of households in Argentina, El Salvador, 
Jamaica and Nicaragua allocate more than 10 per cent of their spending to 
water. In Uganda, water payments represent as much as 22 per cent of the 
average income of urban households in the poorest 20 per cent of the income 
distribution’ (UNDP, 2006: 51). 
In some severe situations, uneven power relationships and the absence of 
appropriately implemented water rights frameworks can open up the pos­
sibility of ‘water grabs’ (UNDP, 2006). According to Franco et  al. (2013: 
1653–1654), ‘water grabbing is a process in which powerful actors are able 
to take control of, or reallocate to their own benefit, water resources used by 
local communities or which feed aquatic ecosystems on which their liveli­
hoods are based’. They have shown how the land that is coveted by investors 
is often made out to be ‘unproductive’, ‘scarce’ or ‘idle’, thus justifying access 
rights to private companies and investors. These have usually led to the ero­
sion of local people’s rights to land and water, often nested in informal and 
customary systems. 
These and other conflict situations can exacerbate unequal or lack of access 
to water, threaten provisions of water and divert attention from food produc­
tion to other priorities. In such situations, the poor become the victims not 
only of the conflict itself but also of hunger and water-borne diseases. Water 
insecurities also persist in occupied areas such as Palestine when restricted water 
withdrawals enforce unequal access and use. For example, Israelis consume 
more than three times as much water per capita per day (300 litres compared 
to 73 litres), but strict military orders restrict water withdrawals and access for 
Palestinians living in occupied areas (Gasteyer et al., 2012). 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of a typology to analyse and understand dif­
ferent portrayals of water scarcity (building on Wolfe and Brooks, 2003). It 
distinguishes between four kinds of scarcity: physical, economic, third order 
and socially constructed scarcity. Under each, the table provides the main 
characteristics, the disciplinary underpinnings and the accompanying solutions. 
Largely, global agencies draw on physical and economic characteristics of scar­
city, which results in a focus on the relationship between supply and demand 
(1 and 2) rather than on scarcity arising due to problems of lifestyle or socio­
political processes (3 and 4). 
Problems arise when the solutions to the problems of scarcity lead to
either simplistic supply or demand management kinds of solutions. Supply
management results in augmenting water to various sectors, while demand
management seeks to reduce demand or improve water management
(see Lankford, 2010 and Molden et al., 2003). These are mostly required
and appropriate interventions but may not get to the heart of the scar­
city problem. Large-scale technical and engineering solutions are deployed
(1) Physical / first order (2) Economic/ second order (3) Third order scarcity/ (4) Scarcity arising through 
scarcity scarcity adaptive capacity socio-political processes 
Characteristics Volumetric quantities Inadequate development of Social, political and Scarcity as a product of 
Population growth water infrastructure economic context of discursive and socio­
Projection of future demand Poor management and water management political processes 
Industrial growth institutional arrangements Entitlements failures 
Water management Enhancing supply through Water reallocation through Social adaptive capacity Deliberation 
solution storage (e.g. small v/s water markets through education, Decision making 
large dams debate) Water reform cultural change and processes 
Desalination Technological fixes lifestyle change Equity and reallocation 
Extra basin transfer of water Pricing 
Increasing efficiency 
Access solution	 MDGs Water as an economic good Social adaptive capacity Redistribution/ 
Lifelines Pricing through education, enhancing equity 
Privatisation cultural change and Instituting entitlements 
Community management/ Lifestyle change to water (e.g. human 
PPPs Decision making right to water) 
Table 2.1 Diverse ways to view scarcity 
































to augment water supplies (e.g. through storage systems, reservoirs and
groundwater recharging). The solutions are largely concerned with the
technical and economic aspects of scarcity. The assumption here is that
scarcity is a ‘biophysical’ condition, which should be countered by ‘wise
management’ practices. Instead, scarcity is a highly localised issue, subject
to both local conditions and interpretations by different actors. It is also
very much a political issue. 
Further nuances are provided by political science and international relations 
literature that focuses on third order scarcity referring to the socio-political, 
technological and cultural changes that a society must undertake to deal with 
scarcity (see, for example, Ohlsson and Turton, 2000; Wolfe and Brooks, 
2003). But these debates do not focus upfront on the social relations underly­
ing resource use as discussed earlier in this chapter. They also lack the political 
ecology focus on how the ‘problem’ of scarcity is constructed and how a 
problematic framing might exacerbate scarcity conditions; on the need to dis­
aggregate users and their entitlements; and on the politics of distribution within 
a frame of political economy. Finally, most debates ignore both the multiple 
aspects of scarcity and the appropriation of water by powerful actors. The 
resulting interventions, such as ‘integrated water resource management’ as dis­
cussed above, can intensify control over the resource and existing inequities 
(cf. Mehta et al., 2016). 
This is why Nicholas Hildyard (2010) focuses on how scarcity often
emerges as a political strategy. While numerous empirical studies locate the
cause of deprivation in power imbalances and struggles over access to and
control over resources, neo-Malthusianism has shifted focus to population
growth as a cause of absolute scarcity in the future. Neo-Malthusianism is
used to colonise the future to serve particular interests, be it to privatise
the commons or water or promote biotechnology. The fear of unbridled
population growth in the future is used to legitimise the present takeover
of a range of resources. Projections and scares of future resource crises and a
Malthusian world (witness, for example, current debates on climate change,
mass migration and resource scarcity) are privileged over how local people
live with and have adapted to scarcity conditions in specific contexts.
In my own work, I have found it helpful to distinguish between ‘lived/
experienced’ scarcity (something that local people experience cyclically due
the biophysical shortage of food, water, fodder etc.) and ‘constructed’ scarcity
(something that is manufactured through socio-political processes to suit the
interests of powerful players—for example, the dam-building lobby and the
interests of rich irrigators and agro-industrialists in Gujarat, India (see Mehta,
2005)). Official discourses portray scarcity as natural (rather than human-
induced) and universal (rather than something that is cyclical). The external
‘essentialised’ notions of scarcity generated by state and donor discourses and
programmes are often quite different from local people’s knowledge systems
and livelihood strategies that allow them to adapt to the unpredictability and
temporary scarcity of water (ibid). 
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Conclusions 
By taking the case of water, I have demonstrated that scarcity is often seen to be 
a universal phenomenon in both academic and policy discourses. Scarcity is a 
bit of a dangerous idea. It seduces; it is appealing. It is a political strategy for cer­
tain powerful actors to appropriate resources and the future to their advantage. 
Scarcity as a concept can provide meta-level explanations for a wide range 
of phenomena over which humans ostensibly have no control. Thus, scarcity 
emerges as a trope for the justification of need, it becomes a technical term that 
justifies certain action and solutions. Solutions usually lie in deploying markets, 
innovation, science and technology—for example, the new ‘blue revolution’ 
and more irrigation systems for Africa, controversial water privatisations or 
expansion into Mars, and so on—to meet earth’s water needs. Technology is 
presumed to be neutral and its ‘solutions’ are supposed to transcend politics. 
But in reality, technology and techniques are deeply political, and contestations 
around technological solutions—be they around large dams, India’s fantastical 
river interlinking project or water privatisation—are sites of politics (both in 
the cultural and material realm). 
What are the ways forward? We need to link the discursive framings of what 
we mean by scarcity and how we determine what is scarce. Governmentality 
(i.e. the technologies and rationalities of the state) is key to understanding 
how issues of scarcity can legitimise policy and we need to be aware of wider 
political and economic forces that tend to aggravate and perpetuate scarcity. 
Clearly, simplistic portrayals of resource ‘crises’ must be challenged, and local 
realities need to be a part of policy responses to resource management and 
allocation processes. 
I believe that there is sufficient food, water and energy on this planet to go 
around. Famines and water shortages are often the result of failures of allocation, 
especially to the poor and powerless. It is flawed to attribute these problems to 
‘nature’ rather than humanity (see Rayner, 2010). Thus, it is important to shift 
away from a language of scarcity to the issues of resource allocation, access, 
entitlements and rights. 
The global financial crisis of 2008 made it clear that the idea of a perfect 
and frictionless market system is a myth. As Polanyi in 1944 reminded us, 
the market is always embedded in culture, history and politics and scarcity 
is not something that is just the creation of market forces. The idea of sta­
ble markets around which scarcity is the norm is a myth. This needs to give 
way to approaches that acknowledge the role of the symbolic, the reciprocal, 
the substantive, the political, the uneconomic and maybe even the irrational. 
This means revisiting the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, Karl Polanyi, Ivan 
Illich and heterodox perspectives within economics, while also drawing on 
complementary anthropological and socio-political perspectives to scarcity. It 
also urges us to be more upfront about social and power relations as well as 
historical and cultural specificities around resources, which can ultimately help 




































Since notions of scarcity often lead to an erasure of issues of equity,
scale, embeddedness and locality, there may be the need to recover dif­
ferent notions, for instance, of the ‘good’ and the ‘commons’. This would
mean rejecting processes that lead to the commodification and enclosure
of resources and commons that undermine local people’s rights and liveli­
hoods (see Franco et al., 2013; Mehta et al., 2012). Regaining the commons
is also about promoting just decision-making processes, and curtailing
those who unseeingly and overbearingly exercise power over the weak and
marginalised. 
It is also important to critically engage with notions of limits. It is over 40
years since the Club of Rome funded the Limits to Growth (LtG) (Meadows
et al., 1972) report which drew on now discredited doomsday predictions
of resource use, production, pollution and population growth through
computer simulation models. Despite all the problems with the work,
the imperative to limit needs and consumption patterns cannot be denied
because it is the drive for abundance that leads to never-ending needs,
wants and desires. Here the degrowth movement, which is a political, eco­
nomic and social movement that pushes for the downscaling of production
and consumption with an aim of maximising happiness and human wellbe­
ing through non-consumptive means, can provide some important lessons
(Demaria et al., 2013; Kallis, 2015). While this is still more a movement in
the Global North—and it is important to acknowledge that the satisfaction
of needs, wants and desires in the North can sometimes lead to deprivation
in the Global South (Sopher, 2006)—this movement and others are calling
for new ways of being and living. For example, feminists have been call­
ing for the recognition and value of care and social reproduction in green
economy debates (e.g. Salleh, 2009; Vaughan, 2007). There are debates for
replacing efficiency with sufficiency (Mehta, 2010; Salleh, 2009), and for
a focus on communing and ‘enough’ as well as more fundamental ‘green
transformations’ that restructure production, consumption and political– 
economic relations along truly sustainable pathways (Wichterich, 2012).
These arguments link with growing narratives and action around alter­
native economies and solidarity economies (Unmüßig et  al., 2012), and
powerful examples of collective organising and social movement activism
around the world. 
To conclude: scarcity is not necessarily natural or universal. But uni­
versalised notions of scarcity have tended to evoke a standardised set of
market/institutional and technological solutions as the (universal) fix,
which have blocked out political contestation around access as a legitimate
focus for academic and policy debates. It is time to write the obituary of
the universal legacy of the scarcity postulate and develop new imaginaries
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Notes 
1 Some parts of this chapter draw on Mehta (2010). I am grateful to the editors for 
their very helpful comments and patience and to Alice Shaw for her help with copy-
editing and formatting this chapter. 
2 Jean-Paul Satre in Xenos (1989). 
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3 Cooperation in the power sector to 
advance regionalisation processes 
and sustainable energy flows 
Andreas Lindström, Kevin Rosner and Jakob Granit 
Introduction 
Regional development and growth, energy security, sustainable environmental
systems and human prosperity are tied together (Söderbaum and Granit, 2014).
Secure energy provision and healthy ecosystems capable of delivering life-
supporting ecosystem services provide the basis on which our economic system
functions (Granit and Rosner, 2012). Natural resources serve as a key input
to power generation. Energy produced, increasingly in the form of electricity,
enables economic and social system services. Transport, commercial, industrial,
communication and information systems all depend on a secure and reliable
supply of energy. Without adequate energy supply a modern economy cannot
function and inadequacies in energy supply may be translated into the poor
economic performance of specific regions or countries. This has been well doc­
umented in the recently concluded UNFCCC Paris Agreement on Climate
Change (UNGA, 2015) and the UN ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development’. Target 7 of the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), to ‘Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy
for all’, highlights this relationship. 
Because energy sources are unevenly distributed across different geographies,
energy systems and markets typically span political borders thereby locking
countries into trade relationships. If energy security is threatened it can become
a threat multiplier contributing to state insecurity (Granit and Lindström, 2012).
It is important to highlight that the sourcing and transformation of natural
resources into electricity on a regional basis can help in evening out the peaks
and valleys of physical resource availability. Transforming raw commodities into
electric power in effect can address the issue of scarcity by transiting the end
product, electricity, from resource rich areas where electricity can be generated
to energy poor ones. 
The formation of ‘macro regions’, defined loosely as a number of states that 
share a geographical relationship and levels of mutual interdependence, can be 
catalysed for several different reasons (Nye, 1968). Different countries might 
share joint ambitions to achieve specific targets of political, economic, envi­
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collaboration, expansion of cooperation at several different levels is often an 
outcome of initiated partnerships (Söderbaum and Granit 2014; Wilde, 2015). 
Most importantly, a regional conceptualisation of a market for generated power 
(electricity) may eclipse territorial boundaries, provide expanded access to 
energy commodities, and accordingly—and importantly—transform the vision 
of the market by tangibly expanding along trade and commercial pathways that 
already exist. 
The concept of regionalism, which ‘refers to the common objectives, values 
and identities that lead to region-formation and regional cooperation within a 
given geographical area’ (Söderbaum and Granit, 2014: 7), is theoretically rele­
vant when analysing energy and cooperation. Cooperating in different regional 
configurations to reach mutual benefit is not a new concept. However, the 
patterns and characteristics of regional cooperation have changed in step with 
globalisation and the existing world order. ‘Classic’ regionalism as defined in a 
post-World War II era was very much influenced by bi-polar Cold War logic 
and, as such, characterised by sector specific cooperation, protectionism as well 
as exclusiveness in terms of membership (Söderbaum and Granit, 2014). New 
order regionalism, however, is shaped by a multipolar world and is character­
ised by being more extrovert and inclusive in terms of membership and being 
more comprehensive and multipurpose in terms of focus (ibid). 
The concept of governance is a key defining aspect in all types of regional 
formations. Governance can be defined as ‘spheres of authority at all levels 
of human activity that amount to systems of rule in which goals are pursued 
through the exercise of control’ (Rosenau, 1997: 145). A traditional concept 
of governance in terms of international relations defined by clear borders, 
separation and non-interference is becoming increasingly dysfunctional in a 
globalised world (ibid). Governance systems tailored to modern region build­
ing is therefore multi-layered and can include a range of actors, public and 
private, formal and informal, and they are not to be confused with government 
(Söderbaum and Granit, 2014). Though regional governance systems and con­
nected institutions are positively recognised, they are most often characterised 
as ‘nested systems’ (ITFGPG, 2006). This means that different levels of gov­
ernance (local, regional, national, macro regional, global) are intertwined in 
systems both competing with and complementing each other (Olsen, Page and 
Ochoa, 2009). 
Nested systems have, among other reasons, evolved out of specific manage­
ment needs not easily confined to one specific scale (ITFGPG, 2006). This 
is not least true for transboundary water management as well as for energy 
development. The degree of regional development and the progressiveness of 
incorporated governance systems will influence both natural resources manage­
ment and economic and energy development in a globalised world. Likewise, 
heightened pressures on and demand for water and energy resources will serve 
as catalysts forming new regional dynamics and relationships. 
Questions addressing resource scarcity, power generation technologies and
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world’s energy regions. This chapter provides some initial insight into how coop­
erative actions on energy matters preceded, as one example, the effective creation
and transboundary functioning of the European Union (EU) itself. Elsewhere,
power pooling has allowed and facilitated EU member and non-member states,
exemplified by Sweden and Norway respectively, to coordinate the dispatch of
electricity across Europe’s northern frontier to provide security, stability and cer­
tainty of energy access to members of the Nordic Power Pool. Finally, in Southern
Africa power pooling, managed and coordinated by the Southern Africa Power
Pool (SAPP), preceded as a direct result of the creation of the Southern Africa
Development Community as a mechanism for binding Africa’s front-line states
together with post-apartheid South Africa. We argue in this chapter that regional
peace and stability, economic growth and improved human security can be gen­
erated by and through the effective, competitive and rational sharing of electricity
across national borders. Power pools provide a sum greater than their parts and,
in doing so, establish cooperative methods of discourse and decision making that
transcend the territorial boundaries of the nation state through a positive burst of
tangible synergy allowing for sustainable energy choices. 
Case studies on cooperation in the power sector 
The EU 
The EU is today one of the largest economies in the world when compared 
to individual countries as well as economic regions, and the largest trader of 
manufactured goods and services (European Commission, 2014). The impact 
of European cooperation on the EU has produced several interesting observa­
tions related to the development of regional cooperation on energy issues. 
The evolution of what is today one of the world’s most successful economic 
entities has not always been smooth; there have been several setbacks. It should 
also be mentioned that motivations for economic and energy cooperation were 
partially grounded in a will to reach political agreement and in doing so to 
minimise the risk of resumed violent conflict. Cooperation on coal, the main 
energy resource at the time, and steel as well as economic integration was iden­
tified as the path of least possible resistance to obtain this. 
What was to become the EU was born out of conflict. Devastated by World
War II, the ‘Treaty of Paris’, signed in 1951 by Great Britain, West Germany,
Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium, marked the start of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and laid the foundation for what would
eventually be the EU. Simultaneously, the treaty based on energy and natu­
ral resources trade formed the first ever organisation built on the concept of
‘supranationalism’ (Mason, 1955). This refers to a multinational political entity
where an authority composed of member state governments is delegated agreed
elements of power (Martin, 2004). The core purpose of the newly found collabo­
ration was stated by the then French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, as being
to make war ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’ (EU, 2015). 
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The vision to pursue unification through economic cooperation can be seen 
as a continuation of the inter-war period between World War I and World 
War II, when attempts were pursued to forge economic links through interna­
tional trade cartels in order to prevent new conflicts. These early attempts were 
insufficient in preventing the outbreak of World War II. In spite of this failure, 
economic integration was again attempted in the post-World War II era. This 
is mainly because there were few other options that could be deemed realistic 
at the time (Gerbet, 1956). Interest in other forms of political cooperation was 
considerably low and the idea of a unified Europe was non-existent. The form 
of cooperation was negotiated and established through the so-called ‘Schuman 
Plan’, after the French minister, with the overall purpose to reach political 
cooperation through providing economic opportunity (Kiersch, 1963). 
There are many reasons why the coal and steel sectors were selected to 
pursue regionalisation in Europe. In the aftermath of World War II, Europe’s 
industrial infrastructure was shattered; collaboration was one way of address­
ing the reality that important natural resources were located in one part of the 
continent while industrial capacity was located in another (Schmidt, 1968). 
Collaboration in relation to coal and steel, central to warfare and defence, also 
made sense for a weakened Europe in order to protect it from other possible 
external threats emerging in the wake of the war. Though things would soon 
change, coal and steel were still considered basic industries hosting similar ration­
alisation, investment and organisational principles internationally (Haas, 1958).
To support the overarching aim of the ECSC to usher in greater political sta­
bility in Europe, cooperation on coal and steel made sense on both symbolic 
and economic levels. 
Favourable traits of the sectors, from political and symbolic standpoints, 
were that they were built on historical traditions, geopolitical realities and that 
they could generate relative consensus (Mioche, 1998). This might also explain 
some of the challenges experienced when trying to integrate coal and steel 
markets as no pre-feasibility studies on the suitability of these priorities were 
made prior to selecting these sectors (Gerbet, 1956). 
The official opening of the common market for coal and steel was in February 
1953 (EU, 2017). From the outset compliance with policies was problematic. 
Forms of subsidies and cartelisation as well as the lack of pricing transparency 
continued in the nations of the ECSC (Alter and Steinberg, 2007). The idea 
of supranationalism had not yet emerged among ECSC nations that sought 
growth and job protection mainly defined in strict ‘national terms’ (Alter and 
Steinberg, 2007). In this regard, the idea of increased competition through an 
integrated market did not necessarily align with perceived national objectives; 
at the outset ECSC policies were largely followed when deemed convenient. 
The ECSC did, however, provide other goods beyond the economic field 
in overall support of strengthening regional development. Investments aimed 
to increase welfare for coal and steel industry workers provided support to 
financing housing as well as redeployment costs related to lost jobs due to the 
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The European Economic Community (EEC) can be seen as a continuation 
of the economic integration component of the ECSC. The EEC had in its 
mission for expanding economic cooperation the intention to create a single 
integrated market for all industrial goods and to facilitate the free movement of 
capital, services and people. Within ten years of signing the Treaty of Rome 
the value of trade quadrupled between member countries (Gabel, 2010). The 
EEC facilitated a merger with existing ECSC institutions as well as adding 
new ones. The EEC was a big and largely successful step towards an integrated 
European market. The key goals of the EEC in stimulating economic activity, 
promoting economic expansion and improving living standards in member 
countries were in many regards met. War torn economies were allowed to 
recover successfully. The EEC managed to rid barriers to internal trade and 
harmonise common policies supporting intra-trade relationships. 
Positive outcomes from enhanced economic collaboration of the EEC paved
the way to, again, push for the concept of European supranationalism. The 1992
Maastricht Treaty (also known as the ‘Treaty of the European Union’) unified the
existing European treaties (ECSC, Euroatom, EEC/EC) in a new form of cooper­
ation (Bradley, 2011). Energy cooperation has concurrently developed, resulting in
more common regional energy policies. Though energy cooperation and integra­
tion has not evolved at the same pace as economic collaboration since the ECSC,
EU nations are today bound by several common policy frameworks on energy
(Maltby, 2013). A prominent example includes the EU 2020 policy with aims to
reduce CO2 emissions by 20 per cent and increase renewable energy by 20 per cent
with a 20 per cent increase in energy efficiency by 2020 (ibid). A strategy towards
2030 has also been agreed boosting the targets from the 2020 policy to reach even
more ambitious targets. These targets include a 40 per cent cut in greenhouse
gas emissions compared to 1990 levels, a 27 per cent share of renewable energy
consumption and 27 per cent energy savings compared with the business-as-usual
scenario (Europe Documents, 1 January 2014). However, in February 2015 the
EC announced a new project of exploring ways to form an energy union with a
focus on reliable, affordable sustainable and competitive energy supply. 
In February 2015, the EC launched a vision to form an energy union in 
response to increasing energy demand and interconnected challenges. The 
vision states that the EU shall achieve secure, affordable and climate-friendly 
energy (European Commission, 2015). The vision includes delivery in five 
key policy areas: the first area is to achieve energy security through better 
diversification of its energy sources and increase energy efficiency for internally 
produced energy; second the EU aims to remove all internal barriers (techni­
cal and regulatory) and enable free flowing energy across the region regulated 
by one fully integrated market; third is reducing imports by reducing energy 
consumption, which will also reduce energy related pollution; fourth is to 
encourage private infrastructure investments and to renew the European emis­
sions trading scheme, and take strong action to reach a global deal for climate 
change; and the final policy area includes investing in science and low-carbon 
technologies supported by private sector investments. 
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The move towards a fully integrated energy region will harmonise what 
is presently 28 different national regulatory frameworks and ensure customer 
influence and adjusted, functioning infrastructure to better accommodate 
increased renewable energy generation (CICERO Group, 2015). The energy 
union adheres to the same principal understanding of a unified Europe as 
other EU bodies or functions. Greater interdependence between EU states to 
shore-up energy supply through further market integration and infrastructure 
development is a key motivation. 
A second motivation is the EU’s firm identification of the need to make 
a transition to a de-carbonised economy powered by a low-carbon energy 
future. The energy union, through the harmonisation of energy market func­
tions and investments in clean energy technologies and science, will support 
the EU ambition of becoming the world leader in renewable energy. As the 
EU is currently making good progress on ambitious climate targets the energy 
union will help to stimulate the development of competitive renewable energy 
options and boost its implementation through adjusting market rules and by 
investing in smart grid energy demand response solutions. 
Another objective is the identification of opportunities embedded in what 
can be perceived as shifts in the global economy. It is envisioned that the low-
carbon transition will create new sectors, jobs and skill sets. By leading the 
curve, the EU is positioning itself to become a key actor, as other countries 
follow suit. 
In short, despite temporary setbacks early payoffs from closer economic 
cooperation provided enough incentives to continue to deepen this type of 
relationship building. The case of Europe also seems to support the notion 
that trying to impose supranational structures too early will not be successful. 
Giving up decision-making power at early stages can be perceived as a threat 
to national sovereignty and self-determination. 
When economic integration and other types of development cooperation 
have sufficiently evolved, trust in supranational institutions may become a real­
ity; however, there needs to be a good balance with national decision-making 
powers to maintain the support for broad scale regionalisation processes such 
as the EU. A half century after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the success of 
European integration is evident in most parameters examined. As for political 
stability, there have been no major interstate conflicts between member states 
since the signing of the treaty. Economic interdependencies undermine the 
fundaments of such conflicts. 
Energy cooperation has been a central part of European development suc­
cess from the beginning not least as an enabler and catalyst for overall economic 
integration, which has been at the core of region-building activities to date. 
The close connections between energy developments, sustained economic 
growth and emerging environmental challenges indicate a return of energy 
integration issues to the forefront of EU politics. The possible emergence of a 
European energy union would be a sensible and credible step along the lines 
of stronger integration, tackling challenges through eliminating barriers in the 
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energy sector and by pooling energy resources to an even higher degree than 
is presently the case. 
This EU case study provides several noteworthy takeaways. First, coop­
eration on energy (i.e. coal and energy economics) offers one of a limited 
number of avenues available to stabilise relations in regions severely affected by 
conflict. Second, energy security and economic integration go hand in hand 
where integration of markets for trading energy resources offer a platform for 
strengthened economic integration and progress. Third, political unification 
can be a positive spin-off from cooperation on energy and economic exchange. 
Fourth, receptivity to supranational structures increases as a consequence of 
other successful types of cooperation and integration. 
The Nordic sub-region 
As the first deregulated and fully integrated electricity market in the world, 
the Nordic power market known as Nord Pool is in many respects the most 
mature and developed power pool by any standard (Carlsson, 1999). Several 
others are found in Continental Europe, North America and in parts of Africa 
ranging in levels of development from mature to underdeveloped (Musiliu and 
Pollitt, 2014). Electricity transfers and trade started between the Nordic coun­
tries in the 1960s in order to meet variations in demand on daily to yearly basis. 
By the mid-1970s all Nordic countries (with the exception of Iceland) were 
interconnected through a shared power grid (earlier connections between 
Finland and Russia already existed) (Grönkvist, Stenkvist and Paradis, 2008). 
More recently, concrete expansion plans include extensions (either new links 
or improved existing ones) to the Netherlands, Lithuania, Estonia and possibly 
Great Britain. 
Hydropower is a dominant source of electricity among most Nordic coun­
tries. On average, hydropower supplies 45 per cent of electricity to the Nordic 
region and is the main supplier of renewable electricity, comprising close to 
100 per cent of all power production in Norway and approximately 50 per 
cent in Sweden (IEA, 2008). In the latter country, hydropower has been devel­
oped for over a century with major investments taking place in the early to 
mid-twentieth century as a key component enabling Sweden’s rapid indus­
trialisation and subsequent economic growth trajectory. Today most rivers 
in Sweden with an exploitable hydropower potential have been developed 
with hydropower plants, amounting to approximately 2100 plants, most with 
a capacity of less than 10 MW. Sweden has implemented environmental leg­
islation in different stages while preventing hydropower construction on some 
major rivers. Hydropower is currently the main option for energy storage in 
the Nordic electric system providing regulatory services in the energy system 
for meeting peak demand and also by enabling deployment of other renewable 
energy sources such as wind power. 
Norway was the first Nordic country to deregulate its electricity market in 
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performance and particularly with regard to demand forecasting, which repeat­
edly projected capacity that greatly exceeded demand (Bye and Hope, 2005). 
Moves to facilitate deregulation had already begun in Norway in the 1970s. 
Electricity was predominately sold on long-term contracts between consum­
ers and producers. The contractual arrangements between different producers 
safeguarded that quotas could be met within respective concessional areas. 
Combined with the irregularity of hydropower production, the formation of 
a power exchange among power producers was organised as a spot market in 
1972 and emerged as an effective response (ibid). In similar fashion deregula­
tion occurred in Sweden (1996), Denmark (1999) and Finland (1999). Other 
Nordic countries subsequently joined the Norwegian power exchange, which 
was then expanded to include transmission systems as well. Today the Baltic 
states are also part of Nord Pool. 
To understand how electricity trading functions in the Nordic power pool 
one must be aware of different distribution systems along with their associated 
ownership structures. The Swedish electricity grid is approximately 555,000 
kilometres long with 360,000 kilometres of ground lines and 195,000 kilometres
of overhead lines with average system delivery reliability at 99.98 per cent 
(Svensk Energi, 2017). As part of the Swedish ‘zero-vision’ strategy regarding 
power delivery, weather-proofing the system has played a central role in reli­
ability. This has primarily focused on replacing especially sensitive overhead 
lines with underground lines for better protection during occasional storms, 
which constitute the biggest threat to supply disruptions. 
There are essentially three organisational structures for transmission net­
works. The national grid, owned by the state-run authority ‘Svenska Kraftnät’, 
spans the country and consists of 15,000 kilometres of cables enabling long 
distance transport (Nordic Electricity Exchange and the Nordic Model for a 
Liberalized Electricity Market, n.d.). These cables connect production sites to 
other countries at 16 different points in addition to regional (intrastate) grids 
within the country enabled by 160 transformation and junction stations (Svensk 
Energi, 2017). Most cables on the national grid have a capacity of 400 kV
while a smaller proportion has a capacity of 220 kV, both using alternating 
current (AC) (ibid). Svenska Kraftnät is also responsible for making sure that 
power production and consumption are evenly matched. However, this does 
not include responsibility for production, which rests with the electric power 
generating companies themselves. They in turn predicate electricity output on 
cyclical demand forecasts and trade volumes from the common spot market. 
Another important task for Svenska Kraftnät is to maintain sufficient power 
reserves when demand periodically eclipses supply. Regulated by Swedish 
law, Kraftnät is responsible for maintaining approximately 2000 MW of spare 
capacity during the winter season (Miljö- och energidepartementet, 2003). 
The regional grid(s) has the primary purpose of transferring electricity between 
the national and local grids. Regional grids are consequently operated by dis­
tribution companies affiliated with major power producing companies through 
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certain specified capacities and are normally reserved for higher voltages. Line 
concessions are authorised for 40-year increments and are renewable (ibid). 
Nord Pool is divided into two physical markets and one financial market 
(Nord Pool Spot, 2017). The spot market or the market for trading elec­
tricity for physical delivery is organised to accommodate short-term trades. 
Approximately 85 per cent of power trade takes place on the spot market 
(Energimarknadsinspektionen, 2015). The spot market (exchange) is owned 
by the major, normally state-owned, national transmission system operating 
entities in each country. There are several different actors on the electricity 
market.1 Entities send their buy or sell orders to the exchange and based on 
this activity a system price or so-called ‘spot price’ is calculated on an hourly 
basis. The other physical market is called Elbas, which is an ‘adjustment mar­
ket’ where entities can trade up to an hour before actual delivery. This market 
adjusts for imbalances that might have otherwise occurred after the closing of 
the spot market. The financial market component is organised for longer-term 
trade based on future delivery (ibid). The financial marketplace accommodates 
standardised financial contracts for time periods up to several years so that par­
ticipating entities can compensate for fluctuations in the spot price to limit risk. 
The functionality of an energy region is determined by the status of the
region’s infrastructure and the level and degree of market integration. The
integrated power supply network among the Nordic countries has made
the region energy resilient and therefore secure from an electricity supply
standpoint. A major value of an energy region is the ability to integrate
renewable energy into the regional grid. The vast amount of renewable
energy available in some Nordic countries has become largely accessible
to the entire region. This has enabled the region to set ambitious targets
towards decreasing the carbon footprint of its energy mix. Total decarboni­
sation of Nordic electricity generation might be possible by 2050 according
to the International Energy Agency, and the common electricity market and
the availability of flexible power are key contributing factors to this end. 
This case study on Nordic power cooperation provides the following
important takeaways worth noting. First, a common market and integrated
energy and electricity systems have seemingly generated several advantages
for the Nordic region. This includes providing flexible, resilient and reli­
able supply systems. This in turn enables a substantial share of renewable
energy to become available to the entire region, making it well positioned
to meet targets for full decarbonisation. The common electricity market in
the Nordic region strongly contributes to binding nations together enabling
cooperation on many levels. 
Second, with regard to electricity market deregulation there are several 
noteworthy issues related to pricing. In Norway, deregulation saw electricity 
prices decrease and become more consistent between consumer groups (Bye 
and Hope, 2005). Contrarily, Sweden experienced continuous increases in 
electricity prices following deregulation. However, recent studies have indi­
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factors such as fluctuating generation capacities in mainly hydro and nuclear 
power and, possibly foremost, increased tax levels have played a more signifi­
cant role in higher price levels (CERE, 2012). 
Third, issues of market concentration have also been identified as a result of 
deregulation. Large market shares, both in terms of production and network 
operations, are controlled by a small number of actors. Though there could 
be a potential risk in the exercise of market power by a few dominant actors, 
studies have shown that this has not occurred to any measurable extent (Nordic 
Competition Authorities, 2003). 
Southern Africa 
An example of pooled energy cooperation outside the EU region is found in 
southern Africa through the SAPP.2 The SAPP consists of 12 member states 
represented by 14 (combined) national utilities, independent power producers 
and independent transmission companies from member states of the Southern 
Africa Development Community as of September 1994 (SAPP, 2016). Each 
country can designate one national utility to the power pool as a full member 
although the list of participating companies in some cases counts more than 
one company per country. For example, in the case of Zambia, Zesco Limited 
is listed as an operating entity and Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation 
as a non-operating entity. In addition, the independent power producer 
Lunsemfwa Hydro Power Company (Zambia) and the independent transmis­
sion system operator Copperbelt Energy Corporation (Zambia) are also listed 
as participating companies in the SAPP. 
The SAPP is linked to the evolution of the establishment of the South 
African Development Community (SADC) and was realised through the 
signing of an Intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding in August 
1995. In a 2015 report titled ‘SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap
2015–2063’ the organisation clearly highlights the link between provision of 
energy and prosperity. The strategy states that, ‘Cheap energy is a necessary 
condition for industrial competitiveness and to that end, Member States should 
draw on lower cost regional supplies where practicable, rather than focusing on 
national self-sufficiency’ (SADC, 2015: 23). 
SAPP’s (self-described) primary aim is, ‘to provide reliable and economical 
electricity to supply to the consumers of each of the SAPP members, con­
sistent with reasonable utilisation of natural resources and the effect on the 
environment’ (SAPP, 2016). Initially designed to provide a basis for coop­
erative electricity exchange, the SAPP is evolving towards embracing and 
facilitating a more competitive energy market through three mechanisms: the 
STEM (short-term energy market), the post STEM, and the DAM (day ahead 
energy market). As of 2014 other products are to be developed such as a FPM 
(forward physical market) and an IDM (intra-day market) (SAPP, 2016). 
Accordingly, ‘[b]y empowering SAPP, SADC has contributed to regional
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(Maupin, 2013: 2). The SAPP can therefore be interpreted as a mechanism for
regional integration catalysed by SADC as a key aspect of the southern Africa
vision of an integrated development community. At the same time, control over
a nation’s power production is viewed in Africa, as elsewhere throughout the
world, as an issue of national security and sovereignty (even if left unsaid). There
is therefore an uneasy balance to be struck by SAPP/SADC members between
deeper electricity market integration, which is probably the least costly way of
providing additional electricity capacity to countries throughout the region, and
maintaining adequate generating capacity to meet a nation’s needs. 
SAPP’s activity is largely and proportionally reflective of the economic com­
position (weighted by country as a measure of gross domestic product (GDP))
of SADC itself. This is to say that the character of SAPP power trade is heavily
weighted towards South Africa as the region’s largest economic power, largest
producer of electric power and the SAPP’s most active trading partner. South
Africa’s weighted GDP within SADC averaged 67.9 per cent of this regional eco­
nomic community’s overall GDP over the period 2002–2012 (ReSAKSS, 2015).
In 2009, for example, South Africa also generated approximately 80 per cent of
all available power in the SAPP and, in 2008, accounted for the vast majority of
its bilateral contracts. This reality, however, over-shadows the potential for other
SAPP members to become more active generators of electric power themselves
and potentially more active power traders. In order for individual SAPP/SADC
member states to invest and upgrade their power generating capacity, a percent­
age of which could be regionally intended for export, it is essential that the power
be competitively priced and sold with a return on investment that is competitive
relative to other investment options. 
The SAPP is increasingly providing a competitive electricity market, but 
the departure point for measurement is exceedingly low. Energy choice, which 
is an important question looming over SADC’s energy future in light of signifi­
cant (potential) nuclear power development in South Africa and new coal-fired 
thermal power generation in Maputo, South Africa or Botswana, will shape 
the future of energy in SADC for decades to come. 
Overall the generation mix can largely be sketched as hydropower in the 
north of SADC dominated by the Democratic Republic of Congo and the 
Zambezi states, and coal-fired thermal power generation in SADC’s southern 
tier dominated by South Africa. Renewable energy, given Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
amount of available and exploitable wind and solar power, is making inroads 
into the SAPP’s energy mix but it will take decades of development and dedica­
tion by policymakers before it takes its rightful place alongside King Coal and 
hydropower. Having said this, the SAPP, like the EU, seeks to capitalise on 
its vast renewable energy resources. Climate change is identified as a threat 
to overall development opportunities as well as a challenge to capitalising on 
future energy resources. SAPP holds major renewable energy potentials primar­
ily in hydropower, wind, solar and biomass. Capacity increases of 13,719 MW, 
10,345 MW and 8,243 MW in 2017, 2022 and 2027 respectively are planned 
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As an emerging macro regional economic development community, partially
established around cooperation and trade of energy as a key resource for integra­
tion, SADC shows both common and unique features. First, not unlike other
regions and regional economic communities, SADC illustrates a range in the
composition of its member states from island communities to small, landlocked
states. The SAPP includes only landed (versus island) member states, many of
which have low levels of economic activity. This makes it difficult for countries
like Swaziland, Lesotho or even Malawi to invest in new generating capacity.
However, if the SAPP service area is viewed as a market, then ostensibly these
small economies could be participants in, and better served by, larger-scale elec­
tricity supply generated cost competitively in neighbouring or regional states.
This is one of the exciting dimensions of addressing resource scarcity at the
regional level, but which must confront the traditional and historic challenge of
insisting on control over electric power at the scale of the nation state. 
Second, power generation on a regional scale should provide at least some
economy-of-scale cost–benefit advantages, although this always needs to be
defined within the context of a project’s specific parameters. If it holds true that
larger power projects can provide electricity at or below smaller scale generation
projects, then the least-cost affordability threshold for SAPP/SADC could be met. 
The third, and perhaps most innovative is the demonstration that a
‘regional approach’ to the provision of power to rural communities could
also be tackled by the development of rural mini-grids, which may or may
not traverse official territorial boundaries. Where territorial boundaries are
in play, such a regional decentralised provision of electric power could have
a transboundary, cooperative effect on relations among and between citizens
of different countries. 
Finally, the only way that SADC will come even close to approaching suc­
cess with its Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap (2015–2063) is through 
the large-scale provision of new electric power. Hence the strategy stresses the 
concurrent introduction of new, low cost energy supply with a move away 
from a national energy security strategy to the newer and decidedly visionary 
regional approach to energy provision from which economic development, 
and hence industrialisation, can proceed. This puts the SAPP at the centre of 
SADC’s, and therefore Sub-Saharan Africa’s, energy and economic future. 
In conclusion, it may be that too much lip service has been paid to the 
perceived relationship between trade, economic growth and electricity con­
sumption and too little effort to demonstrating this relationship in a regional 
SADC context. This relationship needs to be underpinned by relevant data 
that can be used to catalyse energy and economic development across the 
region if put in the hands of the SAPP or energy experts within SADC itself. 
Discussion 
This chapter links a number of theoretical concepts that are rooted in natu­
ral resources management and function as the basis for sustainable growth, 
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reduced conflict risk and economic success by building on cooperation in the 
power sector. These concepts are strongly interlinked and depend on the func­
tionality of one another in order to render positive outcomes. 
The concept of regionalisation describes how two or more countries (or 
other units) choose collaboration to reach common goals. The experience 
of European collaboration, which eventually led to the establishment of the 
EU, shows that this process can often start in spite of (or possibly because of) 
the lack of trust, order and infrastructure preconditions (post-World War II 
Europe lacked all of these components). When conflict—or a return to it—is 
rejected, cooperation can begin. In the case of Europe and other regions, this 
happens first along lines of least possible resistance, and/or by focusing on 
objectives that all parties wish to achieve and that are not contested among 
cooperative parties. 
The case of the EU shows how motives for collaboration might change 
over time. In the beginning, cooperation with regard to natural resources was 
pursued not only to gain political control and limit risks to the resumption of 
violent conflict, but also for economic gain. However, as economic collabora­
tion matured and resulted in economic growth for all concerned, the drivers 
of conflict diminished and broader partnerships matured as a result. Over time 
macro regions may emerge when certain aspects of power are delegated to 
common governing institutions. 
A similar development can be witnessed in southern Africa and the region­
alisation process of SADC. Though less mature compared to the EU, positive 
effects of regional cooperation have been identified and progress towards full 
integration in SADC is on the way. Economic gains and political stability have 
been early positive deliverables, similar to those of early European integra­
tion. Also in the case of SADC, energy and water are central themes in which 
the region sees strong development potential for integrating the region and 
thereby bolstering its energy security. 
Regionalisation processes result when different entities strive to reach com­
mon beneficial goals through integration and cooperation on one or more 
levels. The need to satisfy increasing energy demand, including the escalating 
rate of electrification, makes energy cooperation and power pooling a corner­
stone in contemporary regionalisation efforts. 
The concept of ‘energy unions’ is discussed as a departure point for achiev­
ing energy security and broader regionalisation objectives. This is evident in the 
continued strengthening and expansion of already existing and mature energy 
sharing systems such as the Nordic energy market. Nordic power cooperation 
exemplifies how advanced power trade can constitute a backbone of overall 
cooperative structures in a region, while simultaneously positioning all partici­
pating countries in pole position to meet new challenges in the most sustainable 
manner. The ability to become a region fully reliant on renewable energy is 
one example where the Nordic region, through cooperation on its energy 
resources, can face global challenges such as climate change and at the same 
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The same ambitions are also evident in the EU and the creation of a unified 
European energy union in which the share of renewable energy is set to grow 
substantially. 
In regions undergoing rapid development such as SADC and through insti­
tutions such as the SAPP, which consolidate partnerships to secure development 
goals, the strong link between energy access and development can and should 
accelerate collaboration and economic integration. The fast rate of global elec­
trification and the need to meet climate challenges through faster deployment 
of renewable energy types makes trade in electricity and the establishment of 
power pools ever more important. Energy regions bound together by com­
mon grid networks and systems for electricity trade/exchange open new doors 
for reaching energy security objectives particularly for those countries which 
themselves lack significant energy resources of their own. Sustainable energy 
can make a significant improvement to the quality of life in SADC largely 
by narrowing the increasingly widening gulf between energy supply and 
demand in the SAPP/SADC region, while concurrently providing clean and 
environmentally sustainable energy for all. Major challenges to achieving such 
outcomes in the SADC region are, inter alia, access to sufficient finance, regu­
latory policies and protocols providing probably preferred access to the grid for 
renewable energy. All of these challenges point to the efficacy of regionalism as 
a way forward to addressing the SAPP/SADC’s energy challenges. 
Notes 
1 The Swedish Smart Grid Coordination Council describes four market actors as fol­
lows Electricity producers: produce electricity in power plants and feed it to the grid. 
Most power is produced by a couple of major energy producing companies. They 
can determine if produced power should be sold to trading companies, consumers or 
if it will be allocated to the exchange or consumed for other purposes.Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs): the entities operating different portions of the grid either 
at national, regional or local levels (as described earlier). Electricity trading compa­
nies: trading companies buy electricity through the exchange or from other trading 
companies. They sell to consumers in competition with other trading companies. 
These companies can offer a variety of services beyond retail electricity including as 
a balancing power operator and energy portfolio management function. They host 
of wide variety of ownership forms. Consumers: they are comprised of a variety of 
end-user groups such as residential households and industries. Consumer groups are 
bound by agreements with a TSO with regards to electricity transfer and a similar 
agreement regarding the purchase of electricity either directly with a producer or 
trading company. Consumers can also buy electricity through the exchange. 
2 An examination of the SAPP’s objectives provides some perspective on where this 
power pool is in relation to its overall vision. According to the SAPP 2015 Annual 
Report, the SAPP vision is to: facilitate the development of a competitive electricity 
market in the SADC region; give the end user a choice of electricity supplier; ensure 
that the southern African region is the region of choice for investment by energy 
intensive users; ensure sustainable energy developments through sound economic, 
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4 Phosphorus security 
Future pathways to reduce food system 
vulnerability to a new global challenge 
Stuart White and Dana Cordell
 
Introduction 
Phosphorus is an element that has significant interdependence with global food 
security. It is essential for plant growth, and the demand for phosphorus from 
fossil resources (phosphate rock) has grown rapidly in the last 100 years. This 
mirrors many other resources; however, the implications of a peak in produc­
tion may be more profound in this case due to the lack of substitutability, the 
geopolitical concentration of known reserves and the implications for farmers 
across the world. Another factor that makes phosphorus important in global 
environmental terms is the impact of increased phosphorus use on downstream 
environments due to eutrophication of waterways. 
Growth in global per capita demand for phosphorus has been stimulated 
by global changes in diet with increased consumption of animal products, 
as well as the accelerated production of biofuels, both of which significantly 
increase demand for phosphorus fertilisers. Global population growth has also 
contributed to absolute levels of demand. There are, however, significant 
opportunities for improvement in the use of phosphorus, with over 80 per 
cent of phosphorus lost between mine and fork. 
This chapter describes the key issues regarding this resource, outlining some
of the institutional and global security aspects, and provides a description of a
path forward. Despite the strategic significance of this resource, and the increas­
ing interest in it, there is no current framework for global governance. At the
national and regional levels, there are emerging initiatives to improve institutional
arrangements, including at the EU level, and in the UK, Netherlands and the US. 
Phosphorus and its geopolitical context 
Phosphorous is unique in its role in global sustainability and geopolitics. It is an 
essential element for all living organisms and, in relation to food production, 
it is one of the three main ingredients of commercial ‘NPK’ fertilisers, which 
contain the primary macronutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium) essen­
tial for plant growth. In its natural state phosphorus exists only as a solid and, 
unlike nitrogen, it cannot be obtained from the atmosphere or through the use 
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Chemical fertilisers have contributed to feeding billions of people by boost­
ing crop yields. In the 1960s and 1970s the use of phosphate from guano mined 
on the island of Nauru was the most significant factor in boosting agricultural 
yields in Australia and New Zealand. Similar deposits were mined from islands 
off the South American coast for use in European agriculture. Worldwide, 
sustained high agricultural yields are now almost totally dependent on the 
phosphate rock reserves used to produce phosphate fertilisers. 
There will always be a global demand for phosphorous for the production 
of food and fibre. However, phosphate rock itself is a finite and non-renewable
resource, and the world’s high-quality reserves are becoming scarce. Over 
90 per cent of mined phosphate rock is used for food production, while the 
remaining 10 per cent is used for other industrial purposes, primarily in the pro­
duction of some detergents and increasingly in lithium ion phosphate batteries. 
Despite phosphorus being integral to human existence, the awareness of global
phosphorus supply and demand as an issue worthy of policy discussion has been
relatively recent. Prior to 2008 environmental and regulatory concerns about
phosphorus principally arose because of the eutrophication of lakes and water
bodies. This process involves the increase in nutrient runoff from agriculture
and poor land management, which causes excessive growth of plants and algae
in water, resulting in depletion of oxygen and fish kills. Eutrophication has been
a major problem in the Great Lakes in North America and the Baltic Sea in
Northern Europe. In Australia, the Murray-Darling and Western Australia’s Peel-
Harvey estuarine systems have been major sites of eutrophication. It is only more
recently, and principally since the spike in rock phosphate price in 2008, that
there has been a major focus on long-term phosphorus security as a policy issue,
including a foreign policy and security issue for phosphate importing countries. 
The significant global growth in demand for phosphate rock as a source of 
fertiliser is depicted in Figure 4.1. The spatial pattern of global consumption 
of phosphorus fertiliser has changed dramatically over the last 40 years. In the 
1970s, for example, low-income countries were responsible for less than 20 
per cent of phosphorus fertiliser demand and 40 years later they accounted for 
over 75 per cent of demand (IFA, 2009), and are responsible for the growth 
in global demand. Future growth in global phosphorous fertiliser consump­
tion is similarly expected to occur predominantly in low-income countries and 
emerging economies. This is for two main reasons. The first is the economic 
development in those countries and the accompanying shift to diets containing 
more animal products, which have an intrinsically higher phosphorus burden 
due to the losses in conversion of plant protein to animal protein. Diets that 
are high in animal products can require between two and ten times more phos­
phorus than plant-based diets. The second is that in high-income countries, 
where phosphorus fertiliser has been applied for many years, soils have tended 
to become saturated with phosphorus and so the need to boost soil phospho­
rus content has lessened. Worldwide, the distribution of phosphorus in soils is 
uneven, with strong surpluses in Europe and parts of the US, and significant 
underlying deficits in other regions—particularly Sub-Saharan Africa—with 








Figure 4.1 The growth in production of phosphorus fertilisers by source 
Source: Adapted from Cordell et al., 2009 
In 2008 the price of phosphate rock, which had been stable for many years 
at approximately US$50 per tonne, spiked at US$430 per tonne. This dramatic 
price increase coincided with significant hikes in food and oil prices, and con­
tributed to major disruptions worldwide, including rioting in several countries. 
For the first time, the notion of peak phosphorus, as in a peak in production 
due to constraints on resources of sufficient quality, was discussed in the media 
and in public policy discourse. A vigorous debate about when phosphorus 
production might peak ensued. Estimates have ranged from 30 years’ time to 
300 years’ time (Cordell and White, 2014). 
The dimensions of phosphorus scarcity 
The issue of the scarcity of phosphorus needs to be understood in broader 
terms than just the physical availability of rock phosphate. The total amount 
of phosphorus in the earth’s crust, approximately 4 x 1015 tonnes, is relatively 
high compared to most elements, and does not itself reflect scarcity. Instead, the 
scarcity issue is one that is reflected in a number of different dimensions, and 
also the fact that transferring phosphorus from the earth’s crust to farmers’ crops 
is a complex process involving a number of steps (Cordell and White, 2011). 
Firstly, in terms of the dimension of the availability of phosphorus, the
estimated phosphate rock reserves are 2 x 109 tonnes, a value which is limited
by the phosphate rock deposits of sufficient concentration that the energy,
waste generation, cost and geopolitical issues enable it to be mined. Like
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constraints. The estimated timeline for this peak production is highly con­
tested. Our prognostication, based on the most recent estimates of reserves,
and taking appropriate consideration of projected demand levels is that the
peak in phosphorus production may occur between 2025 and 2084 (Cordell
and White, 2014). 
A major constraint on the expansion of mining of phosphate rock deposits, 
particularly as the concentration of deposits diminishes, is the resultant increase 
in waste product generation. The waste products from extraction, including 
radioactive wastes, are increasing. The production of one tonne of phosphate 
gives rise to five tonnes of radioactive phosphogypsum waste, which is stock­
piled and contains heavy metals including cadmium, uranium and thorium, 
which are naturally present in phosphate deposits and can transfer to soils. 
The second dimension is managerial scarcity, which arises due to ineffi­
cient phosphorus use in the global food system. While 15 million tonnes of 
phosphate rock are mined each year, only three million tonnes are available 
to humans through the food produced from that phosphorus. This means that 
80 per cent of the phosphorus is lost between the mine and the fork (Cordell 
et al., 2009). There are significant losses in the mining and processing of phos­
phate rock to make fertiliser, with generation of waste containing heavy metals 
including cadmium, and radioactive elements. There are also major inefficien­
cies in application of fertiliser in agriculture, including whether the phosphorus 
is in a plant available form or bound to the soil, and on-farm losses, which are 
often the cause of nutrient runoff into waterways. In addition, there are the 
losses that occur in the food cycle, including the inefficiency of conversion of 
plant protein to animal protein, and the waste of food itself both before and 
after reaching the consumer. 
The third dimension of scarcity is economic scarcity for consumers, or lack 
of access to phosphorous for those who need it, particularly farmers. They need 
both short- and long-term access to fertilisers, in terms of meeting immediate 
crop needs and planning for building up soil fertility in the longer term. Almost 
a billion farmers lack the purchasing power to access fertiliser markets. Farmers 
in some land-locked African countries can pay two to five times more than 
European farmers for fertilisers due to high transport costs, handling duties and 
corruption (IFDC, 2008). 
The African continent is a key location for global phosphorus inequity. 
There is significant ‘silent’ demand from farmers with low purchasing power 
in Sub-Saharan Africa where soil fertility is low and food insecurity is high. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has the following characteristics: 
x It is adjacent to the largest source of high-quality phosphate rock, in the 
north including Morocco and Western Sahara, Tunisia and Algeria. 
x Soil fertility is low, due to old, weathered soils, which means that it will 
require significant phosphorus inputs to build this up, impacting global 
phosphorus demand. 
x Despite the low soil fertility levels, it has the lowest phosphorus fertiliser 
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x It has the world’s poorest farmers; therefore the equity issues associated 
with access to phosphorus fertilisers is amplified. 
x It has high levels of food insecurity, indicating a need for greater and 
more reliable food production supported by access to fertilisers (Cordell 
et al., 2009). 
The fourth dimension of scarcity is the geopolitical scarcity associated with the 
remaining reserves. Farmers in all countries need phosphorus, yet just five nations 
control around 85 per cent of the world’s remaining phosphate rock reserves 
(Morocco and Western Sahara, China, Algeria, Jordan and Syria). Morocco
controls 75 per cent of available reserves, because it controls the resources in
Western Sahara; a region that it occupies in defiance of UN resolutions. China
is a major producer, but imposed a 135 per cent export tariff in 2008. The US,
which was once the world’s largest producer, consumer and importer of phos­
phate rock and exporter of phosphorus fertiliser now has approximately 25 years
left of its own reserves. India, Australia and the EU are dependent on imports
and are therefore vulnerable to price fluctuations and supply disruptions. 
One of the key reasons for geopolitical vulnerability is that a number of 
major producers are in politically unstable regions. This creates a serious risk 
of disruption to supply and price fluctuations (HCSS, 2012). In addition, 
Morocco’s control of the phosphate reserves in the Western Sahara means that 
there is a significant supply disruption risk as well as human rights violations 
associated with the displacement of the Sahrawi people (Smith, 2011). There 
is also a reputational risk for phosphate companies importing phosphate from 
the region. Trade in phosphate from the Western Sahara has been termed, 
‘blood phosphate’ (Pecquet, 2015), which—much like the revelations around 
Africa’s ‘blood diamonds’—implies that phosphate companies, agri-businesses, 
farmers and food consumers are knowingly or unknowingly contributing to 
the oppression in this region. 
The final element of scarcity is institutional scarcity, which revolves around 
the question of whose responsibility it is to provide governance of this scarce 
resource. There is a lack of effective global governance as there are currently 
no international or national policies, guidelines or organisations responsible 
for ensuring the long-term availability and accessibility of phosphorus for food 
production. The market for phosphorus, both in terms of mining and manu­
facturing, is dominated by a few major companies, the largest of which is 
the OCP Group (formerly the Office chérifien des phosphates), which is wholly 
owned by the Government of Morocco, essentially meaning that it is 100 per 
cent owned by the King of Morocco. Similarly, the second largest phosphate 
mining company in the world, based in China, is state owned. 
The history of phosphate rock mining has been a history of colonial relation­
ships and oppression, with the displacement of entire populations in Banaba 
(Ocean Island) in Kiribati and lengthy court cases to obtain compensation 
for locals (Binder, 1978). Nauru, a small Pacific island nation and the major 
source of phosphate rock for the expansion of agriculture in Australia and 
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most of the last 100 years (Garrett, 1996). The British Phosphate Commission, 
formed in 1920 by the governments of the UK, Australia and New Zealand 
and operating until the 1980s, was a powerful force to ensure the growth of the 
industry (Williams and MacDonald, 1985). Phosphorus is one of the world’s 
most traded commodities, with transport comprising a major proportion of the 
costs of delivered fertiliser. 
Throughout the history of phosphate production, as with many com­
modities, there has been a combination of national interests, colonialism and 
economic exploitation, against the backdrop of a global commodity market. 
While there have been national and even regional (e.g. European) policy ini­
tiatives to consider the strategically significant role of phosphorus fertilisers, 
there has been no equivalent international policy discussion or initiative. There 
is a prevailing assumption that ‘the market will take care of it’, but the market 
alone is not sufficient to ensure equitable, timely and sustainable management 
of this highly important resource. 
The phosphorus system is therefore a vulnerable system, and can be analysed
as such, at a global, regional, national or even a local level. Figure 4.2 shows the
outcome of a phosphorus vulnerability assessment in relation to a national food
system, including external and internal factors (Cordell and Neset, 2013). This vul­
nerability assessment was undertaken in Australia, and shows that, while Australia
is a net food exporter, it is also a net phosphorus importer. In fact, Australia is the
world’s fifth largest importer. Australia’s soils are naturally phosphorus deficient
and its agriculture is heavily invested in phosphorus-intensive exports (beef, live
animals, wheat and dairy). Australia also has declining investment in agricultural
research and development, leaving it vulnerable to future phosphorus insecurity. 
Figure 4.2 Outcomes of a vulnerability assessment for phosphorus in Australia 
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This vulnerability assessment identified four potential adaptive pathways, 
which could buffer farms and farmers against fertiliser price increases. First, 
national stakeholders identified multiple pathways that could lead to phos­
phorous vulnerability in the Australian food system by exploring a range of 
‘what if’ scenarios or perturbations in the system. Second, the potential adap­
tive pathways to increase the resilience of the food system (e.g. investing in 
phosphorus recycling from excreta and food waste, or improving farm prac­
tices such as soil testing these adaptive pathways) were then mapped, and the 
trade-offs explored. It was clear that if the current trajectory is not altered, 
then phosphorus scarcity is likely to have serious consequences for food secu­
rity. These consequences would include reduced agricultural productivity and 
reduced smallholder farm access to fertilisers and food, particularly in develop­
ing countries. Moreover, vulnerability and adaptability to phosphorus scarcity 
is context specific and there is no single key to phosphorus security. Third, 
future-oriented system frameworks can guide identification of priorities to 
increase the resilience of foods systems. Conversely, a failure to adopt such 
frameworks will result in perverse outcomes, and investment in ineffective 
phosphorus strategies. Fourth, integrating phosphorus security into develop­
ment goals has great potential to improve outcomes. 
A sustainable future for phosphorus use 
There is a key question arising from this situation: where does responsibility rest
for ensuring long-term phosphorus security, and how would that be achieved?
The governance of phosphorus production and use is fragmented and there is lit­
tle coordination between the industry’s many different sectors and stakeholders.
These stakeholder groups range from mining of phosphate rock, manufacturing
and sales of fertiliser, agriculture, food production, nutrition and the sanitation
and wastewater industry. It is unusual for such a diverse group of stakeholders
to recognise the common interest that they have in such an issue and to come
together to address it without the auspices of, or facilitation by, an appropri­
ate, international group. For example, in terms of UN agencies, the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) would be a suitable candidate agency, yet it
has not prioritised this issue. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has
co-ordinated the publication of key global reports on the issue, mostly regarding
the environmental aspects, but has stopped short of further action. 
It is possible to distinguish between a hard landing and a soft landing in terms 
of how the phosphorus scarcity problem could play out in geopolitical terms. 
First, imagine a business-as-usual future: if it proves impossible to change the 
current phosphorus use trajectory, a hard landing appears likely. This will mean 
increasing energy use costs and increased waste associated with phosphorous 
production and use, as well as volatile prices, geopolitical tensions, reduced 
farmer access to fertilisers, reduced crop yields and lower food security. Unless 
there is some recognition of the risks associated with the current trajectory and 
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On the other hand, imagine a sustainable future, or soft landing, in which 
phosphorus security enables all farmers to have short- and long-term access to 
sufficient phosphorus to grow enough to feed the world while maintaining 
ecosystem integrity and sustainable livelihoods. These two visions of the future 
are in very stark contrast. In the case of the soft landing, there would need to 
be concerted action to ease the demand for phosphorus, in order to reduce 
over-reliance on rock phosphate through improved efficiency of production 
and use and through the reuse of local sources including crop, animal, human 
and municipal wastes. 
Averting a crisis and securing a sustainable future is possible, but no single 
action will achieve that end. As summarised below, substantial policy changes 
and investments in a range of areas will be required. Figure 4.3 shows an 
approach for reducing the annual consumption of phosphate rock compared 
to a business-as-usual trajectory. A combination of demand side measures is 
shown at the top of the diagram and supply side measures involving the reuse 
of phosphorus are shown at the bottom of the diagram. 
There are several intervention points, in the agriculture and food sys­
tems in particular, which can make a major difference to the likelihood of
a soft landing. These have been outlined in a separate paper (Cordell and
White, 2014) and are summarised below. Interventions in the agricultural
sector include measures that reduce the overall demand for fertilisers through
improved efficiency of application. This has the advantage of reducing
the demand for phosphate fertiliser, while also reducing the runoff of soil
phosphorus into waterways, which is the major cause of algal blooms and
aquatic degradation. These interventions, in the case of the agricultural use of
phosphorus fertilisers, include: 
Figure 4.3  Illustration of methods by which rock phosphate consumption could be 
reduced using a combination of supply side and demand side measures 
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x Placement of fertiliser in the soil close to plant roots to ensure that phos­
phorus is absorbed. 
x Choice of application time relative to growing season and plant stage to 
maximise phosphorus uptake. 
x Adapting the rate of fertiliser application to better meet soil and plant 
needs. 
x Ensuring comprehensive soil testing is in place to enable farmers to match 
fertiliser applications with plant needs using precision agriculture, remote 
sensing or low-tech testing. 
x Erosion reduction through buffer strips to maintain root soil structure. 
Additional measures can include the selection of appropriate plant types. For 
example, the use of natives, perennials or particular crop types can reduce the 
need for phosphorus. Other measures include the use of microbial inoculants 
and enzymes to increase phosphorus uptake by roots. In addition, it is possible 
to increase the amount of phosphorus available to roots by changing soil pH, 
and by altering levels of moisture, carbon and organic matter. 
These measures, or technical interventions, can be achieved through the 
application of a broad set of three types of instruments, as described below, 
including: communication (farm extension services); economic instru­
ments including direct investment in soil testing, information provision and
advisory support possibly funded through a levy on fertiliser; and regula­
tory instruments including requirements for farm management plans and
soil improvement practices. The best strategy is one that combines all three
instruments to support the implementation of a suite of measures. 
Perhaps one of the most effective, but contested and complex, areas relates 
to dietary change. In low-income and emerging economies, the demand for 
meat and dairy products is increasing as consumers imitate the diets of high-
income countries. This is one of the major factors putting upward pressure 
on phosphorus use. By 2050, global meat production is projected to double 
from 2006 levels to 465 million tonnes per year, and milk production is also 
expected to double to 1043 million tonnes per year (FAO, 2006). If this trend 
persists, it will be one of the major factors contributing to an increase in phos­
phorus consumption globally, and it is likely to also be associated with greater 
eutrophication of waterways and compromised water quality. 
In order to address these issues, and to ensure a soft landing, an inte­
grated approach is required. There is no single step that will enable us to
meet future phosphorus demand. The strategies that we put in place need
to respond to global issues and at the same time they need to be context
specific. The situation in Ethiopia will be very different to the situation in
Australia, New Zealand or Cambodia, for instance. In addition, it will be
essential to determine the most cost effective, energy efficient, equitable
and environmentally compatible means of using and reusing phosphorus in
a given context. 
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Insights to phosphorus scarcity from other resources 
In identifying key solutions to the global phosphorus security situation, and 
in aiming to increase the likelihood of a soft landing, we can learn a lot 
from responses to other resource issues. For example, responses to problems 
associated with climate change can provide clues to possible pathways for phos­
phorus. In the case of global responses to climate change, there is an implicit 
understanding in principle, and partially implemented in practice, that high-
income countries have undergone development and built wealth through their 
use of the global atmospheric commons. Therefore, in addressing the issue 
now and in the future, a greater relative reduction in per capita emissions is 
warranted from these nations, to enable low-income countries to increase per 
capita emissions. This is the basis of the principle of contraction and convergence, 
which, while contested in the details of implementation, provides a foundation 
for climate negotiations, including the recent Paris Agreement (GCI, 2016). 
The applicability of the framework of contraction and convergence to the 
phosphorus issue is quite strong. High-income countries have been responsible 
for the mining and processing of the highest concentration deposits to build up 
soil phosphorous concentrations and develop their agricultural production. As 
time goes on, low-income countries become more dependent on phosphate 
rock deposits and imports, just when the concentration of deposits decreases. 
High-income countries, as in the case of the greenhouse gas emissions issue, 
have a greater capacity to employ technical means to improve efficiency of 
application, for example, through precision, or smart farming. There is there­
fore a significant global benefit to be gained from the transfer of knowledge, 
technical capacity and investment from high-income to low-income countries 
with the objective of improving phosphorus use efficiency. At the same time, 
deep cuts in phosphorus use in high-income countries, especially through die­
tary change, would be appropriate to ensure greater equity in its use. 
Similarly, an analysis of barriers to improving resource efficiency in the 
domains of energy and water resources can be equally well applied to the 
phosphorus domain. In many instances, solutions such as improved energy 
and water efficiency and the management of demand are highly cost effective 
relative to the increased capital and operating costs of increasing supply to sup­
port increased demand for energy and water resources. This is also true in the 
case of phosphorus fertiliser, where investments in improving efficiency often 
provide a net economic benefit relative to increased supply. 
The main barrier to more sustainable approaches to phosphorus use is the 
result of market failure stemming from inappropriate pricing signals, payback 
gaps and lack of information. For example, failure to factor in the costs of 
externalities, such as the impacts of resource use that do not manifest as private 
costs, is a key market failure. The impact on waterways of phosphorus runoff, 
arising from over-application is a classic case of an externality, often a ‘tragedy 
of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). Payback gaps relate to a difference between 
expectations of rate of return on investment between actors. For example, a 
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expecting a one- to two-year payback, whereas a landowner, in principle, 
could afford to install equipment and systems to reduce the need for phospho­
rus fertiliser that may have a payback of four to five years. 
Therefore, it is useful to learn from the experience in developing pol­
icy tools to overcome these market barriers, including the use of financial
incentives, provision of information and extension services, appropriate regu­
lations, supplemented by targets, facilitation, pricing and coordination. These
policy tools are illustrated in Figure 4.4 and described in more detail by
Dunstan et al. (2009). 
The policy tools, in each of the different categories are designed to match
the various policy barriers to implementation of sustainable initiatives. For
example, one key barrier to phosphorus efficiency is the low cost of fertiliser,
in many countries directly subsidised, which can lead to inefficient use. In
that case, a solution can be to set a levy on the phosphorus content of fer­
tiliser, as indicated in the example in Figure 4.4. To supplement the impact
of the levy, and to some extent mitigate its impact, the proceeds from such
a levy could be allocated, or hypothecated, to support farmers in improving
the efficiency of phosphorus fertiliser application. This could be in the form
of incentives for farmers to undertake soil testing, to ensure that excess phos­
phorus fertiliser is not applied. 
An example of the use of a regulatory instrument for improving phosphorus 
fertiliser use would be to have a cap on the use or extraction of phosphate rock, 
similar to a ceiling on greenhouse gas emissions in a ‘cap and trade’ scheme, or 
caps on water extraction. This has the effect of recognising, by direct regula­
tion, the limitations imposed by the biophysical reality of the resource base, or 
the biophysical limits to overuse of the resource. 
Figure 4.4 Examples of policy tools 
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An example of the application of targets that also have the effect of support­
ing new industries and innovation includes Sweden’s target for recycling of 
phosphorus from sewage. This target was driven by the impacts of discharge of 
sewage into the Baltic Sea, and the algal blooms that result, and it has encour­
aged the wastewater and sanitation industry to innovate to capture and recycle 
nutrients from municipal and industrial wastewater. 
The ‘policy palette’ depicting and categorising the policy tools provides a 
useful framework for ensuring that there is not too great a focus on different 
types of instruments. For example, an overemphasis on regulatory instruments 
can result in a backlash from farmers or industry, unless balanced by informa­
tion and communication, or incentives or other support. Conversely, a reliance 
on information provision alone will often fail to make a sufficient difference, as 
it does not have strong enough impact to overcome structural barriers. Using 
incentives alone can increase costs of programmes, and risks attracting ‘free 
riders’ who benefit from incentives, even if they would have been prepared to 
act without them. 
Coordination is a key aspect in addressing phosphorous security. There needs
to be a responsible agency, which is tasked with developing a plan for which
policy tools are appropriate and where they should be applied. Moreover, the
engagement of a broad range of stakeholders is a very important requirement for
the institutional response to the phosphorus security issue. Phosphorus security,
like many issues, involves a great diversity of stakeholders. They range from farm­
ers and those involved in the food and nutrition industry through to water and
wastewater utilities as well as the mining and extractive industries. This means
that extra efforts must be made to engage stakeholders and to stitch together
the narrative around the range of solutions. The Global Phosphorus Research
Initiative and the Australian National Strategic Phosphorus Advisory Group are
two examples of initiatives to develop an integrated approach to phosphorus
scarcity and security. The Global Phosphorus Research Initiative, combining the
efforts of key research organisations working on many aspects of the issue, was
the first platform of its kind, and aims to facilitate quality interdisciplinary research
on global phosphorus security for future food production, and to provide net­
working dialogue and awareness raising among policymakers, industry scientists
and the community on the implications of global scarcity and possible solutions. 
We are now seeing the emergence of a range of policy initiatives in North
America and Europe. In particular, the European sustainable phosphorus plat­
form has been developed, which provides a forum to inform policy for European
countries, and has already led to significant advances in institutional arrangements
including for phosphorus recycling. There have also been five bi-annual global
summits, which are unusual in bringing together researchers, practitioners, indus­
try and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) across the many different aspects
of the phosphorus issue, rather than dealing with only, for example, the agricultural
aspects. These and similar initiatives provide some hope that there is an increasing
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5 Peasant mineral resource 
extractivism and the idea of scarcity 
Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt 
Introduction 
In the Post-Washington Consensus era, many poorer countries underwent 
structural reforms, or ‘adjustment programs’ as they came to be known. 
Collectively, these suites of new neoliberal economic policies created more 
market-oriented economies. Integral to this neoliberal shift is the view that 
natural resources, such as land, its mineral resources and water, are tradable 
commodities that are subject to market forces. Consequently, most states 
have—with varying eagerness—exposed their mineral resources to invest­
ments by local as well as foreign entrepreneurs, resulting in the exploitation 
of resources at unprecedented rates. This strategy of exploiting resources for 
quick economic growth—supposedly in pursuit of human development, or at 
least to benefit people living in resource-rich areas—is known as extractivism. 
One can describe the process as a commodities consensus because of its com­
plete disregard for the dispossession of people, resources and territories, while 
simultaneously creating new forms of dependencies. 
The logic and practice of extractivism under neoliberal economic policies 
are often framed and legitimised by notions of scarcity and crisis. In recent 
years, after a protracted period of what Bridge (2001) calls ‘resource triumphal-
ism’, predictions of scarcities of key resources (including petroleum, water and 
food) have been revived. Following the 2008 hike in food and oil prices, The
Wall Street Journal published an article titled ‘New Limits to Growth Revive 
Malthusian Fears’. It drew special attention to the improving wellbeing of 
the billions of Indians and Chinese who are ‘stepping up to the middle class’ 
and raising global demand (Lahart, Barta and Batson 2008: A1). In such a 
Malthusian scenario, resource scarcities lead to conflict and war; at the domes­
tic scale, such conflict may involve the extraordinary phenomenon of ordinary 
peasants (defined here broadly as rural populations directly dependent and 
subsisting on land and water resources) who extract and degrade the very envi­
ronment that supports them through small-scale mining activities. 
Graulau (2001) maintains that instead of being a ‘survival strategy’, informal
mining by peasants should be seen as a more considered strategy for increasing
their odds of escaping poverty. A theoretical challenge is to interpret these live­
















beyond the binaries of resource wars, victims and victors, and scarcity and abun­
dance to understand the lives of those who are actively engaged in the capitalist
processes of mineral resource extraction and surplus generation, yet whose live­
lihoods are not much better than the worst forms of labour. This chapter is a
response to this challenge. It argues that peasant production and labour processes
characterise an array of mineral extractive practices found in the mineral-rich
tracts of the countries of the Global South today. These practices, and the organi­
sation of labour and production in what is widely known as informal, or artisanal
and small-scale mining (ASM), reconfigure the ways in which we have thus far
conceptualised the extractive industries. The practices of these peasants cut across
the spectrum of mining, ranging from the most artisanal individual and oppor­
tunistic enterprises to the work as hired labourers in licensed small-scale firms,
while often engaging with markets located well beyond their immediate vicinity.
These rural labourers undertake a wide array of tasks in the extractive industries,
broadening the meaning of ‘mining’ as a human industry, and inhabiting the
complex intersection of a number of social niches, contributing to new direc­
tions in scholarly research on resource extractivism in the contemporary world. 
Does scarcity push extractivism? 
Experts believe that the processes of global resource scarcity will consolidate a 
model of development founded on an economy that extracts and over-exploits 
mineral resources—most of them non-renewable. One essential aspect of this 
extractive economy is the sense of urgency and crisis, which persists in an 
interesting association with scarcity, primarily in terms of the adequacy of nat­
ural resources to meet human needs. 
Crisis and scarcity are different ideas, but both are inherently political in 
nature and closely interlinked. One can say that both are based on a materialist 
philosophical view of resources that is rooted in a functional or utilitarian view 
buoyed by positivism: that resources exist because they fulfil human needs, 
and that they can be measured as absolute amounts. The first view was pro­
posed soon after World War II by an American economic geographer, Erich 
Zimmerman. His book, World Trade and Resources, is famous for its aphoristic 
comment, ‘resources are not, they become’ (1951: 814). Zimmerman’s ideas 
heralded a new era in thinking about resources. They introduced, for the 
first time since the Scientific Revolution and the era of Enlightenment, that 
resources are a matter of appraisal, that is, what counts as a resource depends on 
the interaction between biophysical heterogeneity, technology and social insti­
tutions. In Zimmerman’s words, resources ‘evolve out of the triune interaction 
of nature, man, and culture, in which nature sets outer limits, but man and 
culture are largely responsible for the portion of physical totality that is made 
available for human use’ (1951: 814–15). These ideas entrenched a functional 
utilitarianism that came to assume hegemony in the wider thought processes 
about resources. More importantly, the utilitarianism was apparently apolitical; 
Zimmerman’s human society was a homogeneous category, discovering nature 
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for its use-value, and putting it to use. For example, there was no consideration 
of the inequities in the end use of resources derived from nature. 
The second dimension of this positivist view of resources, namely that 
the matter constituting nature can be measured in absolute amounts, assumes 
that ‘stuff in nature’ is unknown until we have extracted it and assessed its 
use-value. Therefore, the philosophy comes with its own epistemology of 
elaborate processes of accurate measurement. Many experts in the mainstream 
sustainability sciences were impressed by this approach, and took up the meth­
odological tools to measure, assess and evaluate nature and the resources it 
offers to us. Once measured, they can be placed against other numbers and 
amounts. Approaches to resources adopted in the period since World War II,
which was characterised by a remarkable phase of material prosperity and accu­
mulating surpluses in the West, were primarily founded on this view. Each 
material, irrespective of whether it was water or a mineral, was regarded as a 
constituent of an environment, and its properties were identified and consid­
ered to be fixed, essential attributes of these things. No consideration was given 
to processual, relational or political dimensions. The matters of nature were 
objectively determined and practically experienced. The implications of such 
views were catastrophic for thinking about mineral extractive industries; the 
binary of ‘supply and demand’ became fully entrenched, as the more powerful 
and richer nations began to expand their extractive interests into the countries 
of the Global South where they assumed disproportionate controls over min­
eral resources. The earliest example was the far-reaching fall-out from the 1973 
oil price hike by the OPEC (The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) countries, which, according to Brown (1974: 5), one of the earliest 
proponents of the scarcity agenda, was a ‘fundamental’ change from traditional 
buyers’ markets to global sellers’ markets for commodities. The ensuing sense 
of crisis added a crucial impetus to the structural reforms, changing economic 
policies to put economic growth on the foundation of extractivism. This turn 
of events is exemplified in Huber (2014: 816), who says: ‘Resource scarcity is a 
fact likely to produce concerning effects.’ In this paradigm, scarcity is described 
as a fundamental, economic problem: because of scarcity of resources, goods 
and services are limited, forcing the consumers to make choices. Therefore, the 
concept sounds like a schoolbook primer on ‘unlimited wants, but alas, limited 
means’. A wider problem arises when resource scarcities are related to conflicts 
and wars (such as in Le Billon, 2004); invariably, one suggests an economic 
or a political system that allows the market to allocate these scarce resources, 
subsuming the possibilities of alternative imaginations of how resources can be 
redistributed. Then, the idea of crisis comes in handy to connote the sense of 
urgency; a compulsion that forces those in power to choose certain paths. 
In the developing world, one response to perceived scarcity has been the 
emergence and consolidation of extractivism. Latin American scholar-activists 
distinguish between ‘old extractivism’ and ‘new extractivism’, observing that 
under the former, pursued by imperialist countries located at the global centres, 
resources were exploited ruthlessly without concern for the destruction caused 
 76 K. Lahiri-Dutt 
in peripheral areas. Therefore, under old extractivism, open-access areas were 
over-exploited and radically depleted by coerced, underpaid and unquantified 
workers using outdated technologies to supply volatile external markets. Classic 
examples of such extractivism are the rubber economies of South America 
that destroyed the biodiversity of extensive areas by establishing monocultures 
(Svampa, 2011) and ‘slaughter’ coal mining that was followed by ruthless land­
lords seeking profits during the 1950s and 1960s in India (Lahiri-Dutt, 2014). 
Veltmeyer and Petras (2014: 61) propose the emergence of a ‘new extrac­
tivism’ that operates differently. According to them, ‘extractive imperialism’ 
sees states actively support the operations of extractive corporations overseas. 
An example would be Canadian or Australian mining companies operating 
in poorer countries with implicit state support. In contrast, post-neoliberal 
governments formed over the past decades in many countries have opted for a 
strategy of resource extraction and export primarisation by striking deals with 
global extractive capital to promote coinciding economic interests. Throughout 
the Global South, states in economically poor but mineral-rich countries are 
now seeing revenues from natural resources as providing an easy path to buoy 
their exchequer. These states present themselves as ‘resource frontiers’—a kind 
of virgin territory that offers the opportunity for acquiring huge quantities of 
hitherto untapped natural resources. 
A key characteristic of new extractivism is that it typically operates in active 
collaboration with the state, but at the same time relies on mainstream science, 
particularly the expertise that has developed around sustainability (Hogenboom, 
2012). This is done within ‘triple bottom line’ rubrics in which environmental 
indicators are incorporated alongside economic and social indicators, ideally to 
ensure sustainability. Therefore, ‘new extractivism’ appears to preserve natural 
resources (or at least, in the case of mining, attempts to care for the envi­
ronment), while achieving a reasonable income via ‘nature’s subsidy’. All key 
players, the international agencies, governments and corporations, propagate 
the ‘good extractivism’ discourse. This is where the crucial tactics of invoking 
scarcity and crisis assume significance. Nature is still seen and utilised as the 
reservoir of resources from which to extract, but a rapid rate and massive scale 
of extraction are enabled by the sense of urgency that these two ideas convey. 
Extractive response of peasants to ideas of scarcity 
The discourse of scarcity and crisis that fuels the current processes of extrac­
tivism has also stimulated shifts impacting on the internal social and political 
structures of extractivist states. Notably for the case of small-scale mining, the 
scale and extent of the contemporary occupational shift to mining arguably 
comprises one of the largest in human history. For example, the extraordinary 
rush of peasants for gold in Brazilian Amazonia attracted unprecedented num­
bers of people and extracted vast quantities of gold and other precious metals. 
The Brazilian story is not exceptional; variations can be seen throughout the 
mineral-rich tracts of the Global South, where the scramble for resources has 
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reached a crescendo, as rural workers compete with multinational mining 
companies that funnel capital into remote locations. 
The broad picture is one of innumerable people toiling on mineral-rich 
tracts, extracting enormous quantities of minerals. An exact number is difficult 
to establish for a number of reasons, chief among them being that the defini­
tions of what constitutes a mine and what constitutes mining work vary from 
one country to another. Nonetheless, one can note the substantial increase 
from the 1999 International Labour Office estimate of 13 million workers 
(Jennings, 1999) to the Communities and Small-Scale Mining estimate of 
around 35 million in 2005 (CASM, 2005). A more recent estimate from the 
UN Economic Commission for Africa (2011) suggests that there would have 
been around 25 million directly employed in informal, artisanal and small-scale 
mining in 2005, with another 150 to 170 million relying indirectly on these 
livelihoods. Many of these workers are migrants (ILO, 2016). Half of these jobs 
are filled by women and around two million children are also involved. 
These miners inhabit the margins of the mainstream mining economy. As 
a consequence, they tend to be associated with the illicit part of the infor­
mal economy, and rarely feature in scholarly discourses on mining. They are 
known by strange names: the wildcat Garimpeiros of the Brazilian Amazonia, 
the Galampseys in Ghana, Barranquilas in Bolivia, Ninjas in Mongolia, and the 
Gurandils (literally, ‘those who jump from cliff to cliff’) in Indonesia. These 
names reflect the workers’ non-sedentary nature, and the stealth with which 
they operate. Most states recognise peasants in traditional occupational and 
demographic categories as belonging to sedentary farming communities. The 
mobility of such miners—who cannot be easily contained within conces­
sion boundaries, and who stealthily extract minerals from claims belonging 
to larger companies—frustrates national governments. Consequently, they are 
not included either within mining or labour legislation in these countries. One 
could say that their very existence remains a myth; a fiction for policymakers, 
and scholars also tend to pay greater attention to those who mine precious 
minerals and gems such as gold and diamonds. But the rural migrants toiling 
in the trenches of the less glamorous stone quarries in India as wage labourers 
also need to be taken account of. Addressing their absence requires an analyti­
cal framework expansive enough to accommodate the considerable social and 
economic changes that these workers experience. 
While the effects of global mining-oriented capital on peasant communities 
can be explained within traditional Marxist theories, the new and expanding 
extractive activities of peasants are difficult to frame within a Marxist interpre­
tative framework. A conventional view holds that the peasants will revolt. As 
Veltmeyer and Petras (2014: 61) write: ‘The major protagonists in this struggle 
are the local peasant farmers and semiproletarianized rural landless workers, 
who, unlike the traditional proletariat formed under earlier conditions of “prim­
itive accumulation by dispossession”, are engaged in a fundamental struggle to 
preserve their traditional livelihoods and to protect the global commons of land 
and water on which these livelihoods depend.’ However, in Marxist theory, 
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the proletariat is formed by the capitalist development of agriculture, whereby 
the separation of peasants from their means of production converts them into 
a class of wage labourers. While participation of the poor in the commod­
itised economy is explicable in Marxist terms, it fails to account for the extent 
to which peasants actively determine to engage in mining. Graulau (2001: 
98) offers a different perspective, arguing that peasant mining challenges these 
conventional and oppositional modes of thinking. Indeed, the boundary line 
between ‘survival’ and ‘livelihood’ is exceedingly thin, requiring the use of a 
flexible and comprehensive analytical framework. Drawing on Escobar (1997), 
Graulau suggests that rather than being a ‘survival strategy’, a much-touted 
model for understanding the responses of the poor to economic oppression, 
informal mining is a deliberate production strategy to optimise their chances 
of moving out of dire poverty. The problem, therefore, involves developing 
a scholarly understanding of constantly mobile, marginal and extremely poor 
people, and the livelihood choices they make under diverse sets of forces and 
pressures from market forces. 
How can the peasant mine? 
I am using the imprecise and widely debated term ‘peasant’, primarily to lend 
historical significance to our contemporary understanding of informal min­
ing practices. Geertz (1961) comments that, conventionally, the term ‘peasant’ 
has been associated with the historical, social and economic aspects of life in 
Europe in the Middle Ages, and confused with the term ‘folk’. Shanin (1990: 
69) noted that peasants ‘are not only an analytical construct . . . but a social 
group which exists in the collective consciousness and political deed of its 
members.’ One can, therefore, conceive as ‘peasants’ those engaged in a broad 
range of subsistence-based or small-scale agriculture in the Global South, 
including those who own small pieces of land, are tenants on such lands or are 
sharecroppers or landless agricultural labourers. As peasants, they also occupy 
particular roles within the development objectives of extractivist states that 
involve their managed participation in agrarian economies. 
Peasants who turn to mining activities are being incorporated into a wide 
array of mineral extractive occupations that generate cash for their subsist­
ence or the improvement of their wellbeing. I argue that rural people, located 
on mineral-rich tracts throughout the developed and developing countries 
of Asia, Africa and South America, are being drawn into the peasant mining 
economy almost without exception. These ‘extractive peasants’ use a diverse 
range of artisanal and small-scale modes of mineral extraction and engage with 
the market by increasing or decreasing their production, depending on market 
prices. As a grey zone between the legitimate and the illegal, mineral-based 
livelihood practices offer incomes and stability to millions of disenfranchised 
poor, and present us with the opportunity to recognise peasants not just as out­
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As a substantial body of evidence put forth by social historians and archaeol­
ogists shows, mining and agriculture are not incompatible. Indeed, their work 
highlights the coexistence of, and similarities between, mining communities 
and economies, on one hand, and rural peasant societies and economies on the 
other. The evidence lies largely in three factors: the rural roots of industrial 
mining labourers, the seasonal complementarities, and the informal and formal 
systems of mutual exchange such as the tribute system. 
What is driving peasants into mining? 
From ‘impacts’, recent research has turned to the exploration of what might
be causing the rural poor to leave traditional forms of subsistence in favour
of extractive livelihoods. ASM’s relationship with urbanisation in Africa, noted
by Bryceson et al. (2014), resonates with the ‘rush hypothesis’ (Cartier, 2009;
Walsh, 2003), which is based on the sudden growth of several ‘rush towns’ in
mineralised regions. Walsh (2003: 292) argues that in Madagascar ‘the sapphire
trade has offered many the promise, and some the means, of earning previously
unattainable sums of money.’ Hilson (2010) draws a link to the past in the rush
hypothesis, suggesting that the establishment and growth of many such settle­
ments in Sub-Saharan Africa can best be understood when framed by the gold
rush that took place in the south-western United States more than 150 years ago. 
A different scenario emerged from Jønsson and Bryceson’s (2009) detailed 
analysis of peasants’ mobility patterns to newly discovered mining sites, com­
plicating the linearity of history. They suggest that, at the individual level, 
movements are ‘rushed’ rather than ‘rash’, and whereas movement to the first 
site may be an adventure, movement to subsequent sites is calculated with 
knowledge of the risks entailed. The question that arises then is: are peasants 
branching out into a new source of livelihood offering seasonal or temporary 
income, or is it more accurate to regard this as a shift away from their categori­
sation as peasants? Received wisdom from peasant studies is that peasants either 
move out of agriculture in favour of urban jobs, or circulate between better-off 
rural areas, giving rise to a ‘de-agrarianisation versus livelihood diversification’ 
debate in the context of informal mining. Scholars (such as Bryceson, 1996) 
have speculated that, in response to liberalised markets, rural Africa is experi­
encing pronounced ‘de-agrarianisation’, suggesting that the transition out of 
farming is by no means temporary. 
The contention is that agriculture now plays an ancillary role in the liveli­
hoods of rural inhabitants, and that non-farm activities provide the primary 
source of household disposable income (Bryceson, 2002). In conventional 
‘de-agrarianised’ landscapes, agriculture and mineral extraction play different 
roles: mining has become a primary source of disposable income; farming is 
increasingly undertaken to provide household food security; and household 
finances and other forms of capital now flow between both activities. Jønsson 
and Bryceson (2009) note that gold digging has become a career in much of 
rural East Africa, where farming is regarded as a sideline activity, and that for 
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successful career miners it is best to dissociate from farming. The Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) and economic liberalisation policies in Africa 
have led to a plethora of changes in rural productive and marketing infra­
structure that have often increased rather than reduced uncertainty, leading 
to ‘multiplex livelihoods’ in which, ‘[i]n addition to proliferating sources of 
income, the transition encompasses movement away from agriculture towards 
non-agricultural work, from unpaid towards paid work, and from household-
based to more individualised labour activities’ (Bryceson, 2002: 2). A complex 
set of social, political, cultural and economic dynamics are emerging among the 
critical drivers of informal mining, ‘inducing a large-scale search for new, more 
remunerative activities outside agriculture’ (Bryceson, 1999: 173). 
Global agricultural production has changed markedly throughout the 1990s, 
with extensive liberalisation of agricultural markets marginalising subsistence 
farmers. In less affluent parts of the world, states have privileged urban econo­
mies and withdrawn support for agriculture, following a model of development 
that has been described as ‘predatory growth’ and has led to the ‘internal col­
onization of the poor’ (Walker, 2008: 558). Subsidies on farm inputs were 
eliminated, export crop taxes were reduced, agriculture was privatised and 
non-tariff barriers were removed in order to secure loans from the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The withdrawal of state support 
has placed peasant societies under severe pressure, making farming economi­
cally non-viable and eroding its longstanding status as the economic mainstay 
for rural families. The economic non-viability of agriculture is evidenced by 
the widespread diversification of rural livelihoods into non-farm activities. As 
millions of peasants in Asia, Africa and South America move out of the fields, 
they take up any jobs that are available. Mining as individuals, as families, in 
groups or as wage-workers constitutes such a livelihood. 
At the same time, where economic liberalisation has disrupted rural econo­
mies and pauperised smallholders in agriculture, most states have aggressively 
invited Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)—particularly in large-scale mining— 
as a means of rapidly securing revenue. To attract foreign mining investments, 
and under the advice of the World Bank and the IMF, almost all countries 
have taken steps to reform their mining legislation and regulatory frameworks. 
Relatively remote regions, portrayed as resource frontiers, are now being drawn 
into the vortex of industrial change as new mining companies are allowed by 
states to construct large capital-intensive mining projects. In countries where a 
harsh environment has exacerbated the detrimental effects on traditional liveli­
hoods, the combined withdrawal of the state and the entry of foreign capital 
has resulted in near-total retreat from conventional livelihoods to swift adop­
tion of the new, cash-generating labours in mineral extraction. Variations of 
the story can be found in many corners of the world (for examples see Kamete, 
2008, on Zimbabwe and Tripp, 1997, on Tanzania). 
Clearly, the factors that are pushing peasants into informal mining are rooted 
in contemporary—often interlinked and overlapping—economic, social and 
political changes that were triggered by economic liberalisation. They become 
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more apparent when seen in the context of globalisation (Akram-Lodhi and 
Kay, 2009), agrarian transition and peasant mobility (Araghi, 2009), and the 
incorporation of peasants as wage labourers into informal economies (Breman, 
2010). Local contexts, including historical, political, economic and ecological 
realities, produce unique combinations of factors that drive this unprecedented 
and widespread shift from agrarian to informal mineral extractive economies. 
Of these, six can be broadly recognised as significant: the unsustainability and 
low productivity of agriculture (‘agricultural poverty’ or the ‘push’ factor); 
economic reforms to liberalise land markets and to prioritise FDI (‘structural 
reform’); states’ initiatives to earn revenue income from mineral extraction 
(the ‘rentier state’); the equation of mining with development as a rationale 
for establishing an extractive model that supposedly favours large corporat­
ised operators and local communities (the unproved ideology of ‘mining for 
development’); environmental degradation at the local level, coupled with 
uncertainties of climate caused by local and global processes (‘environmental 
distress’); and high commodity prices, which add further incentive to earn cash 
income (the ‘pull’ factor). Combined, they have compelled peasants to adopt 
extractive livelihoods in addition to, but more often in lieu of, farming. I will 
outline two cases from East and South Asian countries that operate on differ­
ent geographical scales, but represent the diversity of sociopolitical dynamics 
driving informal mining. 
Nomadic herders digging up the Gobi: Mongolia 
Mongolia illuminates how a combination of factors operates to create a spec­
tacular change in livelihoods. Since the liberalisation of its economy in the 
aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Mongolia has established 
foreign-funded large-scale mining projects producing gold, coal, copper and 
molybdenum, primarily for the export market. Today the country relies on the 
mining industry for 30 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) and 70 per 
cent of its total export income. The traditional economy, based on nomadic 
animal husbandry, now contributes only about 20 per cent of GDP (Dierkes 
and Khushrushahi, 2006). In 2003, there were at least 100,000 artisanal miners 
(Grayson et  al. 2004). More recently, Buxton (2013: 3) conservatively sug­
gested that numbers could be between 40,000 and 60,000. However, it is 
useful to remember that this is an estimate focused primarily on gold, thus leav­
ing out workers involved in coal, fluorspar and other industrial commodities, 
the seasonal miners who switch between mining and other livelihoods, and 
the gold traders, shopkeepers and restaurant owners involved in the informal 
mining economy. 
As in many countries, modern industrialised mining in Mongolia coex­
ists and shares space with the production and labour processes practiced by 
ex-nomadic herders. High (2012: 250) argues that ‘the Mongolian gold rush 
is conceived locally’ and is ‘more than an economic phenomenon of facts 





occur around large mine sites where mineral extraction has interrupted river 
regimes, decreasing water availability and quality. At the same time, there has 
been a rapid increase—within a decade—of informal mining by the nomadic 
herders, who have been displaced from their traditional occupations (Suzuki, 
2013). The push from a rural livelihood into informal mineral extraction has 
been exacerbated by severe and sudden environmental catastrophes in the 
form of successive disastrous winters known as dzuds (Upton, 2010), as well 
as the withdrawal of social security systems coincident with the liberalisation 
of the economy. Although High (2008: 3) refutes the popular notion that 
ASM is a poverty-driven activity and suggests that artisanal mining is linked to 
‘Mongolian ideas about patriarchy, generosity and specifically the obligation to 
share wealth’, the need to survive and build a livelihood cannot be ignored as 
having driven many of the poor in Mongolia to take up informal gold mining 
to supplement cash-based incomes (see Cane et  al., 2015). The Mongolian 
state is yet to come fully to terms with it, even after a series of legislative efforts 
to regulate, formalise and control its commodity supply chains. 
Displaced locals creating a moral economy: eastern India 
According to the World Coal Association, 71 per cent of India’s electricity 
supplies come from coal-fired power plants, and in a country with over 500 
million people without access to electricity, the mining of coal for power gen­
eration has assumed great significance. Consequently, coal mining is central in 
the overall scenario of mining-induced displacement. At the same time, with 
a full-fledged separate Ministry, coal occupies pride of place in shaping the 
economic and political milieu of India, dictating its energy future (Lahiri-Dutt, 
2014), and continues to enjoy an iconic status as a national symbol, which it 
assumed after independence, and which led ultimately to its nationalisation in 
the early 1970s. 
Eastern India is one region that witnessed the early advent of coal mining— 
heralding the emergence of ‘modern’ industries—during the colonial period 
(Rothermund and Wadhwa, 1978). Collieries absorbed the local forest-dependent
indigenous communities into the labour force (Corbridge, 2004), leading also 
to urban transformation of the area (Lahiri-Dutt, 2001). As against the colonial 
period underground mines, large-scale, mechanised open-cut collieries have 
been established in recent years; some are funded by private entrepreneurs 
with heavy state, national and World Bank support. These open-cut collieries 
encroach on forests, grazing/farming land sometimes held as commons (gair 
majurwa) and inalienable land that has been traditionally held by indigenous 
communities (Lahiri-Dutt et al., 2012). A mining-degraded environment and 
the physical displacement of forest-dependent communities has seen a signifi­
cant occupational increase in informal coal mining. 
Most of the miners are the dispossessed local poor, who often describe the 
activity as ‘coal collection’, reminiscent of gathering wood from forests dur­
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that had belonged to them. A 2003 field survey in eastern India conservatively 
estimated that 2.5 million tonnes of coal was mined outside of that produced 
by the state-owned Coal India Limited (Lahiri-Dutt and Williams, 2005).
A repeat survey in 2012 found that this amount had increased to 3.7 million 
tonnes (Lahiri-Dutt et al., 2014). Entrepreneurs often carry the coal on bicycles 
in loads of up to 300 kilograms, earning only marginally more than the mini­
mum daily wage they would have received as wage labourers loading coal into 
trucks. Whereas the state largely tolerates them, popular media portrays these 
cycle-pushers as environmental raiders, focusing on the Hobbesian lawlessness, 
conflicts, chaos and illegality of this livelihood. 
The depiction of lawless disorder is not restricted to eastern India, but 
extends throughout the Global South, where underdevelopment, misery and 
ethnic violence are considered to drive these workers, and they are portrayed 
as undeserving opportunists encroaching on the environmental commons— 
fierce political rebels subverting innocent labour (Wilson, 2013). The recurrent 
explanation of informal mining as creating the ‘deadliest places’ in the nation, 
harbouring ‘conflict minerals’ (Eichstaedt, 2011), inappropriately invokes 
notions of the ‘resource curse’ and ‘resource wars’ (see VanDeveer, 2013). 
These simplistic, ahistorical accounts reduce miners to petty criminals, obscure 
their moral claims over land and its resources, and easily lend themselves to 
policy recommendations emphasising control and regulation in order to secure 
revenue for the state. 
Discussion 
The two cases above refer to situations at multiple geographical scales, yet 
the similarities are remarkable: the ongoing transformation from land-based 
herding, forestry and farming to mineral-based livelihoods. They also present 
extraordinary diversities: in production processes and labour organisation, in 
the level of capital accumulation and in market outreach. For example, some 
coal in eastern India is transported on bullock carts or cycles, while heavy-duty 
four-wheel vehicles make their own tracks to reach the nooks and crannies of 
the Mongolian Gobi. This diversity defies the logic of modern industrial labour 
processes, and contains within it significantly pre-modern modes of produc­
tion. For example, the family unit in which the wife works with the husband 
and the child learns a trade by apprenticing with the father in their ‘coal col­
lection’; and the casual or itinerant ex-herder swiftly moving from one gold 
digging site to another. Unlike unionised industrial and factory workers, the 
absence of proper wages and safe working conditions make those working in 
informal mines and quarries the poorest, most wretched and most exploited of 
labourers, engaged in the most insecure and dangerous work in order to sur­
vive and build better lives for themselves and their families. 
Official data often do not reflect this reality. One difficulty is self-identification.
During my fieldwork in the stone and marble quarries of Rajasthan in India,






labourers for up to 15 years continued to identify as peasants, no matter how 
peripheral an economic role farming played in their lives. Therefore, instead 
of asking whether mining is a means of escaping subsistence agriculture, or if it 
represents a social categorisation outside the class of ‘peasant’, questions ought 
to be framed in ways that avoid nomenclature for its own sake, and rather look 
to continuities and discontinuities among the communities affected by rapid 
social and economic transformations. This would be possible if experts inves­
tigating mineral production were to take into account the continuing peasant 
traditions in production relations. Similarly, attention needs to be focused on 
the resource politics of the poor, rather than directed solely at processes occur­
ring on a national scale. 
How the empirical data are interpreted also needs consideration. The ten­
dency to criminalise the poor of the Global South has been strongly criticised; 
in the African context, scholars (such as Mbembe, 2001: 2) have described the 
‘absolute otherness’ that gives rise to negative interpretations that entrap the 
continent in relations of corruption. Informal mining, envisaged as the illegiti­
mate version of extractive industries, arouses similar negative interpretations. 
The cases cited here show that grounded and detailed analyses are capable of 
offering alternatives that can rescue peasants—when they turn to extraction 
in order to survive—from discourses of criminality. Such a reframed research 
agenda to explain the unprecedented stampede by peasants to secure mineral-
based livelihoods would neither ignore the past nor the contemporary social, 
political and economic changes sweeping rural areas throughout the world. 
The extractive peasantry might be crucial to shifting the geographical centre of 
gravity of the world’s extractive industries and redefining mineral production. 
Conclusion 
To a significant extent, the perspectives that researchers and policymakers take 
determine the social and economic structures with which people are confronted. 
For this reason, the frameworks used to describe peasants, and the concomitant 
perceptions of their agency under duress and desperation, are crucial. On the 
one hand, seeing the poor as perpetually trying to survive and barely managing 
has the effect of limiting them to circumstances that occlude their ingenuity and 
the differences within their daily contexts, or of depicting their livelihoods as 
harming or costing others or themselves. The language of survival contributes 
to an image of the poor as victims who in reality may resort to theft, begging 
or prostitution, or the reorientation of their consumption patterns, in order to 
counter unemployment or unaffordable living expenses. On the other hand, 
past ideals of heroic peasant resistance, widely recognised as the crucial marker 
of peasant societies, have been crumbling under the oppressive weight of
market-oriented economic policy. Yet, the sharp demarcation in theory makes 
it almost impossible to offer an alternative interpretation of extraction by peas­
ants that incorporates individual agency and market determinism—permitting
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the commodity. We are disciplined to think in binary terms of need or greed, 
choice or the lack of alternatives, agency or force. 
The concept of the extractive peasant offers an alternative to the ‘need 
versus greed’ argument central to the concept of environmental sustainability 
in mining (Ali, 2009), and the various potential interpretations of the moral 
economy of informal mining. The avoidance of binary options, as suggested by 
Arnold (2001), allows us to see peasants both as moral agents and as those who 
take advantage of commodification of resources. 
In conclusion, in the contemporary world of heightened resource extrac­
tivism, peasants do not encounter the material world as a homogeneous mass, 
nor do they remain unchanged by it. Rather, peasants redefine themselves 
in order to be neither the outcasts nor the victims of modernity. In contem­
porary extractive states, encounters with the material value of minerals and 
underground resources do not simply undermine peasants and turn them into 
outcasts of modernity. Paradoxically, they permit peasants to redefine their 
conception of material and social worlds and their places in them. 
However, peasants are not necessarily the free agents envisaged by capital­
ism (Breman, 2010). Rather, by virtue of their extractivism, peasants in the 
contemporary world appreciate what has been described as ‘three dimensional 
land’ by Bebbington (2013), because they recognise that the yield of mining is 
many times greater than agriculture. As the state recedes to allow the market to 
take over, letting commodity prices rise to hitherto uncontemplated levels, the 
desperate peasants under severe compulsion attempt to turn the tables in their 
favour in order to scrape at least some benefits from the disruptive changes. 
In the process, they reconceptualise themselves and the political economy of 
extractive industries. Through their extractivism, not only do the peasants 
come to appreciate the three-dimensional value of land, they also challenge 
seemingly invincible statist (and later, corporatised) rights to mineral resources, 
and contest the imagined links between corporatised mining and economic, 
human and social development and poverty reduction in less affluent nations. 
Through the extraction of resources, peasants engage—albeit not necessarily 
on their own terms—with the walled-in space of global commodity produc­
tion and trade, in the process reconceptualising themselves and the political 
economy of extractive industries. 
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6 Whose scarcity, whose security? 
Multi-scalar contestation of water 




The use and management of water in South Asia has long been discursively 
constructed as an issue of scarcity. The range of overlapping and competing 
stakeholders representing agriculture, industry, sanitation and a variety of other 
uses necessarily results in contests over how water should be utilised (Adeel 
and Wirsing, 2017). Moreover, high levels of population growth, issues of 
water quality, agricultural intensification and economic change have all inten­
sified this contestation (Kugelman and Hathaway, 2009; Laghari, Vanham 
and Rauch, 2012). Although parts of northern South Asia face these issues to 
greater and lesser degrees (Hill, 2013), it is arguably in the Indus Basin that this 
contestation is the most intense and seemingly the most intractable, not least 
because it involves two countries, which, since gaining independence from 
Britain, have been mired in long-running and seemingly intractable conflict, 
namely India and Pakistan. Indeed, the sharing of water between countries, 
such as between India and Pakistan, has long been imbricated in regional geo­
politics (Gilmartin, 2015; Haines, 2016). Just as significantly, the issue of water 
scarcity and its imbrication with water security is a significant domestic political 
issue in both countries (Hill, 2008). 
While acknowledging that these international and intra-national disputes 
clearly point to a situation where water scarcity has led to political contestation, 
I see the need to problematise the seemingly commonsensical reading of how 
we might understand this particular example of resource scarcity. Like many 
others in this collection, my reading of water security in the Indus suggests 
that we need alternative approaches to how we understand the control and 
allocation of resources than those that prevail in the popular understanding. 
The long tradition of water resource management in South Asia has followed a 
supply side dominated, engineering-led understanding of the use of water and 
this has tended to mean that water sharing is understood in volumetric terms 
(Akhter, 2017; D’Souza, 2016). This reductionist understanding of water—so 
that it is confined only to volume per unit of time—has had the effect of 
confining the debate in ways that impact upon ecosystem services and the live­
lihoods of many local communities. Key to my critique, then, is the argument 




















knowledge and being. The epistemological and ontological closures of ortho­
dox understanding of water security stem from the overwhelming emphasis 
placed upon a volumetric understanding of water. 
In recent years, this volumetric understanding of water has become increasingly
securitised, in that the allocation of water at different times of the year to different
parts of the basin has become framed by an unhelpful conflation of water scarcity
on the one hand, and the propensity towards conflict between nation-states on
the other hand (Chellaney, 2011). In this reading, water security is interpreted in a
manner more redolent of orthodox international relations ideas of environmental
security than a human security centred approach that predominates among donors
and civil society (Burgess, Owen and Sinha, 2016). The dominance of a supply-
led approach to water also contributes to a lack of transparency around water
resource management, since it has become a site for secrecy over data sharing.
Indeed, information about how much water is flowing in a river from one point
to another at a particular time of year is jealously guarded by different bureaucra­
cies in all countries of South Asia (Ali and Zia, 2017; Surie and Prasai, 2015). 
The first part of the chapter analyses water security as it is typically understood 
in South Asia, asserting why this leads to systemic closures and the implications 
for livelihoods and ecosystem services. The second part of the chapter consid­
ers how this logic is transposed and modified with regard to the geopolitics of 
water sharing in the Indus Basin. However, we must also keep in mind that all 
of these other scales of water allocation and scarcity are potentially impacted 
by what happens at this so-called ‘regional scale’. In other words, focusing on 
the relations between countries and what this means for water scarcity cannot 
be about privileging the nation-state as unitary or unified in its intents, as is 
often the case in terms of how hydro politics are analysed (Hill, 2013; 2015). 
The hydro-geographies prevailing within neighbouring provinces, districts, vil­
lages and households do not disappear just because we move analytically to the 
regional scale. A discussion of resource contestation is therefore necessarily also 
a discussion of the politics of this rescaling process (Wald and Hill, 2016). 
The final part of the chapter considers recent initiatives aimed at broad­
ening understandings of water sharing between India and Pakistan. Many of
these initiatives have been promoted by civil society, academia and other non­
governmental organisations. While we see some progress in moving towards a
broader understanding of the relationship of water to its environs in other basins,
in the Indus Basin there is more of a political deadlock, which has meant that
these initiatives have not achieved as much as might be thought possible. The
chapter concludes by considering how we might move beyond this deadlock
and what this case means for broadening our understanding of water security. 
Conceptualising water scarcity and water security 
in South Asia 
There is no doubt that the control and effective use of water is a significant 
issue for a great number of people living in the Himalayan basins of South 
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Asia, and that these issues are particularly evident in the Indus Basin. Most 
basins that originate in the Himalayas are highly populous and are extremely 
biodiverse. Agriculture is the main use of water in the basins and over time this 
water has come to be extracted in ever-greater amounts from both surface and 
groundwater. 
Most people in northern South Asia live in sub-basins that are usually clas­
sified as water stressed; a technical description that refers to the availability 
of water per capita (National Research Council, Committee on Population, 
2012).1 Projections of future availability of water per capita in South Asia sug­
gest that this is likely to get considerably worse in the future, such that more 
and more people will be living in water scarce areas; that is, areas in which 
there is insufficient water per capita for all necessary uses. 
The Indus Basin is an important example of how water scarcity creates and 
intensifies development challenges for a range of people. Indeed, inhabitants 
of the Indus Basin face a significant number of challenges related to declining 
water availability per capita, in terms of both water quality and quantity. This 
is arguably the most important basin in South Asia with regard to agricultural 
production, with the Punjab in particular often labelled the breadbasket of 
India and Pakistan. Agriculture was extended in this basin during the colonial 
period through the construction of the world’s largest contiguous irrigation 
system (Ali, 2004). Agriculture remains the most important usage of water 
and the major contributor to the economic base of the basin, as a source of 
both subsistence food security and rural livelihoods and as an income generat­
ing activity (Ahmad, 2012). Many of the most key industries in the Indus are 
very water intensive, including textiles, sugar and wheat, and their continuing 
viability—on the Pakistani side in particular—is problematised by the continu­
ing low efficiency of irrigation, technological obsolescence, poor regulatory 
mechanisms and worsening power shortages (Briscoe and Qamar, 2006). 
A changing climate intensifies the vulnerability of people in the Indus 
to these challenges, creating a cycle of droughts and floods that has already 
had major impacts on livelihoods and looks likely to increase in the future 
(Singh et al., 2011). Moreover, while surface and groundwater irrigation have 
increased enormously in the period since the Green Revolution began, a con­
siderable demise in both quality and quantity of the groundwater resource 
is now evident (Rodell, Velicogna and Famiglietti, 2009). While there are 
variations across the Indus Basin, this situation holds true for both India and 
Pakistan, making the agricultural base, upon which the Punjab’s prosperity has 
been derived, ever more tenuous. 
One approach that is often cited as a potential solution to water scarcity 
is inter-basin transfer; that is, the transfer of water from one basin to another 
through the building of a lot of infrastructure, such as link canals, storage dams 
and so on. Such an approach has long had adherents in India, in particular, 
and in the contemporary period these plans have become tangible through the 
proposed Inter Linking of Rivers (ILR) scheme (Alley, 2004; Bandyopadhyay 











politics of water allocation come into stark relief, since the ILR scheme is 
premised upon an assessment of which parts of the country are ‘water deficit’
and which are ‘water surplus’. The idea here is that the transfer of water 
from surplus regions to deficit regions will increase agricultural productivity 
and will go a considerable way towards ‘drought proofing’ the country. The 
realisation of this scheme would have significant environmental impacts and 
is likely to lead to the disruption of livelihoods and the displacement of those 
whose villages are in the vicinity of proposed dam sites. It would also exac­
erbate provincial politics between states over the allocation of water, given 
that those areas that are in declared water surplus basins are usually in different 
states from those that are declared water deficit. 
It is striking that this debate and the logic under which it proceeds is
framed almost entirely in terms of a volumetric understanding of water. As
such, very little consideration is given to the broader functioning of these
rivers or the many aspects of the human–environment interface. These eli­
sions are both in terms of what happens inside the river but also in terms of
the river’s role in the functioning of environmental processes and the main­
tenance of ecosystems. 
The ILR scheme has been heavily criticised by social activists and many 
academics for the fact that it pays very little credence to the environmental 
impacts of these planned diversions. Many of the regions that are deemed to be 
water surplus, such as the North-Eastern states that are part of the Brahmaputra 
and Meghna Basins, are biodiversity hotspots with a significant number of 
endemic flora and fauna.2 People living up and down these basins interact with 
and depend upon both the river and its broader ecosystems for their liveli­
hoods. While agriculture is important here, resources from fisheries and forests 
are also important. And yet, proponents of river linking rarely account for this 
diversity or the broader role of water in socio-ecological processes. 
Conceptualising water security within basins 
Regardless of whether one believes that inter-basin transfer is practical or desir­
able, there is little question that such a narrow understanding of water usage 
and availability—that is, only conveyed as a quantum of flow expressed spatially 
by basin or sub-basin—limits our capacity to understand who has inadequate 
access to water and why this is the case. One aspect of this is the significant 
variations within these basins. For example, those living in the mountainous 
parts of the Indus Basin continue to rely upon monsoon-variable, rain-fed 
agriculture and tend to be economically and politically marginalised, whereas 
in the more prosperous parts of the basin, notably in both parts of (Indian and 
Pakistani) Punjab, agriculture generates high surplus returns and has provided 
the opportunity for diversification into non-agricultural industries. 
In addition to these regional variations, there are also significant differences
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Asian societies are more often than not marked by significant inequalities that
can typically, but imperfectly, be understood on the basis of social categories
such as class, caste, gender and ethnicity. The headline figures on water scar­
city cannot capture this complexity unless they are disaggregated on the basis
of these social categories. The discursive construction of resource scarcity
therefore needs to account more explicitly for the operation of power rela­
tions and how these are contested in social, economic and political domains.
When we do this, we see that not everyone suffers from water stress in these
‘water stressed’ basins, and that those that do are likely to be marginalised in
other respects as well. Lower caste or class communities are less likely to be
able to access water and, when they do, they are more likely to have to enter
water markets in order to do so. Women typically have less access to water
than men and usually have to spend a considerable part of their working lives
accessing it. 
While all of these issues ostensibly appear to be mainly questions of limited 
water supply being outstripped by the multiple demands of a growing popula­
tion, in reality, at the heart of the challenge of managing water across the Indus 
is the overcoming of poor governance on both sides of the border (Briscoe 
and Qamar, 2006; Hill, 2013; Khagram, 2004; Lahiri-Dutt and Wasson, 2008; 
Mustafa, Akhter and Nasralla, 2013; Roy, 1999). Numerous authors have 
extensively outlined the systemic failures of the high modernist ambitions of 
the state, with criticism frequently aimed at the lack of responsiveness from 
the government with regard to appropriate procedures for the mitigation of 
social, economic and environmental impacts (Choudhury, 2014; Erlewein, 
2013). For example, in assessing governance challenges in Pakistan, Mustafa 
et  al. (2013) argue that there is little evidence that the state intends to shift 
away from a culture where endemic corruption and little regulatory oversight 
are normalised. Moreover, there is significant bureaucratic fragmentation with 
different subjects handled by different departments, as well as numerous bodies 
of legislation in both India and Pakistan, related to minor and major irrigation, 
drainage, forestry and environmental protection. 
Social, economic and political factors inherently drive who controls water
in the Indus and the purpose for which they use it (Mustafa, 2010). One of
most notable things about how this water allocation is materially contested
in the Indus Basin is that it is mediated through relationships between the
state and different social groups. Historically, water resource development
in the Indus was extremely state-centric and technocratic in its orientation.
While there have been some changes over time, this remains overwhelm­
ingly the case. A range of authors has analysed and documented how the
hydraulic state has consistently represented the interests of dominant classes
in both India and Pakistan. In the work of Imran Ali (2004), for example,
there is a clear demonstration of how the historical trajectory of the canal
colonies from the colonial to the post-colonial period in Pakistan has inten­



















other social groups. To Ali, the control and distribution of water demon­
strates how the state is an instrument of control for these classes and, as such,
it is unsurprising that governance issues continue to bedevil the sector. 
Thus, while it is certainly the case that Pakistan has a relatively low volume of
water available per capita, an environmentally deterministic or neo-Malthusian
explanation does not do justice to the institutional context that supports the
promotion of the interests of a class of Punjabi large landholders, who them­
selves have strong connections with the bureaucratic and military apparatus
of the Pakistani state (Ali, 2004). In a similar way, the prosperity of Punjabi
and Jat farmers is underwritten by the Minimum Support Prices (MSPs) of the
Government of India for the purchase of wheat and the highly subsidised elec­
tricity (and diesel) that enables the extraction of groundwater (Hill, 2003). An
important farmers’ movement has developed since the Green Revolution in dif­
ferent parts of India (and Pakistan, in different ways) that has led to widespread
concessions for subsidised power, fertiliser, pesticides and, in particular, water.
MSPs also continue to encourage the cultivation of water intensive crops, such
as cotton, which contribute to the over-utilisation of irrigation, whether it is
from canals, rivers or groundwater aquifers. 
Thus, we might consider an environmentally deterministic account of intra­
regional differences between parts of the basin to focus on the relative ease of 
capturing and utilising water for intensive agriculture in the lower, flatter parts 
of the Indus Basin compared to the upland parts. In contrast, it is not simply 
the topography, but also the economic structure and political marginalisa­
tion of parts of the Indus, such as Azad Kashmir or Himachal Pradesh, which 
contribute to the fact that the gains from the development of the Indus Basin 
are extremely uneven in terms of both spatial distribution and social relations. 
Hydropower in the Indus 
Disagreements over the appropriate scale and distribution of hydropower 
development represent an important factor in controversies over water sharing 
in the Indus Basin. Hydropower projects for both irrigation and energy have 
historically been the state’s most visible intervention into the geographies of 
water, particularly in India. While large-scale dams can transfer surface water 
to areas of greatest demand at times when it is most needed, offer flood protec­
tion and be an important source of electricity, too often the gains from their 
construction in South Asia are not enough to offset the negative impacts that 
they have generated (D’Souza, 2008; Hill, 2013). Displacement and disruption 
of livelihoods for people living in the immediate environs of these dams have 
often been accompanied by impacts on both riverine and riparian ecosystems 
that have impacted people living downstream. 
One of the ways in which we see most clearly that the control of water extends
and intensifies pre-existing power relations between different groups within the
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live. Moreover, the building of these projects has significantly disadvantaged
these kinds of communities, while creating new revenue streams for other, more
powerful, groups. For marginalised peoples, projects that are promoted as being
in the ‘national interest’ lead to the usurpation of their resources, their displace­
ment and, more often than not, their impoverishment. The Tarbela Dam in
Pakistan, which was completed in 1974, is a striking example of the failures of
the state in this regard. More than 96,000 people from 135 villages were dis­
placed, and despite large cash compensation outlays, many of them have yet to
be adequately resettled even to this day (Hill, 2009). Similarly, in India there is a
striking predominance of tribal people among those displaced as a consequence
of the building of large-scale hydropower projects, despite their comparatively
small proportion of the total population of India. 
In addition to the state consistently favouring powerful groups within 
society at the expense of the marginalised, water resources policy also creates 
disputes between provinces. Indeed, in the Indus Basin, different provinces 
have long argued with each other over how much water should be utilised by 
the upper versus the lower riparian territory (Hill, 2008). We can see this most 
clearly in Pakistan, between Punjab and Sindh provinces, and in numerous 
examples in India, including between Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan in the 
north-west of the country. 
The culture around hydropower construction has meant that it has been 
difficult for other voices and perspectives to penetrate this sphere. In India, 
civil society has been extremely active in contesting these plans, although they 
struggle to be able to obtain data on the ecological or livelihood conditions of 
many rivers in India, particularly in the more remote areas such as Jammu and 
Kashmir (J&K). In Pakistan, civil society has less capacity to influence decision-
making processes and the highly professionalised organisations that are able 
to participate in conversations about water resources, such as the Islamabad-
based Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), are constrained in the
manner in which they can dissent. 
Water has also increasingly been securitised and this presents difficulty for 
those who are attempting to articulate a different vision of what the Indus Basin 
should be, and how the resources should be utilised. The Hydro Meteorological 
Data Dissemination Policy, notified in 2013, divides India into three regions, 
namely the Indus (Region 1), the Ganges, Brahmaputra Meghna (Region 2) 
and the rest of the country (Region 3). Data is supposed to be readily avail­
able for all basins in Region 3, but data about Regions 1 and 2 are subject to 
a regulatory environment because these data are ‘classified’ (Government of 
India, Ministry of Water Resources, 2013: 2). 
Controversies in Indian controlled parts of the Indus 
The Chenab sub-basin, which includes the Indian controlled states of J&K




















96 D. Hill 
expansion of hydropower has been particularly controversial in recent years.
The planned expansion of large-scale dams in J&K has attracted criticism for
a wide variety of reasons (Hill, 2017). Seismologists suggest that building so
many dams in a quake prone zone is hazardous, particularly because a great
deal of the Chenab River runs along a fault line. The building of these pro­
jects has also been embroiled in Centre-State politics, particularly with regard
to the Government of India’s treatment of the troubled state of J&K. In that
state, there are long-running complaints about the role of the Government
of India-owned National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. (NHPC),
which is one of the most significant companies in the entire country in terms
of hydropower construction. 
One of the objections to the role of the NHPC relates to the proportion 
of revenue from its hydropower projects given to the state government of 
J&K, with critics arguing that this should rise to 25 per cent from the current 
12 per cent (Shah, 2015). Furthermore, to many people in J&K, the NHPC 
is directly responsible for the fact that the state continues to suffer significant 
load-shedding,3 particularly during the winter, while also having high prices 
for electricity. Indeed, the state government wants the NHPC to return to 
state control a number of hydropower projects, including Salal, Uri-I and 
Dulhasti. Animosities are such that the state government is asserting that it will 
not give any more projects to the corporation and this is creating difficulties 
in the People’s Democratic Party-Bharatiya Janata Party (PDP-BJP) alliance 
(Naikoo, 2015). 
For its part, the Union Power Ministry rejects the arguments of the J&K
government. It asserts that hydropower projects are the responsibility of many
different ministries and, as such, the inter-ministerial nature of the projects means
that there are too many financial and legal hurdles to return the projects. Further,
it argues that the state government gains concessions, including a proportion
of the total output as ‘free’ power, every time a new project begins operating.
As such, the most advantageous position for the J&K government to take is to
encourage the NHPC to build more dams. Indeed, the Union Power Minister
recently asserted that since the Indian Himalayas contains a range of sites in other
states, too much agitation from J&K would result in NHPC looking elsewhere. 
It is not only in the J&K parts of the Chenab that hydropower construc­
tion is controversial. In the adjacent state of Himachal Pradesh, civil society 
groups have been protesting because a large number of the projects that have 
been proposed or are under construction have not been following appropri­
ate procedures with regard to gaining clearance and undertaking consultation. 
They further suggest that, in the building of some of these projects, parts of 
the Kishtwar High Altitude National Park might be submerged and that envi­
ronmental mitigation measures (such as fish ladders) have not been put in place 
and benefit sharing measures (such as adequate compensation for loss of land, 
or employment) have not been given to local people. Further, many Indian-
based civil society groups object to the number of projects proposed or under 
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construction, because no cumulative assessment has been carried out to evalu­
ate their impact. The Union Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) 
has specifically requested that such cumulative assessments be carried out; but 
the government of Himachal Pradesh has asked for waivers on environmental 
clearance, suggesting that cumulative assessments are against the interests of 
the state. Such a perspective clearly disregards the ecosystem services and the 
livelihoods of people that are currently living in the Chenab sub-basin and 
instead prioritises a model of development where large-scale projects can create 
economic growth and, in doing so, integrate economically poorer areas with 
wealthier ones, ostensibly for the benefit of both regions. Clearly, though, 
investment is in itself not enough; there must be a change in the relationship 
between local people and energy suppliers. 
International contestation of water and the discursive 
construction of scarcity 
Clearly, resource scarcity in countries such as India and Pakistan needs to be 
understood in terms of the complex interaction between different stakehold­
ers and how the debate is discursively constructed to privilege particular uses 
and understanding of water. Previous sections have demonstrated that this dis­
cursive construction and material contestation elides a whole range of power 
relations at a variety of scales. This section argues that this contestation takes 
on added complexity when the dispute over water allocation is between neigh­
bouring countries. 
At the whole-of-basin scale, the allocation of water is conditioned by the 
fact that the Partition of the Indian sub-continent divided the eastern and 
western rivers between India and Pakistan. The regulatory framework for this 
division was set out through the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT) and the 
appointment of the Permanent Indus Commissioners to resolve any disputes 
or differences that arose between the two countries. While widely regarded as 
successful (Salman and Uprety, 2002), in recent years there has been debate 
about whether or not the IWT should be renegotiated (Sinha, 2016). Indeed, 
at least one influential commentator believes that the Treaty has outlived its 
usefulness and now is an impediment to both countries cooperating to maxim­
ise the possible mutual gains to be had in the Indus (Swain, 2016). Intensifying 
pressure on the Treaty is the contention over the legality and appropriateness 
of a range of individual projects in recent years.4 
Disputes over transboundary water resources have different dimensions on 
either side of the basin. In India, the harnessing of these rivers is projected to 
decrease the marginalisation and underdevelopment of marginalised provinces, 
particularly the troubled J&K province, however, a long-standing collection of 
civil society groups rejects these claims as not being borne out by the history of 
dam building both in Kashmir and elsewhere in the country. In Pakistan, many 
























including militant groups such as Jamaat-u-Dawa, who have sought to increase 
their constituency by continual assertions about India’s intention to use water 
as a strategic weapon. It has been widely noted that the construction of projects 
in this sub-basin has been controversial because of the perceived impacts that 
this may have for Pakistan (Briscoe, 2010; Committee on Foreign Relations, 
2011). Indeed, Pakistan objects to many projects on the Chenab, including 
the 1000 MW Pakal Dul, the 120 MW Miyar and the 48 MW Lower Kalnai 
hydropower projects (Alam, 2015). This continues to be a point of mobilisa­
tion, even if the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) itself admits that India 
is not causing water shortages in Pakistan (The News International, 2015). 
Environmental security in the Indus 
When thinking through the manner in which the transboundary water
resources become securitised in the Indus, it is clear that the terms of the
debate about the costs and benefits of hydropower are frequently reduced
to a binary representation of ‘Indian’ interests versus ‘Pakistani’ interests.
The national interest of the nation-state must therefore be defended against
the aggressive ‘other’ who is intent on stealing the ‘nation’s water’. In this
rendering, the national resource of water is easily conflated with other
issues of national interest. The portrayal of the Indus as indicative of a neo-
Malthusian crisis of environmental security (a la Homer-Dixon, 1994; 1999)
is reflected in the number of writings in the past few years, which suggest
that a water war in the region is a possibility (Chellaney, 2011), although
most commentators argue against such a position. A significant recent exam­
ple of the role of water in the emerging security scenario of South Asia
was the fallout after the confrontation at Uri, when Prime Minister Modi
declared that ‘blood and water cannot flow at the same time’, with regard
to India’s relationship with Pakistan in the Indus Basin.5 This prompted
much speculation about the government’s intention to renegotiate or even
abandon the IWT, a move that never eventuated. In addition to issues that
are clearly largely between India and Pakistan, the securitisation of the Indus
Basin has arguably become intensified in the last few years as China has
become a larger player in the geopolitics of water in the Indus and elsewhere
in South Asia (Hill, 2013; Kondapalli, 2016). 
This representation is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, by con­
centrating on the nation-state, the internal dynamics of water use within these 
countries is not given sufficient emphasis. Indeed, both India and Pakistan 
have been wasteful in how they have managed the waters and many of their 
problems are internally generated. To give just one example, canals in Pakistan 
have fallen in to disrepair, leading to high rates of conveyance loss in trans­
porting water to fields that some estimate accounts for 25–30 per cent of the 
total (Kahlown and Kemper, 2005). Concentrating on the nation-state as the 
focus for discussion about the Indus Basin also elides the differential impact 
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of any planned developments between upper and lower riparians within the 
same country (such as between Punjab and Sindh, for example). Secondly, 
although most water use in the basin is for agriculture, to confine the debate 
only to withdrawals for irrigation simplifies the relationship to broader ecosys­
tem services. In so doing, the impacts on biodiversity are not given sufficient 
consideration. Thirdly, orthodox accounts of water security focus only on 
the capacity of the sovereign to enforce its territorial integrity against other 
sovereign states. This limited notion of what constitutes security ignores the 
issues of human or non-traditional security, which are nevertheless extremely 
pressing for many people in the Indus Basin. 
Moving beyond the current deadlock in the Indus Basin 
We have established thus far that the discursive construction and material con­
testation of water scarcity in South Asia is implicated in a range of social, 
political, economic and ecological contestations. Indeed, we have seen that 
there is nothing natural or commonsensical about the water scarcity that pre­
vails among many people in South Asia. Instead, it is as a consequence of a 
range of politics at a variety of scales. Development in the basin is all too often 
exclusionary and serves to inflame tensions between and within Pakistan and 
India, rather than being a catalyst for joint prosperity. Moreover, it is not only 
just in terms of human security that a new approach is demanded; the pro­
jected cumulative environmental effects of large-scale transformation of the 
Indus Basin also clearly demand the most serious consideration (Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 2011). 
Clearly, then, in order to increase accountability, transparency and legiti­
macy of water resource planning in the Indus Basin, there is a need to include 
a range of other stakeholders and to craft robust and durable institutional 
arrangements that ensure their participation in the design and implementa­
tion of projects. How can such an institutional transformation be achieved 
in the Indus? One promising trajectory of change may be encouraging dia­
logue through a range of what Dore (2007) calls multi-stakeholder platforms. 
There is certainly a central role for Track 1 discussions6 between the govern­
ments of India and Pakistan as is currently occurring as part of the Composite 
Dialogue.7 However, beyond these formal bilateral processes, what is needed 
to build respect and capacity across the basin is a set of processes that encompass 
think tanks, parliamentarians and civil society. These can contribute to, and be 
engendered by, the de-securitisation of the politics of water at a range of scales. 
Several authors have argued that there are hopeful developments occurring 
in the Indus and that these suggest new directions in the way water govern­
ance is approached (see Adeel and Wirsing 2017; Hill, 2013; 2016). The World 
Bank has thus far sponsored six rounds of the Abu Dhabi Dialogues under 
its South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) and has now expanded to include a 














a shared basis of understanding (Hanasz, 2017).8 As well as initiatives driven 
explicitly by multilateral organisations, there is a bourgeoning corpus of reports 
that has resulted from dialogues on the Indus,9 which can serve as an impor­
tant guide or roadmap to the broader debates about how the Indus could be 
governed. This roadmap seeks to look beyond the dominance of a supply side 
hydraulic paradigm that remains the frame of reference of water bureaucracies 
and to incorporate a number of other factors, such as ecosystem services, adap­
tive management and capacity building. The roundtables conducted as part of 
these processes are also important in building links across the Indus, because 
they can look beyond specific contentious projects. 
In a more general sense, multi-track diplomacy initiatives in the Indus
Basin are infrequently able to penetrate into government policy and offer
significant criticism of government, lessening this potential to an even greater
extent. Indeed, in a broader sense, civil society operates in extremely tight
spaces with regard to being given ‘a seat at the table’ in the region, particularly
in Pakistan, and there is much greater space given to service delivery than
to advocacy groups. As such, many of those groups who are truly trying to
challenge the institutional status quo are often excluded from such dialogues.
Forging long-standing relationships between groups across the Indo-Pakistan
national borders is clearly likely to remain extremely problematic for the
foreseeable future. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that a significant aspect of how water is discursively and materially 
constructed is through orthodox ideas of water security and water scarcity. 
However, as argued throughout this chapter, such conceptions tend to make 
assumptions about conditions throughout the Indus Basin and posit liveli­
hoods in a way that does not disaggregate for the social geographies of different 
social groups, as might be understood on the basis of caste, class and gender. 
The elisions of these discursive constructions have become more pronounced 
in recent years as water has become increasingly securitised. Again, such an 
approach gives analytical primacy to the nation-state and the ‘national inter­
est’ that is taken to be paramount when considering whose water and whose 
security is involved in the contestation over water. 
Any change in the Indus Basin is constrained by a formidable combination 
of broader political relations, vested interests and a technocratic approach to 
water resource management that has the effect of discursively delimiting the 
debate about what can and should be done. As such, the opening of new politi­
cal spaces around Indus water governance is a long and unenviably difficult 
process, and there are no guarantees of success in this regard. It is also clear 
that if water management is to have greater legitimacy among local stakehold­
ers, new approaches must be utilised; but to do so is to challenge a range of 
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and politically marginalised parts of the basin, future approaches cannot simply 
replicate the previous experiences of development in the Indian- and Pakistani-
held parts of the Himalayas. 
In recent years, a significant counter-discourse has emerged from stake­
holders beyond the Indian and Pakistani states, which seeks to imagine Indus 
Basin-wide management in ways that can augment and ultimately transform 
existing approaches (Bakshi and Trivedi, 2011; Indus Basin Working Group, 
2013; ICPC, n.d). These counter-discourses argue for a move beyond the 
supply side hydraulic paradigm that remains the dominant frame of reference 
of water bureaucracies in South Asia. Basin-wide management requires these 
institutions to consider both upstream and downstream communities and, in 
doing so, pay equal attention to the watersheds, catchments and headwaters of 
the Indus Basin (Rasul, 2010; 2014). However, translating these recommen­
dations for enhanced attention to inclusive development, ecosystem services 
and adaptive management into tangible actions requires capacity building as 
well as institutional transformation. This process is not simply a mindset shift 
for policy makers, but is instead an inherently political process that challenges 
vested interests at a range of scales across the basin. 
Notes 
1 Water stress is the ratio of total water withdrawals to available renewable sup­
ply in an area. In high-stress areas, 40 per cent or more of the available supply
is withdrawn every year. In extremely high-stress areas, that number goes up to
80 per cent or higher.A higher percentage means more water users are competing
for limited supplies. 
2 This includes both terrestrial species as well as a large number and diversity of aquatic 
species in the many tributaries. 
3 Load-shedding is a term used in many parts of South Asia to describe a situation 
where electricity is unavailable for certain periods of the day (e.g., eight hours of 
load-shedding per day).This is used to ration the amount of available power, with the 
professed aim of making power available when it is needed most. 
4 These include the Salal Dam and the Baglihar Hydel Power Project, both on the
Chenab, and the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project on the River Jhelum, 
and the (Pakistani) Neelum-Jhelum and (Indian) Kishanganga projects. On this, see
Hill (2013). 
5 Uri is a sector of Indian controlled Kashmir. On 18 September 2016 an Indian army 
base was attacked and 18 Indian soldiers were killed. For its part, the Government 
of India has asserted that this attack could have been carried out by militants associ­
ated with the Pakistan based group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).The Government of 
Pakistan denies this. See ‘Uri attack: initial reports indicate JeM involvement, says 
military operations chief ’, Scroll.in, 18 September 2016; and ‘Blood and water can’t 
flow together, Narendra Modi says on Indus treaty with Pakistan: ANI’, Scroll.in, 26 
September 2016. 
6 Track 1 dialogue refers to those discussions that are held between governments. 
Other tracks, such as Tracks 2 or 3, might include donors, civil society or academia 











7 The Composite Dialogues began in 1997 as an agreement between the Prime 
Ministers of India and Pakistan to attempt to discuss a range of issues simultaneously, 
since it was seen that this might help build confidence between the countries. Perhaps 
the most important aspect of this peace process was that it meant that India agreed to 
discuss the issue of Kashmir. On the Composite Dialogue, see Padder (2012). 
8 While they include all seven countries involved in Himalayan water sharing, they 
nevertheless represent an opportunity for stakeholders from Pakistan and India to 
understand each other’s perspectives, with the last iteration (2012) having a focus on 
transboundary collaboration for floods and disaster management, including in the 
Indus (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2013). 
9 Such dialogues are usually organised jointly between Indian and Pakistani think tanks 
with collaboration from outside agencies such as the Atlantic Council or Stimson 
Center. See Ahmad (2012) and Indus Basin Working Group (2013). 
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Unprecedented threats will require bold 
interventions 
Todd L. Capson 
Introduction 
Over the coming century, marine organisms will be confronted with a suite of 
environmental conditions that have no analogue in human history. The effects 
of overexploitation, habitat degradation and other impacts on marine ecosys­
tems stand to be amplified by changes in ocean temperature and chemistry. Just 
as the threats to the world’s oceans are unprecedented, successfully address­
ing them will require an unprecedented degree of political will, transparency, 
cooperation and boldness. In 2014, US Secretary of State John Kerry initiated 
the Our Oceans initiative with a focus on some of the key ocean issues of our 
time: fisheries, marine protected areas (MPAs) and climate-related impacts on 
the oceans, each of which I will address in this chapter. 
It is instructive to place the issues discussed in this chapter in the context
of resource scarcity. Extractive activities such as fisheries are not only deplet­
ing fish stocks of global importance but are also restructuring key ecosystems.
This has led to a scarcity of resources that affects not only humans but other
species that depend upon those resources. A classic example of the impacts
of capture fisheries on other species in an ecosystem regards the decline in
the Alaska Steller sea lion and commercial fisheries (Hennen, 2006). The
walleye pollock is the largest fishery by weight in the United States and one
of the largest in the world—fishermen landed almost three billion pounds
in 2011 with a dockside value of just under $375 million (National Marine
Fisheries Service, 2013). At the same time, the Steller sea lion population in
Alaska declined by more than 80 per cent between 1970–2000, prompting
the species to be listed as ‘threatened’ under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) (National Research Council, 2003). In November 2000, an ESA con­
sultation prepared by the National Marine Fisheries Service concluded that
the Alaska groundfish fishery posed a threat to the recovery of the Steller sea
lion and imposed more restrictive measures on its management. While the
exact nature of the relationship between the captures of groundfish and the
decline in Steller sea lion populations remains controversial, positive cor­
relations exist between several metrics of historical fishing activity and the
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As described below, recent studies indicate that many well-assessed fisheries 
in developed countries are moving towards sustainability, which suggests that 
scarcity is not a significant problem for the fish stocks involved. The situation 
is different, however, in the developing world where fish populations are on 
a continuing trajectory of decline with repercussions for local and national 
economies and food security (Pikitch, 2012; Costello et al., 2012). Despite this 
trend, there are examples of well-managed fish stocks in Latin America and 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, including fisheries that have been 
certified by the Marine Stewardship Council (see, for example, Orensanz and 
Seijo, 2013; Marine Stewardship Council, 2016a; 2016b). 
Also addressed in this chapter, and relevant to the issue of scarcity, are 
MPAs, which are indisputably the flagship tool for protecting both ecosystems 
and biodiversity by limiting direct human impacts (Mouillot et al., 2015). The 
importance of MPAs in protecting biodiversity is reflected in the targets that 
were established during the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
of the Convention for Biological Diversity in October 2010, one of which 
explicitly addresses the expansion of both marine and terrestrial protected areas. 
The scarcity of both marine and terrestrial resources in Panama is reflected 
in my efforts to establish a protected area in the country’s Tropical Eastern 
Pacific, as I describe in this chapter. 
Understanding how climate change is likely to alter the fisheries revenues of 
maritime countries is a crucial next step towards the development of effective 
socioeconomic policy and food sustainability strategies to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change (Lam et al., 2016). Recent studies reveal that climate change is 
already having an impact on fisheries, in particular, warmer ocean temperatures 
are driving marine species towards cooler, deeper waters and this, in turn, has 
affected global fisheries catches (Cheung et al., 2013). Developing countries 
that are dependent on fisheries for food and livelihoods are likely to be the 
hardest hit. I address in this chapter the closely related issue of ocean acidifica­
tion. Regions that are particularly vulnerable to ocean acidification include 
the cold waters of the North and South Poles, which naturally absorb more 
carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere than warmer waters do, and areas 
with upwelling currents that bring more acidic waters to the surface. Given 
that both types of regions contain globally important fisheries, rising CO
2
 levels 
will lead to a scarcity of species that are the target of commercially important 
fisheries, such as the walleye pollock, and those that depend upon them, such 
as the Steller sea lion. 
Fisheries: between sustainability and depletion 
The debate on the sustainability of fisheries has moved to a global level
over the past 20 years as fisheries have become recognised as a major driver
of ecological and evolutionary change in the world’s oceans (Worm and
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Figure 7.1  Increases in global catches (dark line, reported tonnage to FAO) and 
fishing effort (light line, total engine power in gigawatts [109 watts] 
expended per year) 
Source: Adapted from Worm and Branch (2012) (used with permission from the authors 
by a growing population and rising incomes in countries such as China
and India (Béné et al., 2015). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) estimates that there is no room for expansion of 90 per cent of moni­
tored fish stocks as they are either fully exploited or overexploited (FAO,
2016a). A study by Pauly and Zeller (2016) reports that even these statistics
are conservative as they understate the size of the global seafood catch by
about 30 per cent. In particular, fishers caught an estimated 109 million met­
ric tons (mt) of fish in 2010, well above the 77 million mt reported by the
FAO. An analysis of global catch data by Worm and Branch (2012) showed
that catches peaked during the mid-1990s and have since declined despite an
increase in fishing effort over the same time period (Figure 7.1). 
While many marine species have declined in abundance and are region­
ally and/or functionally extinct, there are still only a few well-documented
examples of global marine extinctions in recent centuries (Harnik et  al.,
2012). Consequently, meaningful rehabilitation of affected marine ani­
mal populations remains within the reach of marine resource managers
(McCauley et al., 2015). 
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Assessed stocks stabilise, others decline 
Recent reports suggest that many well-assessed fisheries in developed countries 
are moving towards sustainability while previously unassessed fish populations 
are on a continuing trajectory of decline (Pikitch, 2012; Costello et al., 2012). 
These poorly understood fisheries, which represent about 80 per cent of the 
world’s fish catch, are in much worse shape than the relatively well-studied 
fisheries upon which previous reviews of global fish stocks have relied. A key 
problem in global fisheries is that much of the world’s catch, and a large frac­
tion of its biodiversity, resides in regions that urgently require increased food 
production and employment, but that have little capacity for scientific assess­
ment and management controls (Worm and Branch, 2012). Africa, Asia and 
Latin America harbour most of the marine fish species richness and are hot-
spots of marine biodiversity, but have lower capacity for scientific assessment 
of fish stocks and management controls than other regions. Good fisheries 
management does not require perfect science if precautionary measures are 
taken. Tools for the assessment of fish stocks have been developed to meet the 
requirements of fisheries management where information on fish populations 
is either lacking or highly uncertain, making these tools particularly useful in 
resource-poor settings (Pilling et al., 2008). Among the assessed fish stocks are 
the target species of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). 
Any country’s commercial fishing fleets that wish to fish in regions of the 
high seas managed by an RFMO must abide by the conservation and manage­
ment measures of the organisation (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, 2010). There are 
five tuna RFMOs, one of which—the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC)—is discussed by Jollands and Fisher (this volume, 
Chapter 11). As I will discuss below, tuna RFMOs have significant impacts on 
non-target species. 
The role of aquaculture in reducing pressures on wild fisheries 
Between 1987 and 1997, global production of farmed fish and shellfish more 
than doubled in weight and value (Naylor et  al., 2000). Aquaculture now 
provides half of all fish for human consumption (FAO, 2016b). Many people
believe that such growth may relieve pressure on ocean fisheries, but the 
opposite is true for some types of aquaculture, and the conversion of habitats, 
pollution, disease and diversion of forage fish from poor communities threaten 
its sustainability (Smith et al., 2010). 
Bycatch: implications for marine ecosystems and food security 
Fish is a critical source of protein in the developing world (UN General 
Assembly, 2011). There are at least 30 countries in which fisheries contribute 
more than one-third of total animal protein supply, 22 of which are low-income 
food-deficit countries (LIFDCs) (FAO, 2014). Despite the critical importance 
of fish to diets in the developing world, limited attention has been given to 
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fish as a key element in food security and nutrition strategies in development 
discussions and interventions at national levels and beyond (Béné et al., 2015). 
Going forward, it will be increasingly important to take advantage of all acces­
sible sources of seafood. One such source is ‘bycatch’, which is the catch that 
is not the main objective of a fishing fleet and consists of: (i) retained catch of 
non-targeted, but commercially valuable species; (ii) discarded catch, whether 
the reason for non-retention is economic or regulatory; and (iii) unobserved 
mortalities (Gilman, 2011). Eighty per cent of global bycatch comes from 
industrial fishing fleets, generating an estimated 7.3 billion kg annually of highly 
nutritious seafood, much of which is wasted (Béné et al., 2015; Smith et al., 
2010). Retaining bycatch for human consumption also means that a ship’s hold 
will fill up faster, reducing total capture of both target and non-target species, 
and has the benefit of driving fisheries towards selective fishing gears and the 
avoidance of areas and times with high bycatch (Chan et al., 2014). 
There are also important ecological considerations associated with bycatch. 
Minimising or eliminating bycatch is necessary to maintaining marine bio­
diversity, ecosystem structure, processes and services, including sustainable 
fishery resources. Bycatch in purse seine and pelagic longline tuna fisheries— 
the two primary gear types for catching tunas—is a primary mortality source of 
some populations of seabirds, sea turtles, marine mammals and sharks (Gilman, 
2011). There has been substantial progress in identifying gear technology solu­
tions to seabird, sea turtle and dolphin bycatch, and, with sufficient investment, 
gear technology solutions are probably feasible for the remaining bycatch prob­
lems. Most binding conservation and management measures of tuna RFMOs 
fall short of gear technology best practice for minimising bycatch. The lack of 
quantifiable performance standards for reducing bycatch, inadequate observer 
coverage for all but large Pacific Ocean purse seiners in the Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and the WCPFC, and incomplete 
data collection on bycatch captures, hinder the ability to assess the efficacy of 
RFMO conservation and management measures and vessel crew’s compliance 
with those measures (Gilman, 2011). 
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
IUU fishing is prevalent worldwide (Agnew et al., 2009) and has been identi­
fied as one of the greatest threats to marine ecosystems by the UN General 
Assembly (Österblom and Bodin, 2012). Estimates of total IUU catches glob­
ally range from 11 to 26 million tons annually, and the monetary value of 
IUU catch ranges from US$10 to $23.5 billion. Developing countries are 
particularly vulnerable to IUU fishing due to their limited governance and 
enforcement capacity over their fish stocks (Agnew et al., 2009). IUU fishing 
has generated significant attention recently, as evidenced in encounters with 
illegal vessels on the high seas (Urbina, 2015) and the capture and destruction 
of vessels fishing within the exclusive economic zone of Indonesia (Bever, 
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where it is unreported and unregulated. For example, small-scale fisheries that 
cumulatively include about 90 per cent of the world’s fishers are ubiquitous 
in the world’s coastal waters but generally operate without controls or records 
(Vincent and Harris, 2014; Worm and Branch, 2012). Most of these 100 million
or so fishers depend on the ocean for livelihoods and exploit marine resources 
persistently and intensely. Such relentless pressure has led to fisheries collapse 
and the serial depletion of species (Vincent and Harris, 2014). 
Addressing IUU fishing 
A range of tools, international agreements and management practices have 
been implemented to address IUU fishing, several of which are presented 
below. The sections in this chapter entitled Marine protected areas and Optimal 
management regimes for rebuilding global fisheries, discuss two additional means of 
addressing IUU fishing. 
UN Port State Measures Agreement 
Twenty-nine countries and the European Union (EU) have become parties
to the 2009 FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate IUU Fishing (FAO, 2016a). The agreement officially entered into
force on 5 June 2016, making it the world’s first ever binding international
accord specifically targeting IUU fishing to become international law. The
treaty requires that parties designate specific ports for use by foreign ves­
sels, making monitoring and control far easier. Those vessels must request
permission to enter ports ahead of time, provide local authorities with infor­
mation on the fish they have on board and allow inspection of their log
book, licences, fishing gear and actual cargo, among other requirements. The
Agreement calls on countries to deny entry or inspect vessels that have been
involved in IUU fishing and to take necessary action, including the sharing
of information regionally and globally about any vessels discovered to be
involved in IUU fishing. 
Technology platforms to detect and deter IUU fishing 
Global Fishing Watch is the product of a technology partnership between 
SkyTruth, Oceana and Google that is designed to show all of the trackable 
fishing activity in the ocean (Global Fishing Watch, 2016). This interactive 
web tool is being built to enable anyone to visualise the global fishing fleet in 
space and time. A global feed of vessel locations is extracted from Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), tracking data that is collected by satellite and reveal­
ing the movement of vessels. Another recent technology used to combat IUU 
fishing is electronic monitoring, which automatically collects high-resolution 
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vessel is engaged and the composition of catch, bycatch and discards (WCPFC, 
2013). Electronic monitoring has the advantage of being deployable on a wide 
range of vessels, including smaller ones where personal accommodations are 
limited and on vessels that spend long periods at sea. 
Cooperation between levels of government and capacity for enforcement 
Enhanced cooperation between communities and local managers, provincial
governments and national governments, working on different scales to regu­
late and enforce fisheries laws, could have a major impact on IUU fishing
(Vincent and Harris, 2014). In countries that lack the capacity for effec­
tive fisheries management and enforcement, government engagement must
be accompanied by serious investments in technical capacity and govern­
ance skills in order for government agencies to work at their full potential
(Costello et al., 2016). 
Public and scientific engagement 
The political will to effectively conserve marine species and spaces will only 
emerge when public opinion insists on action for ocean protection. Market-
based incentives for the purchase of sustainable seafood provide a means to 
involve consumers and fishers in making choices that foster sustainable fish­
ing (Vincent and Harris, 2014). The community of conservation professionals, 
from both academia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), must do a 
much better job at communicating a compelling and comprehensive vision of 
the threats to ocean health, including IUU fishing, that transcends traditional 
disciplinary and societal boundaries and the immediate needs of their institu­
tions (Noss et al., 2011). 
EU rules to combat IUU fishing 
The EU works to close the loopholes that allow illegal operators to profit from 
their activities including an EU Regulation to prevent, deter and eliminate 
IUU fishing that entered into force on 1 January 2010. Among the regulation’s 
provisions include: (i) only marine fisheries products validated as legal by the 
competent flag state or exporting state can be imported to, or exported from, 
the EU; (ii) the publication of an IUU vessel list that is updated regularly and 
based on IUU vessels identified by RFMOs; and (iii) the potential blacklisting 
of states that turn a blind eye to illegal fishing activities (European Commission, 
2016). In one case, the European Commission put Thailand on formal notice 
for not taking sufficient measures in the international fight against IUU fish­
ing by issuing a warning (yellow card) that it needed to improve its poorly 
regulated seafood industry or face ‘red card’ bans on exports to the EU market 
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Elimination of bottom trawl fisheries and improving data collection for capture of 
non-target species in tuna RFMOs 
Of all indiscriminate fisheries, bottom trawling is the most catastrophic for 
both species and habitats. It also contributes substantially to IUU take, mainly 
through bycatch (Vincent and Harris, 2014). The incomplete data collec­
tion on bycatch captures in tuna RFMOs also contributes to large gaps in our 
understanding of the scope and magnitude of the captures of non-target species. 
Shark conservation 
Efforts to conserve shark populations provide an example of the need to address
marine conservation efforts on multiple fronts, including fisheries. Despite their
evolutionary success, many species of chondrichthyans, which include sharks and
their relatives, are increasingly threatened with extinction as a result of their low
reproductive rates in the face of human activities, primarily overfishing (Camhi
et al., 2009). Quantifying the extent of sharks’ decline, the risk of species extinc­
tion and the consequences for marine ecosystems has been challenging and
controversial, mostly due to data limitations. In the most comprehensive study
to date of shark mortality, Worm et al. (2013) considered all sources of mortality,
from direct fishing, finning and discard mortality, and concluded that sharks are
being harvested at an unsustainable rate (approximately 100 million sharks per
year for the period 2000 through 2010, which is highly likely an underestimate of
shark mortality). Though many estimates and approximations went into calculat­
ing these figures, one message is clear: sharks are being harvested at an unsustainable
rate and global shark mortality needs to be reduced drastically in order to rebuild depleted
populations and restore marine ecosystems with functional top predators. Another key find­
ing is that, despite increased public awareness and advocacy, the authors did not
detect a significant decrease in shark fin consumption over the period 2000–2010,
suggesting that the publicity associated with finning and the regulations that
resulted do not appear to have reduced the volume of fins traded in global or
regional markets (Worm et al., 2013). 
There are a growing number of studies that address the ecological conse­
quences of declines in shark populations and suggest that wider community 
rearrangements often follow declines in shark populations (Ferretti et al., 2010; 
Worm et al., 2013). Large sharks can exert strong control on the large long-
lived marine animals that they prey upon. In a study on the cascading effects of 
the loss of 11 apex predatory sharks from a US coastal ocean, whose populations 
fell between 87 and 97 per cent over a 35-year period, the populations of other 
elasmobranchs (rays, skates and small sharks) that they consumed exploded, 
resulting in the loss of a century-long scallop fishery (Myers et al., 2007). 
Shark captures on the high seas 
Shark captures in large-scale purse seiners provide a window into shark mortal­
ity on the high seas. Figure 7.2 reveals the difference between captures of the 
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Figure 7.2  Oceanic whitetip shark in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Average oceanic 
whitetip capture per floating object set in 1996 (left) and 2009 (right). 
Source: Guillermo Compeán, IATTC (used with permission from the author) 
oceanic whitetip shark (Carcharhinus longimanus) in tuna purse seine vessels of 
the IATTC in 1996 (left panel) and 2009 (right panel) in the Eastern Pacific 
Ocean. The extent to which the difference in the numbers of sharks captured 
in 1996 and 2009 reflects oceanic whitetip sharks captured in purse seine fish­
eries, is a reflection of shark mortality caused primarily by other fisheries (e.g. 
longline) or is some combination of the two is not clear. What is clear, how­
ever, is that, in 2009, there were far fewer oceanic whitetip sharks left to be 
captured than in 1996. The authors of a recent report by the IATTC that drew 
upon this data wrote, ‘The signal in this case is impossible to miss—the species 
has practically disappeared from the fishing grounds’ (Hall and Roman 2013:
p. 149). The same report indicates that the situation with the oceanic whitetip 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is comparable where the current lev­
els of catch per unit effort are compatible with a drop of 80–95 per cent from 
the population levels in the late 1990s. This catastrophic loss of sharks on the 
high seas has received little attention by the marine conservation community. 
Policies relevant to high seas shark captures 
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) is the primary international 
instrument for encouraging countries to undertake the cooperation essential 
to manage shared fish stocks (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). The UNFSA 
includes provisions for precautionary fisheries management (i.e. to take con­
servative measures when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate) to 
minimise bycatch and impacts on associated and dependent species including 
sharks, seabirds and turtles (Gilman, 2011), among other important provi­
sions. The UNFSA has become the point of departure for negotiations to 
establish new RFMOs, including the WCPFC, while others, including the 
IATTC, have revised their charters to incorporate UNFSA provisions (Balton 
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and Koehler, 2006). In addition, many states, both parties and non-parties to 
the UNFSA, have begun to incorporate its provisions into their domestic laws 
and regulations. While the ‘UNFSA sparked a concerted effort to implement 
an “ecosystem approach to fisheries management”’, namely, focusing on the 
ecosystem in which the target species (tuna, in this case) is captured, in prac­
tice, implementing such an approach requires considerable scientific research, 
which is difficult and costly for nations with even the most sophisticated fisher­
ies management systems (Balton and Koehler, 2006: p. 8). 
Progress in international shark conservation 
A positive development in the field of international shark conservation came in 
2013 with the addition of the oceanic whitetip shark, scalloped hammerhead 
shark (Sphyrna lewini), great hammerhead shark (Sphyrna mokarran), smooth 
hammerhead shark (Sphyrna zygaena), porbeagle shark (Lamna nasus) and manta 
rays (Manta spp.) to Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). These listings mean 
that, for the first time, trade in shark species of great commercial value will 
require verification of the sustainability and legality of that trade, which cannot 
be incompatible with the species’ survival (CITES, 2014). A major challenge 
to the implementation of the CITES convention will be to ensure that devel­
oping country signatories have the necessary capacity to implement their treaty 
obligations. Market-based mechanisms are another potential means of address­
ing shark conservation that are largely unexplored (Gilman, 2011). The Eastern 
Tropical Pacific tuna-dolphin issue provides a market-based model that could 
be relevant to shark conservation. In this case, concerns about high dolphin 
mortality in tuna purse seine fisheries and publicity generated by NGOs drove 
the IATTC to begin a dolphin conservation programme in 1979 known as 
the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP). 
Between 1986 and 1998 dolphin mortality in Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna 
fisheries declined by 98 per cent (Hall et al., 2000). 
Optimal management regimes for rebuilding global fisheries 
Of all the problems that beset marine species, excessive exploitation may be the 
most egregious; but it may also be one of the more tractable (Vincent and Harris, 
2014). Costello et al. (2016) evaluated 4713 fisheries worldwide, representing 
78 per cent of global reported fish catch, in order to estimate the status, trends 
and benefits of alternative approaches to recovering depleted fisheries. They 
found that effective fisheries reforms span a range of approaches, from scientifi­
cally informed harvest policies to institutional reforms that restructure incentives 
that align profits with conservation. While their business-as-usual scenario pro­
jects the continued collapse for many of the world’s fisheries, their results also 
showed that common sense reforms to fishery management would dramati­
cally improve overall fish abundance while increasing food security and profits.
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They also found that some of the greatest economic improvements in fisheries 
may come from improving institutions for fisheries managements rather than 
improving the status of fished stocks (Costello et al., 2016). 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) 
The scientific literature makes increasingly clear the positive impacts of MPAs 
in terms of the greater size and number of fish within the area, including preda­
tors such as sharks, and that the biomass of targeted fish species can increase 
outside MPAs without disadvantaging fishers (Kerwath et  al., 2013; Edgar 
et al., 2014; Caselle et al., 2015). Large and strategically placed reserves with 
their full component of trophic levels and greater genetic and species diversity 
are likely to be more resilient to some environmental changes and could be 
important tools in climate adaptation (Lubchenco and Grorud-Colvert, 2015). 
The parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) established 
the Aichi Biodiversity Target 11, which includes the objective to put 17 per 
cent of terrestrial and 10 per cent of marine regions under protected area status 
by 2020. This has contributed to nearly 10 million km2 of new MPAs, a growth 
of approximately 360 per cent in a decade (Klein et al., 2015). Some examples 
include the Easter Island Marine Park and Nazca-Desventuradas Marine Park in 
Chile announced in 2015; the four-fold expansion of the Papahānaumokuākea 
Marine National Monument off the coast of Hawaii, creating the world’s larg­
est MPA (2016); Kiribati’s ban on commercial fishing in its Phoenix Island 
Protected Area (2015); the United Kingdom’s Pitcairn Islands Marine Reserve 
(2015); New Zealand’s Kermadec Ocean Sanctuary (Lubchenco and Grorud-
Colvert, 2015); and the 1.57 million km2 MPA that protects the Ross Sea that 
was established by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR), which will come into force in December 2017 
(CCAMLR, 2017). 
Despite the recent growth in MPAs, a number of studies point out significant 
shortcomings in their capacity to protect marine biodiversity. A recent study 
assessed the overlap of global MPAs with the ranges of 17,348 marine spe­
cies (fishes, mammals, invertebrates), and found that more than 97 per cent of 
species have less than 10 per cent of their ranges represented in stricter conser­
vation classes (other classes permit most human activities, including mining and 
fishing) (Klein et al., 2015). Similarly, when all categories of MPA protection 
are considered together, from lightly to strongly protected, only 1.6 per cent 
of the world’s oceans fit the latter category (Lubchenco and Grorud-Colvert, 
2015). Another study showed that less than 6 per cent of scleractinian coral 
species and 22 per cent of labrid fish species reach the minimum protection tar­
get of 10 per cent of their geographic ranges within MPAs (Klein et al., 2015). 
The requirements for effective MPAs are well known, as is our understanding 
of the performance metrics necessary to assess their effectiveness, meaning that 
reaching Aichi Target 11 has the potential to generate genuine benefits for 
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Case study: protection of the Coiba National Park 
Located off the southwest coast of Panama in the Gulf of Chiriquí and com­
prising an area of 2700 km2, the Coiba National Park includes an insular area of 
535 km2, a marine area of 2165 km2 and an adjacent buffer zone of 1600 km2 
of ocean (UNESCO, 2016a). The park is located within the Tropical Eastern 
Pacific (TEP), a unique tropical marine region, one of the most isolated regions 
in the world’s oceans, which has probably the highest rate of endemism of any 
equivalent region in the world (Robertson and Allen, 2015). Due to a combina­
tion of geographic and oceanographic factors no other continental shore marine 
park could do as much for marine conservation in the entire TEP as the Coiba 
National Park and its buffer zone (ANAM, 2005). With an area of 503 km2,
Coiba Island is the largest tropical island on the continental shore of the Pacific 
coast of the Americas. Located at the centre of the Coiba National Park, Coiba 
Island retains 85 per cent of its original primary forest due to its designation as 
a penal colony in 1919, where the prisoners and the guards assigned to protect 
them served as a deterrent to exploitation of the park’s resources. 
The President of Panama passed an Executive Decree in 2003 that would 
have permitted logging, hunting, fishing and the destruction of cultural artefacts 
within the park, among other destructive activities. In response, I launched a 
campaign to save the Coiba National Park that changed its image from that of 
a forbidding penal colony to valued national treasure, resulting in legislation 
for the park’s protection, and its inscription to the UNESCO list of World 
Heritage Sites; the only national park in Panama to achieve this recognition 
for its natural character. The campaign that I organised, with input from col­
leagues in Panama, emphasised four themes: (i) how the park could benefit 
local fishermen, citing studies that showed how the size and numbers of com­
mercially important species would increase if fishing intensity within the park’s 
boundaries is sufficiently low; (ii) the potential of the park’s ecosystems for sci­
entific research including the discovery of chemical compounds with activity 
against disease; (iii) the potential of low impact activities to generate revenue, 
for example, scuba diving; and (iv) that the park represented unique natural 
patrimony for its own sake and for future generations. The campaign to protect 
the Coiba National Park provides insight into the argument about protecting 
nature for its own sake (referred to as ‘traditional’ or ‘old’ conservation), or 
saving nature to help ourselves (known as ‘new conservation’). As described by 
Tallis and Lubchenco (2014), infighting in the conservation community about 
new versus old conservation is stalling progress to protect the planet. In the 
campaign for the park’s protection, I adopted the approaches of both ‘new’ and 
‘old’ conservation, stressing both the economic benefits to be gained from the 
park’s protection as well as the park’s importance as unique natural patrimony. 
The President abandoned the Executive Decree and legislation was
adopted for the protection of the Coiba National Park in July of 2004, the
first law of its kind for the Republic of Panama (ANAM, 2005). Starting in
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Environment (known by the acronym ‘ANAM’) to have the Coiba National
Park inscribed into UNESCO’s list of approximately 160 World Heritage
Sites. In July of 2005, the park was formally designated as such (UNESCO,
2016a). The addition of the park to the list of World Heritage Sites was an
intensely political process in which the Government of Colombia played
a key role. The following year, Colombia added the Malpelo Fauna and
Flora Sanctuary, located some 300 miles off the west coast of Colombia and
also within the TEP, to the list (UNESCO, 2016b). The importance having
the Coiba National Park declared a World Heritage Site became evident in
August of 2008 when the head of Panama’s Legislative Assembly allowed
for a change in the law that would have permitted tuna fishing by purse
seine vessels within the boundaries of the park. Panama-based environmental
organisations vigorously opposed the change in the legislation and notified
UNESCO of the potential threat to the Coiba National Park. In April of 2009,
the ban on purse seine fisheries in the park was reinstated. The international
scrutiny from UNESCO likely had an impact on this outcome. 
Climate change impacts on the oceans 
In the coming decades and centuries, three independent factors linked to anthro­
pogenic CO
2
 emissions—ocean acidification, ocean deoxygenation and rising 
temperatures—will affect the ocean’s biogeochemical cycles and ecosystems 
in ways that we are only beginning to fathom (Gruber, 2011). Approximately 
one-quarter of the CO
2 
released into the atmosphere is absorbed by the oceans, 
causing measurable declines in surface ocean pH and carbonate ion concentra­
tion (Albright et al., 2016). This process, referred to as ‘ocean acidification’, 
represents a major threat to marine ecosystems, in particular marine calcifiers 
that build their shells or skeletons out of calcium carbonate, such as tropical 
corals, echinoderms, molluscs and small marine snails called pteropods. The 
literature on the biological and ecological impacts of ocean acidification on 
marine organisms and ecosystems is rapidly growing (Kroeker et al., 2013). 
Albright et al. (2016) measured the response of a coral reef community in 
the Great Barrier Reef to ocean chemistry conditions that were characteristic 
of the pre-industrial era and showed that, all other things being equal, net 
coral reef calcification would have been around 7 per cent higher than at pre­
sent, suggesting that ocean acidification may already be diminishing coral reef 
growth. Shelled molluscs comprise some of the most lucrative and sustainable 
fisheries in the United States (Ekstrom et al., 2015). Ocean acidification has 
already cost the oyster industry in the US Pacific Northwest nearly US$110 
million, and directly or indirectly jeopardised about 3200 jobs (Ekstrom et al., 
2015). In another study, researchers from the US National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) showed that large portions of the shelf 
waters along the coasts of Washington and Oregon are corrosive to pteropods, 
an important prey group for ecologically and economically important species, 
including fishes, birds and whales (Bednaršek et al., 2014). 
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There is no known geological precedence for current rates of ocean 
acidification 
A survey of the geologic record for evidence of ocean acidification over the 
past 300 million years found that the current rate of ocean acidification is faster 
than at any time during this vast period. The most comparable was 56 million 
years ago, the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, which was character­
ised by a decline in ocean pH of between 0.25 and 0.45 units. However, 
current acidification is occurring at almost ten times this rate, meaning that 
we are embarking on an uncharted course in the Earth’s history. Historically, 
sustained periods of acidification and CO2 increase have led to the collapse of 
coral reefs and, in one instance, to the extinction of 96 per cent of marine life 
(Hönisch et al., 2012; The Earth Institute at Columbia University, 2012). Once 
these changes occur it takes centuries for the oceans to recover (Gruber, 2011). 
Local and regional factors that contribute to ocean acidification 
Globally, the phenomenon of ocean acidification is driven by anthropogenic 
CO
2
 emissions, but in the coastal areas where the effects of ocean acidification 
may be most significant for human communities, local drivers can strongly 
influence coastal acidification (Strong et  al., 2014). Coastal ecosystems are 
impacted by a multitude of these drivers, including impacts from watershed 
processes, nutrient inputs from agricultural fertiliser, sewage, atmospheric dep­
osition and changes in ecosystem structure and metabolism, many of which 
can be positively impacted by policy and management interventions. As the 
scientific understanding and monitoring of the dynamics of coastal acidification 
continue to advance, coastal resource and fisheries managers will be able to 
make increasingly informed decisions about mitigation and adaptation strate­
gies in the socio-ecological systems in which they operate (Strong et al., 2014). 
Addressing ocean acidification on international, national and 
state-wide levels 
Despite the ocean’s critical roles in regulating climate and providing food secu­
rity and livelihoods for millions of people, international climate negotiations 
have only minimally considered impacts of rising CO2 levels on the oceans 
(Gattuso et  al., 2015). In light of the 21st session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP21) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) held in December 2015, recent publications have addressed the 
impacts of CO
2
 emission scenarios for ocean and society. Gattuso et al. (2015) 
report that several key marine and coastal ecosystems will face high risks of 
impact well before 2100, even under the most stringent CO
2 
emission sce­
nario adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP2.6). Small island developing 
states have argued for several years that a temperature increase of 1.5°C above 
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pre-industrial levels, rather than 2°C, should be the UNFCCC target, which 
contributed to the COP21 goal of holding the global mean atmospheric tem­
perature rise by the end of this century to 2°C (Magnan et al., 2016). 
As part of the COP21 process, 185 countries, representing 94 per cent of 
current global greenhouse gas emissions and 97 per cent of the world’s popula­
tion, submitted their emissions pledges mostly with a time horizon of 2030. 
Based on those projections, a median global temperature increase by 2100 of 
between 2.7°C and 3.5°C was estimated. Even the most optimistic assessment 
of 2.7°C by 2100, ‘profoundly and negatively affects the ocean and the services it 
provides to the world population’ (Magnan et al., 2016, emphasis added), mean­
ing that the 185 countries that committed to a reduction in CO2 emissions 
by 2030 ‘must consider the imperative for faster and deeper decarboniza­
tion post-2030’ (Magnan et al., 2016). It is noteworthy that only 1.5 hours 
were dedicated to oceans-related issues during COP21, which consisted of 12 
days of talks. Ironically, the 1.5-hour session ‘highlight(ed) the dynamics and 
concrete action of civil society stakeholders committed to raising the issue of 
oceans as a solution for climate change’ (UNFCCC, 2016, p. 12). A good start 
towards ‘raising the issue’ of the impact of CO2 on the oceans would be for the 
UNFCCC to devote more resources to the issue, and more time to oceans-
related issues at COP22. 
Actions by the United States 
In the United States, the Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring 
(FOARAM) Act of 2009 was passed in Congress and signed into law by 
President Obama. Among other actions designed to spur federal agency col­
laboration and research on the challenges of ocean acidification, the passage of 
the FOARAM Act created an Interagency Working Group on ocean acidifica­
tion, which published the Strategic Plan for Federal Research and Monitoring 
of Ocean Acidification in 2014. NOAA created the Ocean Acidification 
Program, which is organised around six core issues: monitoring carbonate 
chemistry changes, measuring biological impacts, assessing socioeconomic 
impacts, managing and coordinating ocean acidification data, coordinating 
education and outreach, and engaging directly in the process of developing 
adaptation strategies. 
State-wide actions in the Unites States 
A seminal event in driving ocean acidification policy and research in the Unites 
States was the near collapse of oyster hatcheries in Oregon and Washington 
where researchers showed a clear link between increased CO
2
 levels in sea­
water and the mortality of oyster larvae (Barton et  al., 2015). In response, 
Washington State established the Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean Acidification 
in 2012, whose recommendations led to legislation that funded a centre for 
ocean acidification research at the University of Washington and formed 
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the Washington Marine Resources Advisory Council in the Office of the 
Governor (Strong et al., 2014). Funding procured from the federal govern­
ment was crucial for the establishment of monitoring stations in Oregon and 
Washington, which provided the ability to observe carbonate chemistry data 
in real-time and allowed shellfish growers to take adaptive measures, enabling 
them to restore most of their original production of oyster larvae (Barton et al., 
2015). Following the lead of Washington, the states of Maine and Maryland 
convened ocean acidification panels, which have produced actionable recom­
mendations to protect their fishing and aquaculture industries that are tailored 
to local conditions and needs. The states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island are 
following similar courses of action. 
A key player in resolving the ocean acidification issue in the Oregon oyster 
hatchery mentioned above was Alan Barton of the Whisky Creek Shellfish 
Hatchery. In addressing representatives from industry, government and aca­
demia during a 2013 workshop in New Zealand on ocean acidification impacts 
on shellfish aquaculture Barton told participants: ‘The only way we’re going to 
stop acidification is to get out in front on this issue—nobody else is going to 
do it, and we’re the guys who will first go out of business. So I encourage you 
to get on board with this issue, convince yourself first, and get out there and 
convince other people before it’s too late’ (Capson and Guinotte, 2014: p. 3). 
Summary 
The scientific literature makes clear that piecemeal, business-as-usual interven­
tions will be inadequate to confront the threats to ocean health including an 
unprecedented combination of overexploitation of resources, marine pollu­
tion, ocean acidification, deoxygenation and ocean warming (Harnik et  al., 
2012; Gruber, 2011; Rands et  al., 2010). The IPCC stated that due to the 
nature of the threats to marine and terrestrial ecosystems, ‘The resilience of 
many [marine and terrestrial] ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this century’ 
(IPCC, 2007). While this is an estimate, society would be ill advised to try and 
prove this estimate incorrect. 
Decades of research and experience in the field provide a wealth of expe­
rience that can be drawn upon in order to protect marine biodiversity in a 
diversity of settings. Effective conservation will require bold, well-informed 
and common-sense approaches that include political will that is driven by an 
informed public, inclusivity, funding and good science (Fisher et  al., 2013; 
Noss et al., 2011; Rands et al., 2010; Watson et al., 2016). The need for an 
informed public highlights the essential role of scientists in informing the pub­
lic and policy. Bold approaches by conservation professionals will be necessary 
in order to counteract the ‘pro-growth norms of global society (that) foster 
timidity among conservation professionals, steering them toward conformity 
with the global economic agenda and away from acknowledging what is ulti­
mately needed to sustain life on Earth’ (Noss et al., 2011). This is particularly 
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driven by an institution’s need to secure donations and focus on politically 
palatable measures (Redford et al., 2013; Pressey, 2014). Other NGOs take a 
bolder tack; for example, the tracking for 110 days and across 10,000 nautical 
miles of a fugitive fishing ship considered the world’s most notorious interna­
tional poacher, by the NGO Sea Shepherd. The ship was ultimately scuttled 
by its own crew (Urbina, 2015). 
Cooperation among conservation professionals from academia and NGOs 
and between disciplines will be key in order for practitioners to respond to 
complex ecological, social and political uncertainties and challenges (Beever 
et al., 2014). Cooperation across disciplines will also help conservation profes­
sionals do a better job in communicating a compelling, convincing and honest 
vision across traditional disciplinary and societal boundaries. The messages must 
be based on the best available science and expert opinion and geared towards 
the protection of nature and not secondary to economic or political considera­
tions (Noss et al., 2011). Anything less will fail to provide policy makers with 
either a thorough understanding of what is at stake, or the arguments they will 
need in order to defend their positions. 
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8 Food sovereignty and the politics 
of food scarcity 
Alana Mann 
Introduction 
As this chapter is written, 16 million people in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and 
South Sudan are desperately in need of food, water and medical treatment. 
In South Sudan alone, one million are on the brink of famine. Economic and 
social collapse, driven by constant conflict, is leading to large-scale displace­
ment, disease and destitution in what might be the largest humanitarian crisis 
since the creation of the United Nations. Given this situation it is clear that 
hunger, ‘the world’s greatest solvable problem’ (World Food Program, 2012), 
appears no closer to being solved. Nor is the evidence from non-conflict 
zones convincing. Housing stress, low incomes, disability and poor access to 
transport are among the complex factors that contribute to alarming rates 
of food insecurity even in comparatively wealthy economies including the 
European Union, North America and Australia. Yet, paradoxically, obesity 
has eclipsed hunger as the most widespread global health problem. 
It is in its dialectical pairing with abundance that the relational and socially 
constructed nature of scarcity in food politics emerges. This chapter discusses 
how peoples’ movements are using the concept of food sovereignty to contest 
the naturalisation of scarcity in discourses about hunger. By unveiling the webs 
of power and social relations that govern access to and control over productive 
resources, advocates of food sovereignty draw attention to the politics of allo­
cation and attendant policies that are legitimised by predominant framings of 
scarcity. In decoupling hunger from food production, food sovereignty reveals 
scarcity to be socially-mediated and the result of socio-political processes. 
The very fact that scarcity is prone to naturalisation in discourses related to
food and agriculture demands a political ecology approach (Peet et al., 2011)
that recognises food systems as complex networks through which productive
resources flow and are governed by issues of allocation, access and entitle­
ment. Drawing attention to how scarcity is constructed discursively reveals
it to be a floating signifier, relative to temporal, spatial and cultural contexts,

















The unsustainability of an industrial food system that relies on supply solu­
tions generating overproduction belies the myth that free trade will feed the 
world. Episodes of crisis, including the food price hikes of 2007–2008, are 
generating resistance against the increasing power and reach of transnational 
corporations, exploitation of labour and the encroachment of regulations in both 
public and private spheres. Supporters of food sovereignty reject the notion of 
food as a commodity, adopting a rights-based approach that asserts the right to 
food is indivisible from other human rights including gender and racial equality. 
Demanding inclusive political spaces and pluralistic notions of sovereignty to 
facilitate transnational cooperation in the management of food and agricultural 
systems they are also driving new forms of collaboration (Schiavoni, 2015). 
The emergence of food sovereignty as a mobilising frame 
Food has long been recognised as a political weapon, and the discursive pro­
duction of scarcity is key to this. Scarcity relies on an imbalance of systems 
and establishes the basis of the free market. In shifting to new opportunities, 
capital itself creates and manipulates scarcities. Terms such as ‘food violence’ 
(Eakin et  al., 2010) draw attention to the structural inequalities that lead to 
hunger, obesity and diseases of malnutrition, and their disproportionate impact 
on populations subject to chronic economic marginalisation, social exclu­
sion and discrimination. Critical food scholars, civil society organisations and
peoples’ movements argue for more democratic governance of food systems 
that accommodates ‘alternative perspectives on food and its value to society’ 
and addresses ‘the differential power and political interests associated with dif­
ferent perspectives on food values’ (Eakin et al., 2010: 263). 
Framing scarcity as an inherent characteristic of productive resources such 
as soil, water and seeds naturalises it, and effectively sidesteps issues of social 
justice that run counter to the interests of elites. Linking hunger with wider 
socio-political and institutional processes, advocates of food sovereignty draw 
attention to power relations and unequal property rights. They call on govern­
ments to support radical transformations to domestic food systems held hostage 
to an unjust trade regime and the interests of multinational corporations. 
Ordinary people, many of whom are the most affected by hunger, are actively
promoting the rights-based concept of food sovereignty in local, regional and
international policy circles. Through grassroots mobilisations and engagement in
global forums, peoples’ movements are engineering a paradigm shift that exposes
the flaws in traditional approaches to addressing hunger. Coalitions of small-scale
farmers in the Global North and South are especially active in progressively
articulating this new vision of food production and consumption. Over the
past 20 years many of these groups have joined La Via Campesina (‘the peasant
way’), the world’s largest social movement with over 160 member organisations
mobilising in more than 70 countries. The members of La Via Campesina col­
lectively project food sovereignty beyond farmers’ interests towards a democratic
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The goal of food sovereignty demands a dynamic shift in state–society relations
and terms of engagement (Schiavoni, 2015). Food sovereignty emerged out of
the reduced power of the state in domestic food systems and seeks to reclaim
some of this power. It also valorises local control of food production and con­
sumption informed and legitimised by the participation of eaters and growers. 
In its purest interpretation, the concept of food sovereignty is a proposal for 
radical social transformation that aspires to democratise food systems. In the 
current context, food sovereignty is perhaps more accurately described as ‘a 
set of reactions to neoliberal globalisation and the industrial food system that 
is presented as an alternative approach predicated on the dispersal of power’ 
(Andrèe et al., 2014: 11). The concept has served as a compelling master frame 
for the mobilisation of La Via Campesina as a transnational coalition (Mann, 
2014), which is creating collaborative spaces and ways of working that ena­
ble people with diverse social, economic and cultural backgrounds to come 
together to recognise scarcity as a social construction and demand that govern­
ments address issues of access and distribution. 
The emergence of this coalition was triggered by the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1993, which coincided with the establishment 
of the North American Free Trade agreement (NAFTA). For small farmers, 
the globalisation of the trade regime would subject them to the full impacts 
of neoliberalism’s structural violence, ‘the unprecedented concentrations of 
wealth and power and the rapid destruction of life-ways and livelihoods, eco­
systems and species’ (Reitan, 2007: 16). Countering this, food sovereignty 
grants people, through their elected government representatives, control over 
their food security policies, including the right to impose protective tariffs 
against the dumping of subsidised exports, and the support and promotion of 
local markets. It also puts the onus on governments to respect, protect and 
fulfil the rights of citizens to food and the productive resources to produce it, 
including land, forests, fisheries, water and seeds. 
La Via Campesina characterised the reaction of the WTO, World Bank and G8
governments to the crippling escalation of food prices in 2007–2008 as disastrous,
claiming the policies they called for, including further trade liberalisation and a sec­
ond Green Revolution in Africa, are at the root of a decades-long food crisis. The
movement remains highly critical of internationally sourced food aid, financed
largely by the World Bank’s Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme, a
multilateral trust fund set up by the United States, Canada, Spain and the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation (Holt-Gimènez and Shattuck, 2011). Coupled with
a series of industry–non-governmental organization (NGO) and public–private
partnerships (PPPs), the programme represents a continuation of what Philip
McMichael (2005) calls the ‘development project’, which assumes that agriculture
is the main source of economic growth, and therefore increasing productivity is
the solution to poverty, and scarcity. Also referred to as the ‘productionist para­
digm’ (Lang and Heasman, 2016), this approach is committed to raising output,
intensification of farming, mass processing, mass marketing, homogeneity of



















Advocates of food sovereignty argue that the neoliberal model of production 
is based on the principle of overproduction by the ‘grain-livestock complex’ 
in the temperate world (Weis, 2007: 86–87). The United States, specifically, 
has achieved ‘tremendous productivity gains, exported surpluses, industrial 
innovations and the rise of its agro-TNCs [transnational corporations]’ (ibid.), 
resulting in extreme concentration of production and insurmountable inequal­
ity among producers. As a result, farmers throughout the Global North are 
trapped in a ‘cost-price squeeze’, while distorted competition from cheap 
exports has ruined largely unsubsidised farmer livelihoods in the Global South, 
exacerbating the detrimental effects of the shift from domestic food crops to 
export-bound cash crops. The rhetoric of scarcity is hollow; excess production 
is in fact the problem (Guthman, 2011). 
La Via Campesina promotes an alternative system based on small pro­
ducers using sustainable and local resources in production for domestic
consumption. In this model peasant and farmer-based sustainable produc­
tion methods have to be ‘supported and strengthened’ (La Via Campesina,
2008). Smallholder farmers’ engagement in pluriactivity—involvement in
activities unrelated to agriculture—is one of the many ways in which land
is improved. Pluriactivity is a form of risk management, in that the impact
of the failure of a single crop and the longer-term negative environmen­
tal impacts of farming are reduced and biodiversity maintained. Miguel
Altieri and Victor Manuel Toledo (2011) argue that not only are small-
scale, pluriactive farms more productive and resource-conserving than large
monocultural set-ups; they represent a sanctuary of agrobiodiversity free
of GMOs, are more resilient to climate change and create carbon stores.
Through practising agroecology, ‘the application of ecological concepts and
principles to the design and management of sustainable agricultural eco­
systems’, small-scale farmers can, according to Altieri and Toledo, lay the
foundation of an ‘epistemological, technical and social revolution . . . from
below’ (2011: 587; see also Ploeg, 2008). 
Agroecology as farming, and framing 
While scarcity is not ‘natural’ in the sense that it is naturalised in the discourse 
of the market, it is a ‘concrete period of dearth’ (Mehta, 2011: 382) felt acutely 
by a rural population when a productive resource, such as water, is limited. In 
response farmers adapt. On a daily basis they apply strategies rooted in local 
knowledge systems and practices that deal with seasonality and uncertainty in 
weather conditions. These highly differential coping mechanisms are designed 
to respond to the lived experience of scarcity, or coping with the ‘regularly 
irregular’, such as rainfall (Mehta, 2011: 379). 
The instrumental and economic rationality embedded in industrial food pro­
duction has led to a reliance on ‘expert’ discourses or ‘monocultures of knowledge’
according to Boaventura de Sousa Santos (in Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2014).
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of those that have been historically excluded from land management and policy-
making, such as indigenous peoples. La Via Campesina redresses these absences
through diàlogo de saberes—dialogue among different knowledges and ways of
knowing. This practice is ‘key to the durability of the LVC [La Via Campesina]
constellation . . . as organisations take mutual inspiration from the experiences
and visions of others’ (Martìnez-Torres and Rosset, 2014: 980). Accordingly,
agroecology is not only a farming method, but also a framing device that has
emerged from, and incorporates, social movement dialogues. 
For opponents of the industrial food system agroecology represents a solu­
tion to declining local economies and rural unemployment. As an alternative 
to a production model that relies on fertilisers, seeds and herbicides as well as 
high levels of regulation and certification, agroecology is affordable and sus­
tainable. Its methods are knowledge- rather than input-intensive, and it aims to 
‘improve links between the land and consumption’, reduce waste and risk, and 
empower producers (Lang and Heasman, 2016). La Via Campesina declared at 
a regional meeting on agroecology and peasant seeds in Thailand in 2002 that: 
Agroecology is giving a new meaning to the struggle for agrarian reform 
to empower the people. The landless farmers who fought to reclaim back 
their land, and those who received land through land reform programs 
in Brazil and Zimbabwe, are implementing agroecology as a tool to 
defend and sustain their farming, not only for their families but to provide 
healthier food for the community. Therefore, land reform, together with 
agroecology, has become the contribution of peasant and family farmers to 
give better and healthier food to our societies. 
(Surin Declaration, 2012) 
The agroecological paradigm recognises that ‘food embodies social, cultural 
and ecological values over and above its material value’ (McMichael, 2008: 
49) and demands a revitalised politics of ‘agrarian citizenship’ (Wittman, 2009) 
within which conventional terms such as sovereignty and rights need redefini­
tion. For La Via Campesina, the question is fundamentally social—who should 
provide food, and how? Whose livelihoods should be protected? 
The path to food security 
Food security and food sovereignty are complementary rather than opposi­
tional concepts. The latter frames food security in terms of rights, in which 
food is a basic human right that can only be realised in a system where food 
sovereignty is guaranteed (Rosset, 2006). As a legal concept, the right to food 
arguably has more force than the concept of food security, being indivisible 
from other economic, social and cultural rights. It embraces worker and labour 
rights within the food system and is linked to rights to water, land and access to 
other productive resources, such as seeds. According to Jean Ziegler, the first 
UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food: 
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The right to food includes all the elements of food security—including 
availability, accessibility and utilisation of food—but it also goes beyond 
the concept of food security because it emphasises accountability. A rights-
based approach focuses attention on the fact that making progress to reduce 
hunger is a legal obligation, not just a preference or choice. 
(Ziegler et al., 2011: 7) 
The rift between the food security discourse of the neoliberal model, on the 
one hand, and that of food sovereignty, on the other, can be traced to mod­
ern theories of economic development and the socially constructed notion of 
scarcity. Food sovereignty is premised on ‘justice between all economic actors’ 
achieved by agricultural trade based on ‘relationships of equality, cooperation 
and fair exchange’ (La Via Campesina, 2009: 61). In contrast, the relation­
ship between the industrial or corporate food regime and the project of global 
development, represented by the WTO’s (failed) Doha Development Round, 
has redefined and institutionalised food security as an ‘internationally managed 
market relation’ (McMichael, 2004: 57). 
The idea of food sovereignty as a foil to the notion of food security exposes 
questions around the ‘how’ of the food system—its social control. As Raj Patel 
explains, ‘as far as the terms of food security go, it is entirely possible for people 
to be food secure in prison or under a dictatorship’ (2009: 665). Advocates of 
food sovereignty challenge glaring absences in the social construction of food 
security, asking ‘who produces what, how it is produced and where it is pro­
duced’ (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2014: 983). 
Tactically reclaiming the role of the state in managing markets, La Via 
Campesina members challenge democratic, enabling states to act in the spirit of 
the movement’s food sovereignty framework by reversing the priority given to 
exports and guaranteeing food security for citizens before engaging in respon­
sible trade that does not damage the prospects of profit for farmers in the 
domestic markets of either trade partner. This position was validated a decade 
ago by La Via Campesina on the grounds that: 
The first problem for farmers is a lack of access to their own local market 
because the prices are too low for their products and the import dumping 
they are confronted with. The access to international markets affects only 
10 per cent of the world production, which is being controlled by trans­
national companies and biggest agro-industrial companies. The example of 
the tropical products (coffee, bananas) is illustrating this clearly. 
(La Via Campesina, 2006) 
This goes to the heart of what is ‘sovereign’ in food sovereignty. Food sover­
eignty promotes the role of the state as guarantor of rights, but recognises the 
sovereignty of people as the originators of claims. Claiming the need for strong, 
enabling states that can regain power over markets, food sovereignty may aim 
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the trade regime’ (Windfuhr and Jonsèn, 2005: 29), but the direction comes 
from the people. Within this framework, it is the responsibility of national 
governments to manage their trade relationships in a manner that protects food 
producers against dumping and unfair competition, thereby protecting the 
rights of people within a democratic framework. 
Food sovereignty policies incorporate claims for the defence of cultural dif­
ference and territories. These claims challenge base inequalities and demand
protection from activities that threaten the organic links between producers
and consumers. They go beyond the primacy of individual property rights
to a model of land reform based on the special nature of agriculture and
its multifunctionality, and are focused on preserving landscapes, protecting
livelihoods and valuing rural traditions (Rosset, 2006). Therefore, reform
embraces the comprehensive revision of agricultural systems to favour the
production and marketing of small farm produce. According to La Via
Campesina, the external constraints imposed by international trade agree­
ments not only lessen economic prospects, but also threaten the livelihoods,
identities and cultures of individuals and communities that are inextricably
tied to the land. The movement argues that the global trade regime lacks
the capacity to go beyond class-based notions of political representation to
a model that protects against the negative impacts of the market and also
protects the environment. Food sovereignty does the latter by ‘encompass­
ing the role of civil society and of democratic communication while also
acknowledging ecological limits’ in recognition that ‘an increasingly unsup­
portable model of food production is ruining soil quality, depleting water
supplies and contributing to climate change’ (Wittman, 2009: 808). 
La Via Campesina’s definition of food sovereignty simultaneously invokes 
the power of the state to provide protection and challenges its subordination 
to the market. It demands that the state provide social support and implement 
land reform, but also pushes the concept of food sovereignty beyond borders 
into transnational political arenas to pressure governments and educate publics 
regarding widespread injustices perpetuated by the architects of free trade areas 
(FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs). It emphasises that the 
solution to the global food crisis does not lie in market-led agrarian reform 
(MLAR), which has led to the dispossession and migration of a significant 
proportion of rural peasants, a point stressed at the Fifth World Social Forum 
(WSF) on Migrations held in November 2012 in Manila. Carlos Marentes, 
director of the US Border Agricultural Workers Project (a La Via Campesina 
member), describes the affinity between peasants and migrants: 
In reality, many migrants are peasants who have been displaced by the
capitalist system and forced to migrate … eight out of ten agricultural
workers in the US are Mexican migrants—poor peasants that cannot
survive on their own land and are forced to cross the border to look
for work.
(La Via Campesina, 2012) 
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Accordingly, La Via Campesina claims the neoliberal agribusiness offensive has 
recruited not only productive resources, but also people themselves. The pres­
sure to resist a ‘race to the bottom’ whereby peasant farmers become a source 
of cheap labour for plantation owners and export-processing zones (EPZs), 
such as those in countries from Mexico to Sri Lanka, has driven the movement 
to engage in global advocacy that integrates social, environmental, economic 
and cultural concerns with demands for access to land, over which conflicts 
are escalating. 
‘New scarcities’: land and water 
Land and water scarcity have been presented as a growing threat to food secu­
rity (FAO, 2011). A political ecology analysis of the trend of land-grabbing 
(which essentially also entails water- grabbing) again reveals the power and 
social relations that govern access to and control over these vital productive 
resources. The food price crisis of 2008 triggered a wave of large-scale land 
acquisitions that signal major changes in agricultural production, land use and 
labour relations. In 2011 the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security 
and Nutrition (2011) reported that land-grabbing is damaging to the food 
security, income, livelihood and environment of those most vulnerable to 
hunger and malnutrition. In fewer than 25 per cent of recorded cases has 
the practice resulted in tangible agricultural output (HLPE, 2011: 9; see also 
Lawther, 2015). A lack of transparency and limited consultation with local 
communities characterise most deals, particularly where corrupt governments 
are involved. Local people without formal tenure are rarely consulted and do 
not give prior consent, sometimes resulting in violent evictions and human 
rights violations. Efforts to create a code of conduct for investors in the form 
of the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments (RAI) have been 
described as a corporate ‘extreme makeover’ designed to make TNCs appear 
responsive and sensitive to the needs of communities and the environment, 
particularly in developing countries (Borras and Franco, 2012: 35; see also 
FIAN International, 2010). 
Access to land is fundamental to the right to food and, accordingly, food 
sovereignty. This is especially true for women, who are frequently denied ten­
ure on the basis of their non-recognition as food producers or agricultural 
workers (Ziegler et al., 2011: 25). Advocates of food sovereignty argue that 
while market-assisted land reform has failed spectacularly in countries such as 
Guatemala (ibid.: 334), genuinely redistributive land reform is good economics 
and effective social policy, as it creates employment and can reverse outmigra­
tion from rural areas. It is also productive. The inverse relationship between 
farm size and output is particularly striking in the Global South, where many 
smaller farms have been discovered to be two to ten times more productive 
than larger ones (Rosset, 1999; see also Ziegler et al., 2011). 
While calling for protection from global multilateral institutions against 
market forces in the form of ‘food sovereignty rights’, La Via Campesina calls 
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on people, through the enabling state, to determine the content of those rights.
These include access to land and choices regarding what to plant and what 
to trade, thereby ‘asserting substantive reformulation of sovereignty through
context-specific rights, situated in particular, historical subjectivities’ 
(McMichael, 2008: 52). The rights of women, for example, are central to 
the food sovereignty framework, which recognises them as ‘agents and actors 
and not merely consumers’, emphasising ‘social reproduction and social devel­
opment as central components of rural development and rural employment’ 
(Spieldoch, 2007: 12). As the producers of 60–80 per cent of food in develop­
ing countries, and as primary carers in most societies, women are affected more 
than men by food insecurity. Considering the intergenerational consequences 
of maternal and child malnutrition, discrimination against women as food pro­
ducers is not only a violation of human rights but has consequences for society 
at large. Women’s access to land, extension services and finance or credit must 
be improved if their role as small-scale food producers is to be protected. 
Drawing connections between the structural violence of economic and 
political systems, the feminisation of agriculture and domestic oppression, 
‘food sovereignty is about ending violence against women’ (Vivas, 2012). 
This gendered perspective of food sovereignty is one very important exam­
ple of how the concept calls into question the neoliberal project as a whole 
on behalf of billions of rural poor. Far from aiming to reconstruct a nostalgic 
rural utopia, food sovereignty is about ‘countering the catastrophic and eco­
logical effects of the neoliberal assault on the agrarian foundations of society’ 
(McMichael, 2014: 338). 
Cooperation from catastrophe 
La Via Campesina’s genesis provides evidence that collective action and 
cooperation can emerge from catastrophe (Solnit, 2004). There is growing 
recognition that addressing the imbalances in our food systems demands new 
approaches on all levels of governance. Former Special Rapporteur for the 
Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, claims that ‘there is certainly a new inter­
est in food issues in the North due to the public health impacts attributed to 
the way food systems have developed and their effects on the environment, the 
inadequate attention given to nutrition, and the disappearance of small-scale 
and family farms in the region’ (De Schutter, 2014: 17). During his tenure, 
De Schutter also drew attention to the impacts of changes in supply chains as 
significant for food producers. Global, vertically-integrated value chains com­
prise firms that engage directly with producers, cooperatives or local buyers 
that manage primary commodities such as cacao, in the case of chocolate. The 
development of these chains, which involve a number of countries at a time, 
has been enabled by reduced government intervention in agriculture markets, 
the deregulation of financial services and commodity futures market and the 
expansion of hybrid trade and investment agreements, of which NAFTA is the 





Food systems are undergoing deep transformations … the increase in 
direct [foreign] investment is part of a larger transformation of the global 
supply chain in the agri-food sector. Commodity buyers (wholesalers) are 
larger and more concentrated than previously and they seek to respond to 
the requirements of their food industry clients by increased vertical coor­
dination, tightening their controls over suppliers … this [processing] sector 
is increasingly globalized and dominated by large transnational companies. 
(De Schutter, 2009: 4–5) 
He argues for corrections to the imbalances of power in the food system where 
the relationships between actors are based ‘solely on their relative bargain­
ing strength’ and believes that participation in agro-export networks should 
not be mandatory for farmers who wish to produce crops for local markets. 
Improvement of communication and transport infrastructure is essential in 
levelling the playing field for smallholders, while other instruments such as 
‘farmers’ cooperatives, marketing arrangements, and public procurement’ 
should be considered by states as a means to strengthen rural economies (De 
Schutter, 2009: 11). In this respect, he accords with the food sovereignty 
framework, which is not opposed to trade per se, but recognises that ‘the 
current trade system is based on the reality that current international trade 
practices and trade rules are not working in favour of smallholder farmers’ 
(Windfurh and Jonsén, 2005: 32). For members of La Via Campesina, trade is 
acceptable when prioritised below satisfying the needs of citizens and where 
domestic production cannot meet needs. 
Food sovereignty emphasises ecologically appropriate production, distri­
bution and consumption, social-economic justice and local food systems as 
ways to tackle hunger and poverty and guarantee sustainable food security 
for all peoples. It advocates trade and investment that serve the collective 
aspirations of society. 
(Nyéléni, 2013) 
Proposed policies that operate within a food sovereignty framework include 
a revised Common Agriculture and Food Policy (CAFP) that ‘relocalises 
agricultural production close to where consumers live’, put forward by the 
Coordination Europèenne Via Campesina. This model would rely on the 
European Union to regulate production, markets and distribution, and ‘to 
take all the actors in the food chain into consideration’ (La Via Campesina, 
2010). More radical options include the development of trade groupings such 
as that proposed for sustainable cocoa to protect members of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) against cheap imports (Koning 
and Jogeneel, 2006). 
Over the past decade the International Planning Committee on Food 
Sovereignty (IPC) has facilitated the participation of La Via Campesina and its 
allies in international governance after decades of marginalisation in discussions 
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over world food security. In late 2009, the 127 UN member states agreed that 
the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) would become the primary 
global forum focused on food security and nutrition, with a difference; civil 
society organisations would become official participants on the Committee. 
Established in the 1970s in response to an earlier food crisis, the original CFS 
was largely ineffective in meeting its mandate to review and follow up food 
production and security issues, and was poorly supported by member states in 
terms of commitment and funding (Shaw, 2007). 
The reformed CFS is promoted as a new space for engagement, a multi-
stakeholder forum committed to eliminating hunger following three guiding 
principles: inclusivity, to ensure that voices of all relevant stakeholders are heard 
in the policy debates on food, agriculture and nutrition; strong linkages to the 
field, to ensure the work of the CFS is based on the reality on the ground; 
and flexibility, in the face of a changing external environment and the needs of 
countries (CFS, 2012: 9). Unlike the case in previous UN platforms, civil soci­
ety actors will be recognised as meaningful political agents representing their 
own interests in the CFS mission to develop a global strategic framework on 
ending hunger. An autonomous international food security and nutrition civil 
society mechanism (CSM) facilitates the participation of organisations from 
countries that regularly experience food insecurity, many of which are mem­
bers of La Via Campesina. In the reformed CFS, states remain the principal 
actors in voting and decision-making, but they will also be held accountable 
for addressing food insecurity. 
The challenges for the CFS in creating a model for genuinely legitimate, 
inclusive and transparent global governance include balancing participation 
and representation, bringing about consensus while being sensitive to diver­
sity, building trust, overcoming language barriers and engineering efficiency. 
The new platform has been described as an opportunity for state and non-state 
actors to ‘challenge the logic of embedded neoliberalism’ (Duncan and Barling, 
2012: 158). Yet, whether it is legitimate, or even possible, for the UN to influ­
ence trade, is doubtful. As attractive as the idea is of considering trade alongside 
social, cultural and economic rights such as the right to food, the FAO has 
no mandate. Thus, the question remains—what institutions and mechanisms 
are needed to empower smallholders as economic actors and to value diverse 
modes of production? 
The shared vision of agroecology and the systematic dissemination of 
agroecological farming practices through the campesino-a-campesino (farmer to 
farmer) methodology, is an increasingly significant ‘socially activating tool’ in 
consolidating and mobilising the food sovereignty project (Martìnez-Torres, 
2014: 994). Over 40 peasant agroecology training schools now operate in 
the Americas, Africa, Asia and Europe. In 2014, the International Year of 
Family Farming, a series of FAO multi-stakeholder meetings in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia determined that agroecology should become an integral part of 
sub-national, national and regional agricultural policies and that governments 











to food production in their research and development programmes. Pilot pro­
jects, marketing strategies, educational programmes and monitoring systems 
are planned to alleviate the move to industrialised food production that con­
tinues to threaten local and indigenous communities in the regions. While this 
wider, formalised engagement with the agroecology concept is welcome, La 
Via Campesina is equally wary of the co-option of the concept by elites includ­
ing the World Bank who have enabled corporate actors to successfully enter, 
and dominate, niche organic markets (Martìnez-Torres, 2014). 
The new institutional frameworks needed to navigate the competing sov­
ereignties must engage civil society actors in governance on multi-scalar levels 
and also address the urban–rural divide. Venezuela’s urban comunas provide a 
working example of corresponsabilidad, which is defined as ‘a means of bridging 
the formation of popular power and the existence (and gradual redistribution) 
of established state power’ (Schiavoni, 2015: 477). In a nation where 90 per cent 
of the population is urbanised, this model is rebuilding rural–urban relationships 
through direct marketing channels and also reframing food sovereignty in terms 
of eaters’ relationship to food and the processes of food production, distribution 
and consumption. Schiavoni (2015: 476) refers to the comunas as ‘a demonstra­
tion of internal sovereignty in that, through joining together and organizing 
themselves into a comuna, the communal councils and communities that run 
them are demonstrating their intent to function as a sovereign unit’. As such, 
corresponsisbilidad is an example of the ‘interactive governance’ (Hospes, 2014: 
125) that can drive the development of new forms of dialogue between state 
and civil society actors collaborating on food and agriculture policy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed how food sovereignty exposes food scarcity as a
socio-political construct that legitimises further intensification of production at
the expense of people and environments. The food industry itself is a major
contributor to overproduction, food insecurity and environmental degradation.
Food sovereignty offers an alternative view of food as a natural resource. It
resists simplistic linkages between population growth, climate change, conflict
and resource scarcity, and reminds us that technological solutions are not neutral. 
A political economy analysis exposes the ideology and forms of governance 
that normalise scarcity. Awareness of the representation of scarcity in hegem­
onic discourses that dominate global debates on food and agriculture reveals 
the machinations and contradictions of sovereign power. Food sovereignty 
challenges us to rethink where, and with whom, that sovereignty lies. 
Critics of food sovereignty contest significant ‘boundary issues’ (Bernstein, 
2014). How can states assert sovereignty in a globalised trade regime and rec­
oncile this with local communities’ desires to manage local food systems? How 
can ‘both the state and units lying within it be sovereign with respect to food 
at the same time . . . are all communities to be equally sovereign with respect 
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inequalities in food production capacities, within and between countries, to 
be resolved? These issues must be tackled if the epistemic community of food 
sovereignty is to advance its political project. A promising first step lies in refus­
ing to allow the socially constructed notion of scarcity to remain the dominant 
frame for policy debate. 
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9 Rare earth diplomacy 
Mitigating conflict over technology minerals 
Elliot Brennan 
Introduction 
The minerals that combine to help make our technology are crucial building 
blocks for our modern world. These ‘technology minerals’1 are key in our eve­
ryday lives and are not only used in cell phones and automobiles but are also 
critical in aiding their functionality through fibre optic cables and the make-up 
of complex communication systems. Far from just being essential for everyday 
civilian uses, these minerals are also key components in many defence technol­
ogies. It is not, therefore, surprising that governments are eager to secure the 
supply chains of these technology minerals. Indeed, one could say that ensuring 
the continued and unimpeded access to such resources for use by private and 
public companies is an essential part of prudent and good governance. Without 
free market access to such minerals entire manufacturing sectors could grind 
to a halt, the manufacture and maintenance of key defence equipment might 
be interrupted or development of vital communication infrastructure could 
become severely impaired. 
Of these minerals, some of the most crucial comprise the lanthanides, found 
on the periodic table between numbers 57 and 71, as well as yttrium at number 
39. Together these elements are known as rare earth elements (REEs). 
While many countries have significant deposits of REEs they do not neces­
sarily have the viable mining, processing or refining capacities that make their 
industrialisation possible. There are numerous impediments to the creation of 
such industry, including the impact on the environment, significant operating 
costs and the dearth of mining companies willing to take a bet on commodities 
susceptible to the significant price volatility of REEs. 
As new ‘disruptive technologies’2 come online, supply chains will be forced 
to transform, as will the refining and processing of such ores to make different 
grades of minerals for new end-users. In this fluid environment of technologi­
cal change, supply chains will undergo constant pressure to adapt to meet new 
requirements. In the foreseeable future, supply chain shocks for technology 
minerals are increasingly likely. 
The nature of availability and supply of REEs also makes them important 
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the political realm, including the emergence in 2010 of a coercive diplomacy. 
Similar to the intimidation present in the nineteenth and twentieth century 
use of gunboat diplomacy, that which emerged is a coercive diplomacy for the 
modern, globalised era. This ‘rare earth diplomacy’ sought to pressure Japan 
and other manufacturing states in Asia, which are reliant on REEs, to relocate 
operations closer to the source of supply. 
Recent disputes over REEs offer a cautionary tale as to how conflict over
technology minerals can occur and may result in international conflicts. New
and disruptive technologies force the emergence of new markets for critical
minerals and, as a result, supersede current supply chains or create new ones. The
contest for a stable supply of rare earth elements offers lessons in the resolution of
disputes, which may be crucial to mitigating future resource conflict. This chap­
ter explores recent conflicts over REEs and how, as a result, both the private
sector and governments around the world have relearned the crucial importance
of supply chain vulnerability in the face of new disruptive technologies. The
discussion is divided into two sections. The first looks at the history of REEs
and the origins of the disputes from the 1980s to late 2010. The second sec­
tion explores how governments and the private sector have acted to address the
global supply chain vulnerabilities inherent in the production and use of REEs. 
A prelude to conflict: REEs from the 1980s to 2010 
On scarcity 
As discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, despite their name, REEs 
are not rare; instead they are difficult to find in large, economically viable and 
minable concentrations. Indeed, the processing of the mined ore to the final 
rare earth metal is capital and labour intensive, often requiring a thousand 
processing steps from mining to end use. The misconception of REEs being 
‘rare’ is due to this misnomer itself. However, the contemporary understanding 
of scarcity is also misleading. Drivers of scarcity are often economic, and thus 
inherently social, rather than reflecting the absolute finiteness of the resource 
itself. Indeed, contemporary debates apportion blame for scarcity onto nature 
not humanity (Rayner, 2010). This is disingenuous and ignores the power of 
cultural change and other innovations that can shape allocation or even alter 
the fundamental dynamics of supply and demand. 
The traditional understanding of scarcity observes the earth as a closed
system writing-off the possible impacts of effective recycling regimes and
improved efficiency. Similarly, in the race for new supply, extra-terrestrial
and non-traditional supply of minerals (such as deep-sea resources) are
increasingly seen as feasible sources of extraction. Indeed, the very idea
of scarcity needs to be challenged (Mehta, 2010). Putting aside the obvi­
ous concerns of wanton consumption and over exploitation, the scarcity












allocation or consumption models such as recycling of ‘scarce’ commodi­
ties. These emerge not from economic drivers but rather the evolution of
socio-political discourse in our ever-changing societies. That scarcity, as it
is commonly perceived, is socially generated and is overlooked in favour of
countable tonnes and megatonnes and other misleading notions of recover­
able and non-recoverable quantities. These in themselves provide a simplistic
and hyperbolic understanding of scarcity. The evolution of socio-political
discourse combined with on-going innovations means that what is ‘scarce’
one day, may be abundant (in terms of demand) the next. This is certainly
true in the recent history of rare earth elements. 
A more nuanced approach to the idea of scarcity is needed when observ­
ing REEs. Not least because the evolving nature of demand, in line with 
technological change, for different REEs means they vary in their ‘scarcity’ 
or perceived ‘finiteness’ (Xenos, 2010). Perception of REE scarcity is due to 
insufficient supply rather than the known reserves. This is further a result of 
unequal dispersion and unequal control over the global supply chain, as dis­
cussed later in this chapter. By a similar token, many of the technological 
products that contain REEs have become ‘status products’; while not essential 
items for survival they are current sociological markers of status and wealth. As 
such, perceived scarcity of REEs differs from the perceived scarcity of other 
more vital life-supporting elements described in this volume—water, food and 
even the elements that support modern-day food production such as phospho­
rous. Thus, in the context of this book, the perceived scarcity of REEs (despite 
their character as essential building blocks of our modern technological world) 
should be viewed differently in that REEs are to some extent more adaptable 
and susceptible to change. 
Regardless, the inequalities in the supply chain of REEs renders them to 
some extent scarce in the political and security realm. This in itself is an impor­
tant consideration, for securing a stable supply of technological minerals, such 
as REEs, often leads to these minerals being described as ‘scarce’ for the pur­
poses of strategic debates and foreign policy agendas. In other words, scarcity 
narratives around some minerals are simply perpetuated to justify interventions 
to secure the stable supply of technology minerals for domestic use. 
What are REEs? 
REEs are a group of 17 elements on the periodic table. These elements are 
crucial in most high-tech products from advanced military technology to clean 
energies, automobiles and cell phones. The early use of REEs in televisions 
and computer monitors allowed for colour television sets and computer dis­
plays. Europium, which glows red under ultra violet (UV) light, is used in 
bank notes to allow the detection of forgeries and in thin super-conducting 
alloys. Fibre optic cables employ erbium as a key enhancer of optical properties. 
Permanent magnets, now crucial components in most high-tech goods, include 
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Table 9.1 Selected applications for REEs 
Electronics Lasers, fibre optics, display phosphors, medical imaging phosphors 
Magnets Motors, disk drives, power generation, microphones and speakers, 
MRI, car parts, communication systems 
Metal Alloys Cast iron, aluminium, magnesium, steel 
Catalysts Petroleum refining, catalytic converters, diesel additives, chemical 
processing 
Ceramics Colourants, sensors 
Glass Optical and UV glass, polishing compounds 
Others Fertiliser, water treatment, fluorescent lighting 
Source: author 
The inclusion of these REEs is credited in the miniaturisation of e-goods. The 
use in fluorescent lamps of yttrium, lanthanum and cerium, among others, has 
enabled significant energy cuts through more efficient lighting. Similarly, the 
rise of green technologies such as wind turbines is unthinkable without REEs. 
REEs can be divided into the heavier (HREE) elements and the more 
abundant lighter (LREE) elements, a distinction that relates to their atomic 
weights. LREEs comprise cerium, europium, gadolinium, lanthanum, neodymium,
praseodymium, promethium and scandium. HREEs comprise, dysprosium, erbium,
holmium, lutetium, terbium, thulium, ytterbium and yttrium. The LREEs are often 
found in bastnaesite deposits, while the HREEs are found in monazite deposits. 
Together, these constitute the majority of deposits found in China and North 
America. Also contained in monazite deposits are thorium and sometimes ura­
nium, and, as a result, a small amount of radioactive waste is produced during 
the process of mining and refining. The prevalence of the different REEs var­
ies greatly. For example, there is an abundance of cerium in many bastnaesite 
deposits and the market is well supplied. Conversely, the criticality of other 
REEs, particularly less abundant HREEs, such as dysprosium, remains a con­
cern for end-users. Currently, cerium and lanthanum are the least valued REEs, 
while neodymium and praseodymium, the ‘magnet metals’, are two of the most 
highly valued. A 2010 US Department of Energy criticality matrix notes the 
importance of different REEs in the medium-term (2010–2025) development 
of green technologies (see Figure 9.1). This example of criticality demonstrates 
a common supply constraint for industry. 
The ability of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) to bear 
both the large capital investments needed for mining REEs and what one 
could call its higher ‘social pain threshold’ for the negative environmental and 
social impacts of their mining, has meant that the lion’s share of HREEs is pro­
duced in China. The importance of REEs, particularly HREEs, in high-tech 
products makes them increasingly deemed to be in the national interest and 
has seen HREEs stockpiled by numerous governments in recent years. At the 
heart of the concern surrounding REEs is the global supply chain. The supply 
chain is heavily balanced in China’s favour, which produces approximately
 150 E. Brennan
 
Figure 9.1 Criticality matrix for green technology substrates 
Source: US Department of Energy (2010) 
90 per cent of global supply.3 China’s monopoly over production runs in tan­
dem with the country being the biggest manufacturer of rare earth containing 
e-goods. However, despite China’s production monopoly, it holds less than 
half of proven global reserves of rare earths. Estimates of China’s reserves differ 
but range between 23 per cent and 42 per cent of global reserves (Information 
Office of the Chinese State Council, 2012; US Geological Society, 2015). 
Table 9.2 Global production and known reserves 
Country Mine Production (metric tons) Reserves (metric tons) 
2013 2014 
US 5,500 7,000 1,800,000 
Australia 2,000 2,500 3,200,000 
Brazil 330  22,000,000 
China 95,000 95,000 55,000,000 
India 2,900 3,000 3,100,000 
Malaysia 180 200 30,000 
Russia 2,500 2,500 inc. in ‘other countries’ total 
Thailand 800 1,100 N/A 
Vietnam 220 200 inc. in ‘other countries’ total 
Other countries N/A N/A 41,000,000 
World Total 110,000 110,000 130,000,000 
Source: USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2015; compiled by author 
Rare earth diplomacy 151
 
As noted, despite their name, REEs are not rare. They are, however, dif­
ficult to find in large, economically viable and minable concentrations and, 
furthermore, processing is costly in terms of financial and human resources. 
China’s low labour costs, state-owned mining firms and centralised governance 
system, which can ‘manage’ the environmental cost, allows Beijing to operate 
mines at commercially viable levels. Nonetheless, this ‘rare earth’ misnomer 
hints at the potential conflict that surrounds the supply of the critical minerals. 
A key problem with the production and processing of REEs is the industry’s 
large environmental footprint.4 Surface and ground water pollution, excessive 
exploitation leading to landslides, clogged rivers and environmental emergen­
cies are some of the potential environmental problems associated with mining 
operations (Information Office of the Chinese State Council, 2012). While 
these issues are better monitored in Europe, Australia and North America, 
traditionally under tighter regulatory frameworks, the concerns remain the 
same and the monitoring of mining operations is costly. Environmental safety 
concerns were largely responsible for the initial closure of the Mountain Pass 
rare earth mine in the US. Similarly, a US$100 million clean-up was required 
at Mitsubishi’s REE refinery in Malaysia. The environmental costs of China’s 
REE mining were estimated to be approximately US$6 billion in 2012 (Els, 
2012). Publicly, and in conversations between the author and Chinese dip­
lomats, Beijing has increasingly expressed its concerns over the industry’s 
environmental footprint (Information Office of the Chinese State Council, 
2012).5 In recent years, China has shut down mines, particularly around Beijing 
and other population centres, due in part to the negative effects on air quality. 
REEs, like some other critical minerals, differ from ordinary commodities. 
The processing and production of REEs is more complex than the mining of 
other ores, such as iron ore. Typically, once commodities are mined they are 
then directly delivered to an end-user. For rare earth ore, once it is mined from 
a mineral deposit it must then be separated into individual rare earth oxides 
before the oxides can be refined into metals. The metals are then processed 
into rare earth alloys and manufactured into components used in a variety of 
e-goods, products and technologies. For commodities like iron ore it is often 
the logistics that are the crux of the operation, for REEs it is the processing. 
Historical background to the strategic importance of REEs 
China’s rare earth resources can be likened in importance to the Middle 
East’s oil. They have immense strategic significance and we must certainly 
deal with rare earth issues with care, unleashing the advantages they bring. 
Attributed to Deng Xiaoping (in Morrison and Tang, 2012: 1) 
At the beginning of the technology boom in the 1980s, the US, propelled by 
the military-industrial complex of the Cold War, held the keys to much of 
the innovation leading the burgeoning global technology revolution. The US 
was the leading rare earth producer and, supported by a booming middle class, 
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was also the largest manufacturer of rare earth containing e-goods. Beijing, 
through the remarkable foresight of Deng Xiaoping who likened China’s REE 
resources to the Middle East’s oil, had its eye fixed on developing China’s rare 
earth and manufacturing industries. 
In the 1980s, Magnequench, a leading US tech firm that was a crucial manu­
facturer for the US Department of Defense’s Joint Direct Attack Munition 
Project, pioneered the manufacture of high-powered neodymium-iron-boron 
(NdFeB) magnets—vital to computer systems and used in advanced weaponry— 
for its then parent company, General Motors (GM). GM’s restructuring in the 
early 1990s resulted in the sale of Magnequench. The consortium of companies 
that purchased the high-tech firm included two Chinese state-owned metals 
firms: San Huan New Materials and the China National Nonferrous Metals 
Import and Export Company. Both firms were run by a son-in-law of Deng 
Xiaoping. After the purchase, the chairman of the San Huan company took 
over as chairman of Magnequench. Shortly thereafter, the company’s NdFeB 
magnet production line was duplicated in China. The transfer of the critical 
rare earth technology by Chinese state-owned firms was complete in 2001 
when, on the day of the expiration of the terms of the agreement that stipu­
lated Magnequench operations must stay in the US, the work force was made 
redundant and the equipment shipped to Tainjin China (Tkacik, 2008). As 
China’s rare earth mining industry emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
the industry collapsed in the US. By 2002, the Mountain Pass rare earth mine 
in California was closed. 
The strategy for China’s takeover of the rare earth industry was perfectly 
executed and met with little resistance from the federal government or the rel­
evant regulatory body, the Committee on Foreign Investment, in the US. At 
the time, still at the beginning of the technology revolution, rare earths were 
not given their due credit as a critical strategic resource. This, combined with 
the significant environmental backlash toward the mining of REEs in the US, 
meant there was little resistance to the downscaling of REE mining. In the 
coming years, as China came to control a near monopoly share of the global 
supply chain of rare earths, many in the US came to see the retreat from REE 
industry as a grave error. 
China’s own ambitions in the REE industry did not stop with the takeo­
ver of Magnequench, nor did it with the collapse of the mine at Mountain 
Pass or Beijing’s near total monopoly of REE production. In 2009 a similar 
bid by a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) was lodged to buy a major­
ity stake in the company running Australia’s largest rare earth mine at Mount 
Weld, in Western Australia. Perhaps having learnt from the Magnequench 
experience, the bid was rejected by Australian authorities. China Nonferrous 
Metal Mining Company (CNMC) had attempted to purchase a 51.66 per 
cent stake of Lynas Rare Earths. In a decision now seen as one of the most 
significant ever by Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), the 
Board requested that the ownership bid be reduced to below 50 per cent. The 
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would not be able to exclude the possibility that Lynas’ production could be 
controlled to the detriment of non-Chinese end-users’ (Keenan, 2011). The 
Board deemed that this would have been ‘inconsistent with the government’s 
policy of maintaining Australia’s position as a reliable supplier to all our trading 
partners and hence potentially contrary to national interest’ (Keenan, 2011). 
The state-owned CNMC subsequently withdrew its bid. Beijing’s aggressive 
acquisition strategy then gave way to a more coercive use of its REE domi­
nance and ultimately witnessed a tipping point in how states viewed REEs. 
The tipping point: conflict between China and Japan 
In September 2010, China halted exports of REEs to Japan. The move fol­
lowed a diplomatic incident—a dispute over the arrest of a Chinese fishing
boat captain after a collision with a Japanese coast guard vessel. Chinese
exports of REEs to Japan dropped from 2300 to 400 metric tonnes between
September and November 2010 (Morrison and Tang, 2012). Japan’s high-
tech manufacturing sector, reliant on Chinese REEs, was crippled. All of
Japan’s major firms were hit including Nissan, Toyota, Sony, Mitsubishi,
Nissan, Honda and Hitachi. 
The move drew wide criticism and was seen as ‘economic intimidation’ 
and an ‘informal embargo’ (Mazza et al., 2013). Despite the quick release of 
the detained fishing boat captain by Tokyo, the REE export ban from China 
to Japan was not lifted and the dispute dragged on for months. The export 
reductions forced high-tech and manufacturing firms, both from Japan and 
elsewhere, to relocate to China or buy rare earth metals on the black market 
to guarantee access to REE supply. After several months, with the export ban 
creating an inevitable REEs price increase that initiated a boom in illicit sale 
and smuggling of rare earth metals by disobliging Chinese suppliers willing to 
flout the export restrictions, the embargo finally ended. 
Global supply chain concerns 
The 2010 dispute between China and Japan was of major concern to man­
ufacturing countries that relied on China for REE supply. It also caught 
Washington off-guard. In the early 2000s, the US relied entirely on imports of 
REEs. Between 2006 and 2009, 92 per cent of the US’ rare earth compounds 
and metals came from China (Mazza et al., 2013). By 2013, that number had 
fallen to 75 per cent (USGS, 2015). It is a figure that may fall even further, but 
without significant new production outside of China the supply chain remains 
heavily in China’s favour. 
REEs are part of a fragmented supply chain outside of China, with some 
locations having downstream but not upstream components of the REE value 
chain and others the inverse. As such, in order to reduce dependence on supply 
from China, mining alone is not sufficient. Instead, the full value chain—both 
upstream and downstream—must be developed. Despite concerns following 
 154 E. Brennan
 
the 2010 Japanese embargo, much of the REEs mined outside of China still 
needed to be shipped to China for processing or manufacturing. 
Today, China’s ‘heavy handed mercantilist’ approach to rare earths (An, 
2015) is largely driven by Beijing’s ‘Go Global’ policy, which aims to extend 
internationalisation of domestic firms and invest in the acquisition of strategic 
resources. Beijing is concerned for its own resource security to support its 
development. These concerns were expressed in China’s twelfth Five-Year 
Plan (2011–2015), which anticipated a growing middle class, rapid urbani­
sation and growing consumption, including a significant push for renewable 
energies. With growing domestic demand predicted in coming years, REE 
exports from China are likely to continue in a downward direction. 
Addressing vulnerabilities: REEs after 2010 
The study of conflict in recent years has evolved to have a more nuanced view 
of conflict (Brunk, 2012). Certainly, the impacts of high-intensity, long-last­
ing and deadly conflict are undeniably negative. Low-intensity and short-lived 
conflict aligns more closely with a positive interpretation of conflict, where 
the hostilities or disputes stimulate creative thinking, innovation and a more 
rapid change than would have likely occurred had the status quo persisted. 
The latter view can be observed in the global reaction to REE supply chain 
concerns since the 2010 tipping point that saw the dispute emerge between 
China and Japan. 
Resource security and relevant disputes, frequently driven by supply 
chain imbalances, often promote new investment in research, exploration 
and technology innovation. For example, over the past half a century, high 
global energy prices have been the catalyst for the development of new and 
often cleaner energies, such as nuclear, wind, solar and, most recently, shale 
gas. Conflict over energy resources is also promoting an efficiency revolu­
tion where new technology is aimed at minimising wastage across the energy 
grid. China’s assertive approach to its REEs has promoted a similar pattern of 
change. Technology innovation, new REE exploration (often unconventional) 
and processing efficiency, in the form of recycling regimes, have all emerged 
in recent years. Most importantly, it has provoked new strategic thinking at a 
governmental level on resource and supply chain security. 
More specifically, the pathways out of the crisis of 2010, and the more gen­
eral supply chain vulnerability, have led to an increase in production of REEs 
to diversify the points of supply, stockpiling of critical minerals, research and 
development toward substitution of REEs, new recycling regimes, and explo­
ration of frontier deposits through deep-sea mining. Together these approaches 
have begun to whittle away a few percentage points of China’s monopoly on 
the global supply chain of REEs. These changes have given governments and 
the manufacturing industry more of a buffer, albeit still wafer-thin, to insulate 
from sudden supply shocks. Most importantly, the debate that has occurred 
since 2010 has vastly improved the visibility of the global REE supply chain. 
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This identification and recognition of the problem has been the crucial first 
step to finding viable, long-term solutions. Importantly, the conflict allowed 
governments to address supply chain vulnerabilities and build resilience into a 
volatile and vulnerable supply chain that was necessary for adaptation toward a 
more balanced model. 
World Trade Organization (WTO) resolution 
The most unified step following China’s export cuts was to challenge Beijing 
in the rules-based system that governs global trade. In March 2012, Japan, the 
US and the EU joined together in an unprecedented demonstration of unity 
and launched a dispute settlement case against China at the WTO. The case 
revolved around the interpretation of China’s invoking of ‘General Exceptions’ 
under Article XX(b), on resource conservation and environmental protection, 
as well as Article XX(g) on conserving an exhaustible natural resource. On 26 
March 2014, the WTO ruled against Beijing. The panel in the dispute settle­
ment case (DS431) found that: ‘[T]he overall effect of the foreign and domestic 
restrictions is to encourage domestic extraction and secure preferential use of 
those materials by Chinese manufacturers’ (WTO, 2014). It continued to note 
that the restrictions were ‘designed to provide Chinese industries that produce 
downstream goods with protected access to the subject materials’ and that the 
intent of the restrictions was to ‘control the international market for a natural 
resource’ (WTO, 2014). 
Despite the result, the arbitration process itself was long and costly. 
Exploiting long drawn out legal processes, whether it be over protectionism 
in the WTO or over territorial disputes as seen in the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Hague, has been shown to work in Beijing’s favour in 
the past. During such processes, Beijing has made important gains in mar­
ket position (Wu, 2014) with little sanction from governing bodies. As such, 
even though successful, the arbitration mechanism alone was not a panacea to 
addressing the global supply chain problem. 
Stockpiling 
Following the 2010 embargo particular emphasis was placed on creating 
strategic stockpiles of REEs by various governments. After much debate, in 
January 2013 the US Department of Defense recommended the stockpiling of 
US$120.43 million of HREEs (Humphries, 2013). At the same time, the US 
Department of Energy created the Critical Materials Institute, to act as an ‘inno­
vation hub for critical materials’ for academics, industry partners and national 
laboratories. In September 2015, the US Defense Logistics Agency, part of 
the Department of Defense responsible for stockpiling, signed a contract with 
Texas Rare Earth Resources, a US exploration company focused on HREEs, 
to supply ultra-high purity rare earths (Texas Rare Earth Resources Corp., 
2015). The contract is indicative of the more proactive government response to 
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aid the domestic development of the REE sector in the US, as well as to rein­
force strategic stockpiles. Worryingly, however, this announcement only came 
after the bankruptcy of the US’ largest rare earth company, Molycorp. 
Tokyo set out its need to stockpile REEs in a 2009 report from the Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry titled ‘Strategy for Ensuring Stable Supplies 
of Rare Metals’. Understandably, the importance of this stockpiling increased 
after 2010 and has been carried out by Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National 
Corporation (JOGMEC) under the Rare Metals Stockpiling Program. Much 
of the detail of Japan’s stockpiling program remains undisclosed, but it is likely 
built on a similar programme, established in 1983 following the 1970s oil 
crisis, which aims to stockpile goods and resources equivalent to 42 days of 
standard consumption. 
China also began stockpiling for what may be seen as a different purpose. 
China’s stockpiles, managed by the State Bureau of Material Reserves and 
according to some estimates involving approximately 100,000 tonnes, have 
allowed Beijing greater control over global REE prices (An, 2015). The State 
Bureau of Material Reserves continued to expand these stockpiles in 2014 
(USGS, 2015). 
Efficiency: new recycling regimes 
There has been a renewed push to establish an industry that can manage the 
recycling of REEs and other critical materials already in circulation in an 
economy. For example, the European Association of Electrical and Electronic 
Waste Take Back Systems, or WEEE Forum, has grown to become the largest 
organisation of its kind in the recycling of e-waste. The US and Japan have also 
explored REE recycling programmes and to varying degrees these have been 
initiated. Amongst the programmes, the US Critical Materials Institute, along 
with scientists from the Korea Institute of Industrial Technology, are research­
ing improvements for the recycling of REEs. 
Globally, however, there remains very limited recycling of REEs due to the 
significant costs associated in the recovery of rare earth metals in e-waste. In 
2011, REE recycling was estimated to account for around 1 per cent of sup­
ply (Ali, 2014). The recovery of metals in the products is complicated by ‘the 
dispersed nature of the rare earth compounds which are intricately embedded 
into the products’ (Haque et al., 2014: 626). 
While recycling alone is unlikely to meet demand for new REEs, the inte­
gration of recycling costs in the pricing of consumer goods would support 
greater sustainability of the resource. Similarly, the mandatory or incentivised 
collection of e-waste and an effective trade-in regime would further support 
the necessary move away from a linear ‘take–make–dispose’ economy model 
toward a more integrated ‘circular economy’ model. Toward this end, the EU 
Parliament passed a law in 2012 forbidding the dumping of electronic scrap. The 
law will compel EU member states to collect tons of e-waste—an important
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Indeed, an increase in recycling is the next logical step to secure critical
materials and free-up global supply chain problems, particularly in developed
economies. If mass-scale recycling is established it may prove more cost effective
than the capital- and labour-intensive recovery and processing of rare earth ores. 
Research and development (R&D): technological advances 
The uncertainty in the market that the 2010 China–Japan dispute brought to 
the fore shocked the industry into action. Manufacturers in Japan began, where 
possible, to reduce the amount of REEs in their products and boost invest­
ment for research into REE substitution. Such substitution is two part; material 
substitution and functional or technical substitution. The former relies on the 
substitution of the REE in the product with another element, while the latter 
relies on the advancement of entirely new technologies to supersede the func­
tion of the REE-containing products. 
The Japanese government has invested heavily in REE substitution research. 
The New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization 
poured US$81 million into a REE reduction and substitution research pro­
gram. Similarly, the Rare Metal Substitute Materials Development Project, 
which ran for eight years, had an estimated annual budget of US$66 mil­
lion (An, 2015). The National Institute for Materials Science conducts similar 
research and controls equally impressive annual budgets. An example of a 
successful REE substitute can be found in Toshiba’s 2012 development of 
a dysprosium-free permanent magnet that employs samarium (a less-critical 
REE) and cobalt. Despite research, substitutes to date are largely less effective 
than their REE-containing components. 
As well as REE substitution R&D, there have also been considerable 
advances in processing and mining, where new techniques are allowing REEs 
to be more easily separated from other ores. These advances have enabled new 
frontiers to emerge in exploration and recovery. 
Exploration: new frontiers 
The 2010 crisis that exposed the REE supply chain vulnerabilities saw the 
opening of a host of new exploration and production frontiers and the injec­
tion of new capital into frontier projects. India, a long-time producer of REEs 
through its Indian Rare Earths Limited, has increased production from mona­
zite sands with a view toward increased processing to reduce imports from 
China. Investments from Japan have also supported REE production ven­
tures in Vietnam, India and Malaysia amongst others. Central Asia and several 
countries in Africa and Latin America have also emerged as new sources of 
onshore production. 
Similarly, there has been renewed interest and significant investment into 
offshore mining. In 2013 Japan confirmed the discovery of a deposit with a 





sea level. Japan’s discovery exemplified a wider trend in the hunt for new 
resources. Nowhere has this been more prominent than in the Pacific Islands. 
REEs can be found between 800m and 2500m in the cobalt-rich manga­
nese crusts below the ocean floor in the South Pacific Islands. Much deeper 
deposits (below 4000m) are also indicated in the Indian Ocean. At the time 
of writing, over 300 exploration licences for deep seabed minerals had been 
granted in Pacific Island countries, including Tonga, Fiji, the Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu, as well as dozens more in the Indian and Pacific oceans. 
The Papua New Guinean (PNG) government has been the first to undertake 
the venture to tap this new source of potential supply. The first ever deep-
sea mining project is being led in a joint venture with Canadian Company, 
Nautilus Minerals. The Solwara 1 project in the Bismark Sea, some 50km 
off the coast of PNG, will mine the hydrothermal sea floor vents at a depth 
of 1500m. The technique for mining hydrothermal vents on the ocean floor, 
which one commentator explains is similar to ‘cutting grass’ (Begley, 2010), 
will use remotely operated vehicles to harvest hydrothermal vents rich in high-
grade copper, gold, silver and zinc deposits. The ore will then be pumped to 
a platform on the surface for processing. Amongst these high-grade ores are 
significant concentrations of REEs. 
As well as these ventures in the Pacific Islands, there are others in deeper 
international waters involving India and China. Since 2001, the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA)6 has issued 26 contracts for exploration of deep-sea 
minerals in the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The body is drafting 
environmental management guidelines and exploitation regulations due to be 
implemented by 2016. Still, some commentators are concerned that the ISA 
will not have ‘sufficient teeth’ to monitor compliance of companies engaged 
in deep-sea mining regulations (Maurin, 2013). Environmental concerns also 
loom large (Wedding et  al., 2015). Commentary in an article in Science on 
deep-sea mining noted that: ‘today’s low rates of marine extinction may be the 
prelude to a major extinction pulse, similar to that observed on land during the 
industrial revolution, as the footprint of human ocean use widens’ (McCauley 
et al., 2015). Yet despite these concerns, the demand for a new supply of REEs 
and other high-grade ores seems certain to outstrip environmental concerns, 
particularly given that operations are far more remote and mine sites near-
impossible to picket. 
The prospect of access to abundant high-grade deposits of REEs and other 
minerals has attracted significant interest from resource hungry countries. In 
2012, India’s Minister for Earth Sciences, Ashwani Kumar, noted the strategic 
importance of such mining when he commented that ‘countries like China 
have taken to deep-sea mining with a strategic purpose’ (Mukherji and Wright, 
2012). In recent years, India has poured money into exploration activities, 
including the purchase of a US$135 million deep-sea exploration vessel, staffed 
with a multidisciplinary team of scientists. The race for deep-sea minerals has 
begun. If successful it could be a game-changer for the REE supply chain, as 
well as for other technology minerals. 
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REEs as an instrument for transitions in Myanmar, Afghanistan and 
North Korea 
Concern over the REE global supply chain has also given impetus for engage­
ment in new frontiers where conflict and military governments dominate. 
North Korea, Myanmar and Afghanistan all have significant and largely 
untapped mineral wealth. In East Asia, North Korea’s reportedly large rare 
earth deposits offer a new carrot for diplomacy. The prospect of new mining 
joint ventures in resource rich Myanmar, which could improve competition 
and diversify the sector away from Chinese dominance, was one of the key 
reasons for Myanmar’s transition from military junta to democracy. Similarly, 
as Afghanistan attempts to stabilise after a decade and a half of war, the coun­
try’s mineral wealth is an important source of income to aid in its transition 
from a war-torn country to a developing nation. While these troubled but 
resource rich countries offer potential for significant new sources of rare earth 
ores, they carry obvious high degrees of risk. 
While interest in these untapped resources is significant, none captures the 
imagination of the rare earth hungry world more than North Korea. In 2011, 
the late Kim Jong Il channelled Deng Xiaoping saying that North Korea’s rare 
earth and mineral resources were ‘a precious natural resource that is urgently 
needed for the country’s wealth, prosperity and development, it must thor­
oughly utilize them without wasting even a lump of ore’ (Korean Central 
Broadcasting Station, 2011). 
In May and June 2014, Pyongyang shipped US$1.8 million in REEs to 
China (Kang, 2014). The export was significant, more so for the dramatic 
increase than the simple volume. The exports were a sizeable increase on the 
first shipments of rare earth ores to China in January 2013, which totalled a 
mere US$24,700. Many analysts saw the increase as proof of earlier assertions 
that North Korea could be a new hub for the highly sought-after ores. This 
development, along with what is believed to be trillions of dollars’ worth of 
mineral deposits, could aid the emergence of a new era in North Korea rela­
tions in East Asia—and a more cooperative, rather than coercive, type of rare 
earth diplomacy. 
While reports of the Jongju super deposit remain contentious, it would be 
the largest deposit of its kind with an estimated 216 tonnes of total rare earths 
oxides—of which at least 2 per cent are HREEs (SRE Minerals, 2015)—and 
other minerals. The geology of much of North Korea’s deposits is reported to 
be easier to mine than in other countries, and while there remain questions 
about the exact size of these deposits and the obvious difficulties of operating 
in North Korea, the prospects offer possible leverage in future negotiations 
with Pyongyang. 
A more promising and immediate source of REEs is in Myanmar. Rare 
earths are known to exist across the area known by geologists as the Eastern 
Highlands in eastern Myanmar. Much of the area in which rare earths may 









surveyed. In 2014, significant exports of tin ore from Wa State in eastern 
Shan State in Myanmar to China were described as a ‘black swan’ event that 
impacted on tin prices in the global markets (Gardiner et al., 2015). A similar 
prospect may await REEs from south-eastern Myanmar. As well as REEs, 
Myanmar’s untapped resources promise other technology minerals including 
antimony, platinum group of metals and tungsten. Only after resource shar­
ing agreements and lasting peace can be achieved between the Tatmadaw (the 
Myanmar armed forces) and ethnic armed groups will deposits of REEs in 
the country be fully surveyed (Brennan, 2013). In the meantime, they risk 
becoming conflict minerals much like the now infamous jade and rubies in 
Myanmar’s restive north. 
In a world that is increasingly reliant on high-tech manufacturing—and 
therefore REEs—improving the overall stability of the global supply chain 
of REEs is a key concern for economies the world over. The untapped tech­
nology minerals, such as rare earths, that lie beneath the feet of military-run 
governments can be powerful incentives to open up to new foreign investment 
and transition to more democratic forms of government. 
However, such political ‘openings’ are fraught with difficulties. Russia 
demonstrates an example of a political opening that was heavily supported 
by allowing greater access for the sale of the country’s resources. The rise 
of Vladimir Putin to control Russia’s key resources demonstrates that such 
openings, supported by resource wealth, can quickly turn back into resource-
controlling oligarchies. Similar problems have also been witnessed in Myanmar’s 
political transition (Brennan, 2013). Regardless of where minerals or mining 
is centred, the wealth generated is more often than not centred in individu­
als rather than sovereign wealth funds. Such a cooperative-type of rare earth 
diplomacy should have, as a central tenet, a moral underpinning that prohibits 
the purchase of conflict minerals and demands transparency, such as is required 
by the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative. 
Conclusion 
The history of disputes over the REE global supply chain offers a caution­
ary tale for other technology minerals. Governments must be cognisant of 
how new disruptive technologies can create international disputes. They must 
employ numerous tools to avert conflict and provide sufficient capital and 
incentives to boost research, as well as innovation to allow policy options and 
pathways out of such conflicts. Greater emphasis of the strategic importance 
of technology minerals and their supply chains is needed in academic research, 
along with greater awareness to build them into foreign policy. 
Employing an array of tools to address such supply chain problems—R&D,
international arbitration, new exploration, strategic stockpiles and recycling
regimes—is the best approach for governments to tackle future problems. There
is a need for an International Agreement for Global Minerals. Yet, such a binding
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on international treaty obligations is the most probable way forward for the fore­
seeable future. As such, regional regulatory frameworks, like those implemented
by the European Parliament in 2015 for a mandatory monitoring system for min­
erals from conflict regions, will have more success in establishing global standards. 
Diplomatic crises over access to technology minerals will continue in the 
future. In order to minimise the fallout from such incidents, and the poten­
tial for an escalation to conflict, numerous avenues for arbitration are needed. 
However, the most influential component to secure the global supply chain 
will remain the ability of technology to adapt and innovate to new conflicts 
and issues as they arise. That said, technological advances will also create new 
and, at least to some extent, unpredictable dynamics of supply and demand. 
Technology is not static and its constant evolution will continue to create new 
trends in supply and demand. Monopolies can quickly emerge and can, just 
as quickly, become insignificant. The response of governments and industry 
to rare earth supply chain vulnerability should be looked at as a case study for 
future shocks and conflict over the supply of technology minerals. 
Notes 
1 Technology minerals include REEs, antimony, platinum group of metals (PGM), 
tungsten, indium, gallium, magnesium, germanium, graphite and beryllium. 
2 ‘Disruptive technology’ can be defined as a technology, often a new innovation, that 
significantly alters the status quo. A disruptive technology may change the supply 
chain or general business operation. For example, the discovery and exploitation of 
oil acted to overhaul other energy sources such as the use of oil from whale blubber, 
in effect ending the whaling industry. 
3 As of May 2014, production of REEs in China occurred in Fujian, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Shangling and Sichuan provinces. 
4 Despite the large environmental footprint in their mining, REEs, in their end uses, 
often play an important role in the production of green energy.They are crucial in 
green technologies such as advanced wind turbines, solar panels and hybrid cars. 
The interest among states to develop green technologies as a means to meet CO
2 
emissions reduction targets is perhaps nowhere more prominent than in China itself. 
Faced with a seemingly insatiable demand for electricity and increasing pollution 
from coal and non-renewable power generation, Beijing has placed unprecedented 
importance on boosting renewables in its energy mix. Electricity from wind turbines 
should increase dramatically from 2009 base rates of 12 gigawatts (GW) to 100 GW 
by 2020. Meanwhile, the installed capacity of solar energy is targeted to triple by 
2017 to 70 GW. 
5 Beijing’s reorganisation of the rare earth mining industry, which is fragmented and
made up of numerous small artisanal mines, is the reason for the contentious decrease in
exports, according to conversations between the author and Chinese diplomats as well
as public statements to the WTO. Beijing contests that the reorganisation was aimed at
cleaning up the environmental impacts of the industry. Of course, a by-product of this
reorganisation has been a consolidation of the industry that has resulted in greater cen­
tralised control where operations can be more closely monitored by Beijing. Beijing
has also encouraged SOEs to diversify their businesses toward rare earth mining. Large
SOEs such as Aluminium Corporation of China have begun investing away from their














6 The ISA is an intergovernmental body established in 1994. The Authority, as 
explained in its mandate, ‘is the organization through which States Parties to the 
Convention [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] shall, in accordance 
with the regime for the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction (the Area) established in Part XI and the Agreement, orga­
nise and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering the 
resources of the Area.’ 
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10 Going with the flow 
Can river health be a focus for foreign policy? 
David Tickner 
Introduction 
In March 2010, Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, gave a speech at 
the National Geographic Society in Washington, DC to mark the UN’s World 
Water Day. In her remarks, Secretary Clinton said: 
the water that we use today has been circulating through the earth since
time began. It must sustain humanity for as long as we live on this earth.
In that sense, we didn’t just inherit this resource from our parents; we
are truly, as many indigenous cultures remind us, borrowing it from our
children. It is my hope that by making water a front burner issue, a high
priority in our national and international dialogues, we can give our
children and our children’s children the future they deserve.1 
(Hilary Clinton, 2010) 
Secretary Clinton was not alone; in recent years, several other high-profile 
figures from the foreign policy sphere have emphasised the importance of 
water issues, including Baroness Catherine Ashton, then High Representative 
of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who wrote 
that, ‘we should listen to what history teaches us: there are superior causes that 
transcend any political interests. Water is such a cause’ (Ashton, 2010: 12).
A quick survey of publications such as Science and Diplomacy, The Diplomat and 
Foreign Policy and the websites of think tanks such as the Stimson Center, the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, the Oxford Research Group or Chatham House, 
suggests that in recent years water has attracted regular attention from interna­
tional affairs commentators across Europe and North America. The potential 
for water resources to be a stimulus for, and a weapon in, conflicts is a recurring 
theme in the recent discourse, especially with regards to recent instability in the 
Middle East (Gleick, 2014). There has also been discussion in these arenas of 
the potential for water to be a focus for cooperation, peace and security. 
The water on which people rely for irrigation, industrial uses, energy gen­
eration or domestic supply falls to earth as rainfall or snow. Much of it then 














Going with the flow 165 
from which society sources water. Rivers are the most visible, and often the 
most contested, components of this hydrological architecture. As linear, flow­
ing features in the landscape, rivers connect economies, societies, cities and 
countries. In doing so, they act as foci for conflict or cooperation between 
different groups of people who need water or other goods and services that 
rivers provide. The ecological health of rivers—in terms of the physical flow 
of water, its quality and the condition of the plants and animals that live in 
or on it—can be thought of as a biophysical litmus test of whether socie­
ties manage water resources sustainably (Tickner and Acreman, 2013). But as 
the human population in many regions continues to grow, economies shift 
and climate change takes hold, global indicators of river health are in steep 
decline with knock-on impacts on strategically important ecosystem ser­
vices (Dudgeon et al., 2006; Vorosmarty et al., 2010; Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). This chapter argues that, in some contexts, maintaining or 
restoring critical aspects of river ecosystem health can be a catalyst for coop­
eration between different groups of people and can mitigate socio-economic 
and geopolitical risks that arise when critical ecosystem services are compro­
mised. As such, river restoration might present opportunities for the foreign 
policy community. 
The chapter provides an overview of the important role rivers have played 
in the rise of civilisations, cultures and economies and the extent to which 
governance of rivers throughout history has been characterised by conflict or 
cooperation. It then briefly outlines the main causes and likely consequences 
of the ongoing collapse in the ecological condition of many rivers. Finally, it 
sets out possible solutions to the primary global challenges of river management 
and, based on ‘six streams’ of effort, suggests ways in which the foreign policy 
community in OECD countries and international organisations can make sub­
stantive contributions to designing and implementing these solutions. 
Civilisation and development, cooperation and conflict 
Rivers host extraordinary concentrations of biodiversity (Dudgeon et al.,
2006). They have inspired a wide range of art, music and literature (think
of The Haywain by John Constable, Johann Strauss’ Blue Danube waltz
or the central role played by the Mississippi in Mark Twain’s Huckleberry
Finn). In many instances, they also hold great spiritual importance. For
instance, the Whanganui iwi of New Zealand have a traditional saying that
underscores the connection between rivers and ancestry: ‘The great river
flows from the mountains to the sea. I am the river and the river is me’
(Young, 2005). The reverence in which hundreds of millions of Indians
hold the ‘mother Ganga’ river is another example of this. In the context
of foreign policy, perhaps the greatest significance of rivers lies in the role
they have played in the rise of civilisations and economies and the way in
which they have fostered cooperation and/or conflict between upstream























In his great book about the role of the Yangtze in Chinese history, The River
at the Centre of the World, Simon Winchester wrote that the river was, ‘the sym­
bolic heart of the country, and at the very centre, literally and figuratively and
spiritually, of the country through which it so ponderously and so hugely flows’
(Winchester, 1996: 13). Archaeologists have dated fortified settlements along the
Yangtze River to 6400–6100 BP and linked the rise of settlements and monarchs
along the river to periods of fluctuating climate, shifting summer monsoons and
the need for access to, and administration of, water for irrigation (Yasuda et al.,
2004). Opponents of the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in the 1990s
were concerned about the inundation of nearly 1300 known archaeological sites
along the river’s banks (Childs-Johnson and Sullivan, 1996) and scientists have
suggested that the earliest human cultivation of rice took place in the Yangtze
region (Normile, 1997). Similar evidence of the rise of civilisations and dynas­
ties has been found along the banks of the Yellow River (Wu et al., 2016), the
Ganges and Indus (Giosan et al., 2012), the Nile (Hassan, 1997), the Danube
(Childe, 1927) and many other rivers. Arguably, the earliest civilisation of all
rose along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia (literally, ‘the
land between the rivers’). The presence there of naturally complex river channel
networks and avulsion belts (areas subject to shifting river courses, especially as a
result of flooding episodes) is thought to have provided conditions so good for
irrigation that they allowed societies to settle and develop (Morozova, 2005).
One such site, at the confluence of the two rivers at al Qurna, is thought to be
the cradle of civilisation and birthplace of Abraham. 
In modern history, river management has contributed significantly to eco­
nomic development and has helped shape societies. In response to the Great 
Depression, the US Congress authorised the establishment of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) with a remit to undertake huge hydropower and 
flood management infrastructure works in 1933 as a means of kick-starting 
the economy in the south-eastern US.2 The TVA took to a new level the 
engineering-led, technical water resource management paradigm, which had 
emerged in Europe and North America during previous centuries. In doing so 
it provided a global blueprint for large water management infrastructure which 
has been, and continues to be, dominant in countries such as Ethiopia, Egypt, 
Mexico, Brazil and India (where Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first prime 
minister after independence, described dams as the ‘temples of modern India’) 
(Pegram et al., 2013). Such ‘hydraulic missions’ (Allan, 2001; Swyngedouw, 
1999) became part and parcel of nation and state-building efforts. Often, the 
construction and operation of dams, irrigation schemes and flood defences 
was closely associated with the building of political capital and the establish­
ment of powerful administrative agencies. Nowhere is this truer than in China 
where multiple ministries, often called the ‘nine dragons’, share responsibili­
ties for, and vie for influence over, water resources and river management 
(Yan et al., 2006) and where the building of the Three Gorges Dam fulfilled a 
nation-building vision held by Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping 
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Civilisations and cities have grown along rivers partly because of the prox­
imity of water supplies for domestic use, irrigation and industry, but also 
because of the other important resources and services that rivers provide. Even 
today people in Cambodia obtain about 60–80 per cent of their total animal 
protein from the fishery in Tonle Sap (a large river–lake system). For Malawi, 
the equivalent figure is 70–75 per cent (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
2005). Rivers such as the Rhine, Danube, Mississippi and Yangtze have served 
as important long-distance transport routes, stimulating cooperation between 
upstream and downstream jurisdictions and populations (Sadoff and Grey, 
2005). Even smaller rivers have historically facilitated economically important 
exchange of goods (Sherratt, 1996). 
Sharing of water resources and riverine transport networks have been par­
ticularly important factors in the development of formalised frameworks for 
governance and cooperation approaches for river management. It is claimed that 
the world’s oldest extant international organisation is the Central Commission 
for the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR), established in 1868 to facilitate 
improved navigation for trade vessels along the river.3 Management organisa­
tions, international legal frameworks or other cooperative mechanisms have 
been put in place for many of the world’s 270 plus transboundary rivers4 in 
the intervening 150 years. These include specific agreements between two 
neighbouring countries to share water, such as the 1944 Treaty between the 
USA and Mexico on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana 
Rivers and of the Rio Grande;5 basin-scale forums for information exchange 
such as the Mekong River Commission, the mission of which is to ‘promote 
and coordinate sustainable management and development of water and related 
resources for the countries’ mutual benefit and the people’s well-being’;6 and 
supra-national bodies to which neighbouring riparian governments have ceded 
some degree of planning or decision-making authority such as the International 
Commission for the Protection of Danube River (ICPDR). At the global scale, 
customary law and practice on cooperation for the management of transbound­
ary rivers was codified in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, which came 
into effect in 2014 when Vietnam became the 35th country to ratify it. 
Although transboundary contexts pose particular governance challenges, rivers
that flow within national boundaries can also be subject to competing interests.
For this reason, most countries of the world have established institutional frame­
works for river management. The nature of these frameworks varies in terms of
scale of analysis and intervention, policy priorities and specific mechanisms. Public
policy measures intended to promote cooperation have included, inter alia, man­
dating of local water resource users associations (e.g. in Kenya, South Africa or
Tanzania), formulating river basin and sub-basin management plans (e.g. in much
of Europe, as stipulated by the EU Water Framework Directive), convening
multi-stakeholder information and planning forums (e.g. the Yangtze and Yellow
River Forums in China) and instigating formal state level water plans within fed­
eral policy frameworks (e.g. in India and Brazil). Beyond the public policy realm,





water permits or abstractions (Brozovic et al., 2011) or to manage flows of water
between neighbouring water users (Lankford and Hepworth, 2010). Such infor­
mal cooperation can be vital in avoiding or defusing potential riparian conflicts. 
There have probably been more events related to cooperation for water and 
river management than there have been outright conflicts (Wolf et al., 2005). 
However, cooperation between nation states is not always what it seems and 
tensions and conflicts over river management have arisen in multiple guises. 
State engagement in transboundary river management may be more strate­
gic than sincere, as shown by recent events on the Nile, which have led to 
Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam despite 
objections from downstream states, especially Egypt (Cascão and Nicol, 2016). 
Recent or ongoing disagreements between Uruguay and Paraguay along the 
La Plata, between Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia on the Mekong, or between 
the USA and Mexico on the Colorado are just a few examples of non-violent 
conflicts. Genuine sharing of the benefits of rivers or large hydraulic projects 
remains an elusive goal (Phillips et al., 2006; Tawfik, 2015) and it has been 
argued that, despite appearances, all forms of cooperation carry with them 
an element of conflict (Mirumachi, 2015). Such events play out in terms of 
uneven treaty conditions, degradation of political relationships or decline in 
ecosystem health with the most powerful nation or state often able to effec­
tively control river resources to the detriment of other riparian nations (Zeitoun 
and Warner, 2006; Wolf et al., 2005). Joint technical committees—whether 
between Palestine and Israel (Zeitoun, 2008), Syria and Jordan (Haddadin, 
2001) or Turkey, Syria and Iraq (Çonker, 2014)—may even mask a deeper 
political conflict, thereby perpetuating it (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). 
As well as being a stimulus for conflict, rivers and water can become weap­
onised during wars. In Iraq, Syria and Gaza, for example, reservoirs, dams and 
drinking water services have been targeted for military attack with devastating 
effects on vulnerable local populations (ICRC, 2015). Even in peace time, 
local conflicts can arise between different groups of river users, as has happened 
in Tanzania, for instance, where continued over-abstraction of the Great 
Ruaha River has led to conflict between upstream and downstream communi­
ties (Lankford et al., 2004; Walsh, 2012). The Water Conflict Chronology,8 an 
online resource maintained by The Pacific Institute (a California-based non­
governmental organization), lists a depressing array of violent water and river 
related conflicts including, in 2014 alone, 24 separate incidents in Europe, Asia, 
North America and South America. There remains much controversy about 
the prospect of genuine ‘water wars’ (e.g. Starr, 1991; Wolf, 1999; Swain, 
2001; Zhang, 2016). Nevertheless, the onset of climate change and consequent 
unpredictability of rainfall and river flows, combined with steadily increas­
ing pressures on river resources as a result of population growth and shifts to 
thirstier economic development models, seems likely to provoke further ripar­
ian disagreements, as well as stimulating new alignments between water users 
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Quantity, quality and timing 
A number of factors affect the extent to which rivers can provide society
with social, economic and strategic benefits such as riverine transport, water
supplies, fisheries or replenishment of sediment to low-lying deltas. Built
infrastructure is often required to harness and direct such benefits; function­
ing institutions are important if benefits are to be distributed among different
groups of people in an equitable and efficient manner; and the health of the
river ecosystem determines the quantity and quality of ecosystem services
which underpin these benefits (Parker and Oates, 2016; Tickner et al., 2017).
There is no accepted scientific definition of ‘river health’ but in general
terms the interaction of a number of key elements influences the condi­
tion of freshwater ecosystems including catchment processes, flow regime,
habitat structure, water quality and aquatic and riparian biodiversity (Speed
et al., 2016). Figure 10.1 illustrates the interaction of these elements and the
ecosystem services and social, economic or strategic benefits they typically
provide. The relative role of each of these elements in determining river
health and associated benefits will vary according to context. Nevertheless,
freshwater ecosystem specialists have referred to the flow regime—defined
in terms of the quantity, quality and timing of river flows—as the ‘master
variable’ that governs the health of the river (Poff et  al., 1997; Brisbane
Declaration, 2007). 
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Figure 10.1 	 Examples of freshwater ecosystem services and links to elements of 
river health 
Adapted from Speed et al. (2016) 
 
River/wetland/ Typical problems Example Potential cooperation/conflict dimensions 
lake health river 
element 
Catchment Degradation resulting Mara  The Mara River provides the only year-round source of water to the iconic,
processes from deforestation,  and economically important, Maasai Mara and Serengeti conservation areas.
urbanisation, Demographic change, climate change and conversion of forests to agriculture and 
agricultural expansion, grassland in the Mara Basin headwaters are likely to reduce dry season flows and 
climate change. increase peak flows, leading to greater water scarcity at critical times of the year, 
increased drought risks and potential competition for water resources between sectors 
 and communities (Mango et al., 2011; Dessu et al., 2014). There are implications
for transboundary land use and economic development policy within the East Africa 
Community (Albinus et al., 2008) and a transboundary water allocation plan is now 
being prepared under the aegis of the Lake Victoria Basin Commission. 
Flow regime Altered flows resulting Nile An emphasis on irrigation and hydropower as drivers of economic and social 
from dam construction development, mean that Nile river flows are increasingly contested. Infrastructure 
and operation and/ development in upstream states has been pitted against established downstream 
 or water abstraction agricultural livelihoods. Inter-state data sharing and technical exchanges have 
(especially for irrigation). occurred but the political situation remains tense (Zeitoun et al., 2013). 
Habitat Wetland drainage and Danube Conversion of the Danube River floodplains for farming and other development 
structure floodplain development has degraded significant areas of floodplain, exacerbating flood peaks. Climate 
for agriculture or change is expected to further intensify flood risks. Ongoing floodplain restoration 
urbanisation; riparian or work commenced in 1993 and has encompassed various transboundary initiatives, 
in-channel sand/gravel including some in parts of Eastern Europe that had been affected by geopolitical 
extraction. transition and violent conflict. Along the lower Danube, restoration of floodplains 
by decommissioning under-performing flood protection infrastructure has 
resulted in improved capacity to retain and release floodwaters and remove 
pollutants, enhanced biodiversity and strengthened local economies through 
diversification of livelihoods. Drivers for restoration included the desire of 
some countries to join the EU and thus an imperative to fulfil EU legislative 
requirements on water management and nature protection (Ebert et al., 2009). 
Table 10.1 Selected examples of links between changes in the health of rivers and dimensions of conflict/cooperation 
Water quality Human health, water Rhine Decades of unregulated industrial and sewage pollution left the Rhine ‘ecologically 
supply and amenity dead’ by the 1970s. In response, the riparian states established the International 
impacts from urban and Commission for the Protection of the Rhine in 1963 (the founding agreement, 
industrial pollution and/ the Treaty of Bern, was superseded by the 1999 Convention on the Protection 
or agricultural run-off. of the Rhine). Specific pollution events such as the 1986 Sandoz Accident 
(which resulted from a fire in a chemicals warehouse) focused the attention of the 
Commission and its member states and stimulated the establishment of the Rhine 
Action Programme for the restoration of the river. Although there remains 
debate about the influence of international cooperation on pollution levels, the 
 water quality of the Rhine and of many of its tributaries has improved and the 
effects of heavy metals and other pollutants have diminished (Speed et al., 2016; 
Bernauer and Moser, 1996). 
Aquatic and Invasive species out- Lake Nile perch (Lates nilotica) were introduced to Lake Victoria in the mid-twentieth 
riparian compete native wildlife; Victoria century in order to stimulate local fisheries, largely for export. Although the 
biodiversity over-harvesting, e.g. population dynamics are complex, it is claimed that the spread of Nile perch 
inland fisheries. has contributed to the extinction of 200 endemic fish species, impoverishment 
of local populations and regional food insecurity. Recent expansion of fishing 
effort means that concern is growing that the species is in decline with potential 
associated economic and conflict issues (Lowe et al., 2000; Glaser et al., 2013; 
Geheb et al., 2008). Meanwhile, water hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes) has infested 
large parts of Lake Victoria since the first report of its presence in 1988. Its spread 
directly reduces fish catch and increases pollution, thereby increasing pressure 
on local communities. Transboundary efforts to control the species have been 















Recent decades have witnessed a substantial upturn in water use, far out­
stripping increases in human population (UN Water, 2009), and a rapid and 
ongoing rise in the number of dams constructed around the world (World 
Commission on Dams, 2000; Zarfl et al., 2015). As a result, river flows have 
been significantly disrupted and habitats associated with 65 per cent of conti­
nental river flows have now been classified as moderately to highly threatened 
(Vorosmarty et al., 2010). Aquatic pollution, invasive plants and animals and 
direct impacts of climate change on rain and snowfall, and thereby on river 
flows, have added to these pressures. The consequences for river health include 
an average decline in populations of freshwater vertebrate species—akin to a 
global river health ‘stock market index’—of 81 per cent from a 1970 baseline 
(WWF, 2016). 
These trends have economic, social and geopolitical implications. Declining 
river, wetland and lake health has brought economic and social disruption to 
most regions of the planet in recent years and has stimulated or exacerbated 
conflicts and/or cooperation (Table 10.1). Many rivers that have been affected 
by pollution, over-abstraction or poorly planned infrastructure development 
flow through geopolitical hotspots, such as the Tigris and Euphrates, the Indus 
and the Mekong. A wide range of commentators—including the intelligence 
and security community (US Intelligence Community, 2012) and mainstream 
economists (World Economic Forum, 2016)—now consider that water risks 
merit policy attention beyond water and environment ministries. As well as 
being important to river health, the quantity, quality and timing of flows have 
also been described as the three issues to which all water disputes can be attrib­
uted (Wolf et al., 2005). Thus, while localised focus on pollution and other 
problems might be needed, the greatest alignment between the geopolitical 
arena and ecological dimensions of river health might be found in analysis of 
river hydrology. 
It’s not the same river 
It is not necessary for the flow regime to be entirely untouched by human
activity in order for a river to be healthy. Rather, there should be sufficient
volumes of water in rivers, and adequate variation of seasonal high and
low river flows, to ensure that critical ecosystem processes—such as sedi­
ment transport to low-lying downstream deltas, dilution of pollutants or
provision of stimuli to migratory fish such that they begin their reproduc­
tive journeys—can still take place. The science of defining ‘environmental’
flows, which can support these processes, and thereby guide river manage­
ment efforts, has matured rapidly in recent decades (Acreman et al., 2014);
but implementation of such flows remains more of a problem (Le Quesne
et  al., 2010). Implementation typically necessitates addressing tensions
over three inter-linked technical water management issues: a) the siting,
design and operation of dams and other water infrastructure that disrupt
flow regimes; b) the allocation of water to different users along a river; and
 
Going with the flow 173 
c) the remediation of water quality problems, including those relating to
industrial, agricultural and sewage pollution. 
Implementation solutions are emerging that can be useful if appropriately 
adapted to prevailing contexts. At the basin scale, frameworks that can help 
decision-makers and stakeholders put in place environmentally sustainable, 
socially equitable and economically efficient water allocation plans have been 
developed (Speed et al., 2013). These are now being tailored for use in river 
basins such as the Mara, spanning the Kenya-Tanzania border, and major 
rivers in China that cross provincial boundaries. Water efficiency tools and 
techniques that farmers can use to increase ‘crop per drop’ productivity are 
continually evolving, although there is lively debate about the impacts of these 
schemes on river and aquifer levels when they are implemented in isolation of 
robust water allocation plans (Batchelor et al., 2014; Lankford, 2006). River 
basin-scale models have been developed which can help decision-makers 
understand the trade-offs inherent in construction and operation of infrastruc­
ture that disrupts river flows (Opperman et al., 2015) and standards have been 
developed by industry groups and other stakeholders which can guide design 
and construction processes for dams (International Hydropower Association, 
2011; World Commission on Dams, 2000). 
Complex issues of governance and institutional capacity affect the devel­
opment and implementation of effective and equitable solutions to these 
challenges. In many regions, government ministries and public water manage­
ment authorities have struggled to resolve tensions and conflicts over rivers 
because of this. In some places, private sector actors who have become aware 
of strategic business risks from water scarcity are exploring and investing in 
mitigation actions that, with sufficient guidance and scrutiny from other stake­
holders, could also bring broader benefits for communities and for river health 
(Hepworth, 2012; Newborne and Mason, 2012). However, it is debatable 
whether the private sector can or should take responsibility to oversee public 
goods such as river flows and water resources and there remains a substantial 
and significant river governance deficit at the global scale. 
When the Ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus remarked that, ‘no man 
can enter the same river twice, for it is not the same river and he is not the 
same man’ he might have been discussing twenty-first-century water chal­
lenges. Contests over river resources around the world present a bewildering 
range of political, cultural, economic, social and environmental contexts. It 
follows that measures to address river health and related water security prob­
lems must be context-specific and must take account of multiple stakeholder 
perspectives, future uncertainties and the complexities of local, national and 
transboundary political dynamics. ‘Cookie cutter’ approaches to river manage­
ment challenges should be regarded with caution. An integrative, rather than 
reductive, approach is needed that draws on a wide range of expertise across 
social and environmental sciences and which is rooted in an understanding of 





Foreign policy serves a number of different purposes, depending in large part 
on whose policy it is. The UK’s foreign affairs (and so, water) objectives might 
be rather different from, say, Turkey’s, which may in turn vary significantly 
from China’s. The promotion of national interests is always a cornerstone, 
however, and such objectives can be pursued through improved cooperative 
arrangements with neighbours and partners and enhanced security of access to 
natural resources. For many states—typically including some that are members 
of groups such as the OECD and/or EU—the stated aims of foreign policy also 
include, at least in theory, promotion of international norms and practices with 
respect to good governance and/or facilitation of common responses to shared 
international challenges (Josephine Osikena, Foreign Policy Centre, personal 
communication). 
Given the increasing scarcity of water resources in some geopolitically 
important regions, the transboundary nature of many rivers and the chronic 
(and sometimes acute) governance challenges presented by the management 
of contested watercourses, it is no surprise that Senator Clinton sharpened the 
USA’s focus on the issue during her time as Secretary of State. In her 2010 
speech, she referred to ‘five streams’, which could be ‘channelled into a mighty 
river that runs across our entire diplomatic and development agenda.’ These 
streams included: 
1 Building capacity of water-stressed nations to manage scarce water resources. 
2 Elevating diplomatic efforts to demonstrate a positive diplomatic precedent 
for fragile and water-stressed nations. 
3 Mobilising financial support, including from the private sector, which might 
expect a return on investment. 
4 Harnessing the power of science and technology, including new water treat­
ment technologies and remote sensing technologies. 
5 Broadening the scope of global partnerships with NGOs, the private sector 
and other governments. 
To this list we might add another stream, which is, in most instances, essential 
for achieving positive water management outcomes and that might particularly 
draw on the position, skills and experience of foreign policy practitioners: 
Supporting international water law as a pre-requisite for good governance and 
a key tool for achieving sustainable, equitable and efficient transboundary 
river management outcomes. 
These six streams form the basis of a conceptual framing that might prove use­
ful to resolve river health challenges and, in doing so, achieve foreign policy 
objectives (Figure 10.2). The framing shows schematically how the quantity, 
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can be focused in contexts where flow is the central issue for river health and a 
potential stimulus for conflict or cooperation. There are no panaceas or silver 
bullets; river health challenges can still be found in parts of the world, such as 
the EU, where the governance deficit is relatively small and where peace, secu­
rity and stability is relatively well-established. Nevertheless, in many contexts, 
improving river health, especially by developing and implementing agreed 
river flows and water allocations, can aid, or be a focus for, cooperation; and, 
vice versa, improving security and stability can create conditions conducive to 
good river management and thus to improved river health. 
Based on this conceptual framework and on recent and ongoing experience, 
Table 10.2 sets out practical measures that could be led or supported by the 
foreign policy community and that might contribute strategically to outcomes 
for flows, river health and peace, security and stability. Given the context-
specific nature of water and river management challenges, and of cooperation 
and conflict situations, these examples should be taken as indicative sugges­
tions of specific interventions that organisations concerned with foreign policy 
might be particularly well placed to make. It is not a definitive list. Further 
development of a typology of interventions could be a useful joint action for 
the foreign policy and river management communities of practice. 
Figure 10.2 	 Focusing ‘six streams’ of foreign policy interventions through the lens of 
flow regime to help attain outcomes for river health and for improved  
cooperation and reduced confl ict 
Source: inspired by Speed et al. (2016), Figure 2.2, p. 39 
 Indicative suggestions for foreign policy interventions to support improved cooperation for river health Table 10.2 
‘Six streams’ Types of measures that the foreign policy Examples 
of intervention community might lead/support 
Elevating  Advise senior figures to take up In 2001, HRH the Duke of Edinburgh and the then President of Romania, 
diplomatic appropriate opportunities to visit Ion Iliescu, hosted a summit of 14 heads of state from Danube River Basin 
efforts conflict/cooperation situations on countries. The main output from the summit was a joint declaration about 
 specific rivers and to champion renewed the need to encourage sustainable development in the basin at international, 
dialogue between senior stakeholders regional and local levels.9 
interested and potentially impacted Funding from a number of European governments and EU institutions has helped 
by river development. Balance this support the establishment of local water user groups and associated discourse 
with encouragement of ‘bottom-up’ between upstream and downstream users in Eastern Africa, e.g. European 
 diplomacy, e.g. through sponsoring Commission funding has helped create Water User Associations (WUAs) along the 
 forums which provide a space for Great Ruaha River in Tanzania and a catchment committee through which such 
 dialogue between upstream and WUAs can convene; and funding from the Dutch Embassy has underpinned efforts 
downstream stakeholders along rivers. to link stakeholders in the economically important Lake Naivasha Basin in Kenya. 
Broadening Develop partnerships with environment The UK government, through the Department for International Development, 
partnerships and development NGOs, researchers supported WWF and The Nature Conservancy to lead an innovative research 
and international/national/local project—with input from the University of Manchester and in conjunction 
authorities to provide technical with multiple local stakeholders—into the potential for optimal basin-scale 
insights on specific river flow approaches to developing Myanmar’s hydropower potential, balancing benefits 
challenges. (e.g. electricity generation) with non-financial costs (e.g. potential impacts on
freshwater fisheries and indigenous people).10 
Mobilising Convene financial institutions from  The OECD, working with the World Water Council (an NGO) and the Dutch
financial private and public sectors to explore government, has recently convened an initiative on water and finance, the aim 
support ways in which they can support water of which is to water and finance communities (broadly interpreted) on how to 
infrastructure investments that help to overcome the global challenges of financing the investments needed for water 
deliver on agreed river flows. security and sustainable economic growth. Although not specifically focused 
on river flows (it considers a broad range of water-related challenges), it has the 
 potential to guide financial institutions towards investment practices and standards

















Encourage widespread ratification and 
effective implementation of existing 
international water laws as well as 
development of new treaties and 
agreements for specific transboundary 
rivers where needed. 
Invest in capacity for negotiated 
solutions where river flow is 
contested, including governance, 
institutions, negotiation strategy 
and international law. Support the 
convening power of diplomats. 
A priority here is to encourage 
sharing of water data with other 
riparian stakeholders. As technology 
rapidly improves, support for the 
development and utilisation of remote 
sensing and earth observation tools 
to monitor river flows and water 
quality will be critical to overcome 
political and technical restrictions on 
accessibility of hydrological data. 
The 2014 entry into force of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention and the
spread of the 1992 UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Water
Convention beyond Europe are recent developments that will require sustained
diplomatic (more than financial) support. Some European governments are already
providing such support, e.g. Switzerland hosts the UNECE Convention secretariat
and France, Sweden and the Netherlands have acted as champions for the UN
Watercourses Convention. Several other OECD governments have yet to ratify or
accede to the 1997 Convention, including the USA, Australia and New Zealand.
A number of European governments—including Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the UK—have collaborated to provide funding to the 
Palestinian Negotiations Support Project (PNSP). The aim of the project was 
to strengthen Palestinian technical capacities needed to effectively pursue peace. 
The PNSP had a broad remit, part of which related to negotiations with Israel 
over environmental issues that affected long-term security of Palestinians, 
such as the shared water resources of the Jordan river. As such, one of the 
beneficiaries of the PNSP was the Palestinian Water Authority.12 
There are many ongoing and planned scientific initiatives to harness the power 
of satellites, big data and remote sensing to aid river and water resource 
management. For instance, the Surface Water and Ocean Topography (SWOT) 
project—led by US, Canadian and French scientists—aims to make the first 
global survey of Earth’s surface water, observe the fine details of the ocean’s 
surface topography, and measure how water bodies change over time.13 
More generally, commentators have called for the USA, through its forthcoming 
Global Water Strategy (which it is required to produce according to the Paul 
Simon Water for the World Act 201414) to leverage the capacity of agencies 
such as NASA, NOAA and the US Geological Survey to develop hydrological 
monitoring and early warning systems that, when combined with other 
























Interest in natural resource and climate risks seems to be on the rise in many
sectors. As yet, however, few states have explicitly included cooperation
or conflict over rivers as a headline priority in their foreign policy strate­
gies. This is true even of many countries in the OECD and/or EU whose
interests ostensibly include promotion of international norms and practices,
good governance and regional or global responses to shared international
challenges. Meanwhile, as pressures on water resources grow, the quantity,
quality and timing of flows of water down many rivers continue to shift with
implications both for peace, security and stability and for freshwater ecosys­
tems. The future for the world’s rivers, and those societies and economies
that rely on them, is increasingly uncertain. Even where violent conflict over
river flow is avoided, hegemony and inequality means that some nations, and
some groups of people within nations, are likely to benefit far more than oth­
ers from disrupted river flows. 
History tells that, in most situations, officials in water or environment minis­
tries and associated public sector authorities charged with managing rivers have 
insufficient influence to ensure that difficult decisions about water allocation 
and infrastructure are made on an equitable and sustainable basis, or to ensure 
that those decisions are reliably informed by good science. Despite Baroness 
Ashton’s assertion, political considerations often take precedence. To ensure 
more equitable and sustainable (and, in the long term, more stable) sharing of 
river benefits, the active engagement of more senior policy sectors—including 
the foreign policy sector—will be needed. 
There are good reasons for foreign policy practitioners to engage with
river and water management issues, especially those relating to river flows,
and there are straightforward conceptual links (based on the quantity, quality
and timing of flows) between river health and stated foreign policy objec­
tives. Moreover, there are already examples of valuable contributions foreign
policy practitioners have made to river restoration efforts. Whether or not
such engagement is a priority for the foreign policy community in the future
will depend largely on specific hydrological, geopolitical and socio-economic
situations. Regardless, given the global context of increasing water scarcity,
however, it is likely that, at least in some regions, water resources and river
flows will remain a front burner issue for those seeking to improve coopera­
tion and reduce conflict. 
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Notes 
1 For the full transcript of Secretary Clinton’s speech see http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/ 
english/texttrans/2010/03/20100322165432eaifas0.4756433.html#axzz4G5SbjRGy
(accessed 1 August 2016). 
2 See https://www.tva.com/About-TVA/Our-History for more on the history of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (accessed 4 August 2016). 
3 See http://www.ccr-zkr.org/11000000-en.html (accessed 5 August 2016). 
4 At the time of writing, convention has it that there were 276 rivers in the world
which crossed one or more national borders: see http://www.unwater.org/statistics/ 
statistics-detail/en/c/211763/ (accessed 8 August 2016). However, the number changes
frequently, largely due to geopolitical shifts including the break-up of large countries,
such as the Soviet Union, into smaller ones. 
5 See http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Treaties_Minutes/treaties.html (accessed 8 August 
2016). 
6 See http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/vision-and-mission/ (accessed 8 August
2016). 
7 For instance, the townspeople of Pickering, a small town in Yorkshire, UK,‘decided to
take matters into their own hands’ following rejection by water management authorities
of a conventional flood management plan on cost-benefit grounds. See http://www. 
independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-flooding-how-a-yorkshire-flood­
blackspot-worked-with-nature-to-stay-dry-a6794286.html (access 8 August 2016). 
8 See http://www2.worldwater.org/conflict/list/ (accessed 8 August 2016). 
9 See http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?uNewsID=2246 (accessed 30 April 2017). 
10 See https://thought-leadership-production.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/05/09/13/
53/29/e26cf10b-9a56-463d-97fc-0309b1fde0d6/System-Scale%20Planning_ 
Myanmar_Report.pdf (accessed 30 April 2017). 
11 See http://www.oecd.org/environment/resources/roundtableonfinancingwater.htm
(accessed 30 April 2017). 
12 See https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1& 
ved=0ahUKEwiCya7Q8czTAhWJHsAKHcZXCBAQFggnMAA&u 
rl=http%3A%2F%2Fiat i .df id.gov.uk%2Fiat i_documents%2F3717226. 
odt&usg=AFQjCNEz3CWUjwqg0oyLN-s l jgwOp0yk2Q&sig2=lG_ 
TrPC7fxK6zbczheEMkQ&cad=rja (accessed 30 April 2017). 
13 See https://swot.jpl.nasa.gov/ (accessed 30 April 2017). 
14 See https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2901/text?overview=
closed (accessed 30 April 2017). 
15 See https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2017/02/global-water-national-security-time/?
utm_content=buffer7e875&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_ 
campaign=buffer (accessed 30 April 2017). 
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11 Don’t forget the fish! Transnational 

collaboration in governing tuna 
fisheries in the Pacific 
Victoria Jollands and Karen Fisher 
Introduction 
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is home to the world’s
largest, most valuable tuna fisheries (Hanich and Tsamenyi, 2010; Harley
et  al., 2014; Hunt, 2003; Langley et  al., 2009; Parris, 2010; Parris and
Grafton, 2006) and forms the backbone of the Pacific region’s economy
and culture (Chand, Grafton, and Petersen, 2003; Hanich and Tsamenyi,
2009). For distant water fishing nations (DWFN), the exploitation of tuna
(Thunnini, Scombroidei) species for commercial purposes dates to the early
1900s. Liberalisation of trade policies, coupled with intensified utilisation of
marine resources as a consequence of fisheries industrialisation, has increased
socio-economic, political and environmental pressures in the Pacific and
presents challenges to sustainable development (Pilling et  al., 2015). Tuna
fisheries in the WCPO exemplify the challenges to governing scarce fugitive
resources where social, cultural and economic values are highly politicised,
and tuna biology disrupts political and economic attempts to govern. 
In this chapter, we understand fisheries scarcity to be socially constructed
and a consequence of either demand or supply. The growing demand for fish
driven by consumption fuels increased fisheries effort and can lead to over-
fishing. On the supply side, the technology used to harvest tunas and tuna
biology influence what is made available to the market. In addition, the ‘race
to fish’ can lead to overfishing, since there are economic incentives to exploit
the resource. The effects of both supply and demand subsequently lead to
changes in targeted fish biology, populations and to ecosystem structure and
function affecting resilience of socio-ecological systems (Walsh et al., 2006).
Moreover, fisheries scarcity is increasingly acknowledged as being a conse­
quence of governance failures requiring governance solutions (Hilborn et al.,
2005). This is particularly so in the WCPO tuna fishery where scarcity is
defined in socio-political terms. 
In this chapter, we demonstrate how regional agreements emphasising 
cooperation and coordination enable multi-scale collaborative governance of 
tunas. In the WCPO, the tuna fishery faces two major challenges to achieving 
conservation and development goals: the need to collaborate because of the 
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fugitive nature of tunas and competing interests in relation to tunas; and the 
complex interrelated social and ecological issues that arise when managing a 
multi-species fishery. We elucidate the multi-scalar governance arrangements 
in WCPO tuna fisheries and consider the potential of these agreements to 
manage trade-offs (social, ecological and economic). 
Our focus in this chapter is on extending previous research by exploring the 
concept of scarcity from a socio-political perspective to reveal how interconnec­
tions between socio-ecological systems interplay through myriad institutional 
arrangements influencing control of access to tuna stocks. We are particularly 
interested in tuna biology, tuna movement and the effects of the migratory 
and transboundary nature of tunas on national and international cooperation 
and governance, with the aim of understanding the trade-offs between social, 
economic and ecological aspects of tuna social-ecological systems. 
Tunas to consumers: characterising Pacific tuna fisheries 
Implications of biology and ecology 
Tunas capture the attention of a wide scope of researchers. These fishes exhibit 
some of the most remarkable physiological and circulatory adaptations with 
sustained swimming, elevated cruising speeds and expansion of thermal niche 
(see Box 11.1). Adaptations include heat-conserving rete (increasing body 
temperature up to 20°C above ambient), high blood volume, more exten­
sive aerobic red muscle, and streamlining modifications (Bond, 1996). The 
life history traits, foraging strategies, thermal and vertical niche, and ecosystem 
linkages are of critical interest to Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs) 
wishing to develop their tuna fisheries, to DWFNs with considerable fish­
ing interests in these areas, and to fisheries management organisations within 
the WCPO wishing to conserve them including, for example, the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement (PNA) and Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). 
As active pelagic predators, tunas exhibit vast horizontal and vertical move­
ment (see Box 11.1). Tunas are often incorrectly grouped as ‘highly migratory’; 
however, only some are true ‘migrators’, while other tuna species show ‘move­
ment’ and do not exhibit movement tied with specific life stages, or typical 
migration patterns. Two main categories of tunas can be used to describe move­
ment of tunas (Itano et al., 2011). Temperate water tunas, including albacore 
(T. alalunga) and three bluefin species (Atlantic, Pacific, and South Pacific), are 
generally described as ‘highly migratory’ and exhibit ocean basin scale move­
ments at specific life stages and between juvenile feeding areas and tropical 
spawning habitat. The second group of tunas, including skipjack (Katsuwonus 
pelamis) and yellowfin (Thunnus albacares), are described as tropical tunas that 
spawn, recruit and live within a single warm-water region. These tunas exhibit 
more restricted lifetime movements. Bigeye (T. obesus) tuna exhibit life history 
traits from both the temperate and tropical water tuna groups. 
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Box 11.1  Factors influencing spatio-temporal 

horizontal and vertical movement of tunas 
and consequently that of tuna fisheries 
Accessibility of prey 
Accessibility of tunas’ prey is controlled by tunas’ physiological limita­
tions. For example, the unique endothermic traits of tunas have provided 
increased cold tolerances. The evolution of endothermic characteristics 
has been hypothesised as providing an expanded niche for tunas thereby 
increasing access to prey both geographically and horizontally in the 
water column (Madigan et al., 2015). 
Niche separation 
Tunas exhibit niche separation in the water column where each spe­
cies predominates different ranges of temperature and depth (Madigan 
et al., 2015). Yellowfin tuna occupy shallower, warmer waters (less than 
25 m) with short infrequent dives below the thermocline. Albacore are 
found in intermediate depths associated with the thermocline (20–90 m).
Bluefin tuna, such as Pacific bluefin tuna are the most extreme of the 
tuna species in their depth range and have been found to spend more 
time in the deeper, cooler water (190–450 m). The deeper-diving char­
acteristic is thought to be an outcome of the tunas’ hunting activity, 
causing forage species (e.g. sardine, jack mackerel, squid) to seek daytime 
refuge in deeper, sub-thermocline waters through diel vertical migration. 
This may also be the result of searching behaviour (Madigan et al., 2015). 
Foraging strategies 
Strategies for foraging of prey depend on tunas’ geographic location, 
stage of ontogeny, availability of prey and season. Albacore and yellowfin 
tuna diets exhibit more opportunistic feeding than other tuna species 
pursuing a wide range of species including small pelagic crustaceans, 
fishes and cephalopods (Hosseini and Kaymaram, 2016; Madigan et al., 
2015). Conversely, even with a wider vertical and thermal niche, bluefin 
tunas show a preference for high energy, schooling prey when available. 
For example, Pacific bluefin tuna pursue sardine or anchovy, show­
ing evidence for specialisation in the California Current Large Marine 
Ecosystem and Japan (Madigan et al., 2015). Larger Pacific bluefin tuna 



































Oceanography (water temperatures, currents, productivity) and climate
dynamics impact on fishes’ dynamics and fisheries (Lehodey, 2000; SPC,
2009). Such impacts have been shown to influence spatio-temporal hori­
zontal and vertical movement of tunas in the WCPO. Generally, catches
of tunas are mostly from the western equatorial Pacific warm pool—an
area of low productivity and warm sea surface temperature. An example of
a major oceanic process that affects the distribution of tunas in the WCPO
is climatic changes of El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Tuna catches
vary along the equator both seasonally and inter-annually due to the
east–west movement of the warm pool-cold tongue pelagic ecosystem.
Typically, during El Niño conditions, tuna catch is displaced eastwards.
Tunas’ biology and ecology have implications for socio-economic
organisation within and beyond PICTs. Sensitivity to scale is, therefore,
important when dealing with the management of fugitive resources such
as tunas that stretch beyond political and social boundaries. Here, scale is
defined as ‘the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used
to measure and study any phenomenon’, as defined in Cash et al. (2006, p. 2).
Levels are the ‘units of analysis that are located at different positions on a
scale’ (Cash et al., 2006). Interactions occur both within and across scale
and in the WCPO tuna fishery this can become both complex and chal­
lenging. For example, the geographical location of tunas (place-based but
also vertically in the water column) has implications for fisheries (e.g.
fisheries gear required), but also the distribution of revenue gained (e.g.
within or outside a nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)) and ulti­
mately determines what form of collaboration is required or developed to
manage the fishery through national regulation, bilateral and multilateral
treaties across local, national and international levels. Challenges are faced
by society where such interactions are ignored, mismatched or generalised
(Cash et  al., 2006). Without taking scale and cross-scale dynamics into
consideration, there is a risk of fisheries ‘collapse’ (Cash et al., 2006). The
recovery of fisheries across the globe today is attributable, in part, to the
shift towards a collaborative form of governance that engages stakeholders
and interested parties. 
Diverse markets 
Besides being unique species that have received considerable scientific interest, 
tunas are a highly valued and sought-after commodity in food markets around 
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are characterised by a range of product types that serve different market niches. 
The majority of catch landed is processed into canned tuna; but tunas are also 
processed into sashimi and other value-added products such as steaks, loins and 
smoked tuna products (Hamilton et al., 2011). Tuna fish markets are determined 
by a grading process based on fishing method (e.g. longline or purse seine)
and the characteristics that make them exceptional such as fish body appear­
ance, fat content, the ‘redness’ of fish muscle, freshness and external appearance 
(Blanc, 2002). 
Bluefin tunas are the most prized commodity in the sushi market and also 
the most highly variable in price (Miyake et al., 2010). In 2010, bluefin tuna 
were reported to receive between 200 and 20,000 JPY per kg in the Japanese 
market (approximately between US$2 and US$210 based on the exchange rate 
on 31 March 2010 of US$1  93.3898 JPY) (Miyake et al., 2010). In 2013, a 
bluefin tuna became a million-dollar fish during the first auction of the year 
at Tokyo’s Tsukiji fish market (US$1.76 million for a 222-kg bluefin tuna). 
Compared to bluefin, prices paid for fresh yellowfin, albacore and skipjack are 
lower but relatively more stable. 
Tunas are also regarded as important to the food security, health and liveli­
hoods of Pacific Island populations (Pilling et al., 2015). Globally, the potential 
for fish to contribute to food security has been the subject of debate. In some 
cases, fisheries have been (incorrectly, in some instances) identified as fully 
exploited or over exploited and, therefore, marine resources are not consid­
ered a sustainable source of food (Godfray et al., 2010). However, fish protein, 
in addition to agricultural production, has been identified as a panacea to 
feeding a projected nine billion people and redressing food insecurity particu­
larly in regions such as the Pacific (Food and Agriculture Oranization of the 
United Nations, 2015; Godfray et al., 2010; Pilling et al., 2015; World Health 
Organization, 2015). While important to populations in the WCPO, local 
access to tuna fisheries for food security has been described as a local depletion 
and policy issue due to the industrialisation of tuna fishing such as purse seining 
of skipjack tuna (Pilling et al., 2015). 
Tuna harvest and monitoring abundance in the Pacific 
The WCPO tuna fishery is considered the largest (by catch volume) and most 
valuable in the world. In 2014, the total value of the tuna catch in the Western 
and Central Pacific Convention Area (WCP-CA)1 was approximately US$5.8 
billion. The annual total catch has steadily increased since the 1960s, mostly 
due to growth in the purse seine catch. In 2014, purse seine catch of tunas was 
estimated to be 71 per cent of the record total catch at 2.9 million tonnes; this 
represented 60 per cent2 of the global tuna catch (4.78 million tonnes) (FFA, 
2015; Harley et al., 2014). In the same year, skipjack also reported a record 
catch at 2 million tonnes, which was 69 per cent of the total catch. 
Four main species of tuna are targeted and managed within the WCP-CA: 
skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and albacore. Catches are broadly distributed across 
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the equatorial waters of the WCP-CA in EEZs of PICTs and in the high seas 
(Harley et al., 2014; Sibert and Hampton, 2003). Eighty per cent of tunas are 
caught within eight EEZs: Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands 
and Tuvalu. In addition, there are a number of species caught in association 
with these targeted tuna species. Some are of commercial importance while 
others are discarded. The discarded species include fish of no commercial 
value, and endangered, threatened or protected species such as marine mam­
mals, seabirds, sea turtles and sharks (a feature of fisheries exploitation discussed 
in Chapter 7). 
The expansion of tuna fisheries in the WCPO has relied on scientific advances 
and improved understanding of biology and fisheries science. Knowledge of the 
tunas’ life history traits and varying levels of movement across the Pacific and 
within the water column is fundamental to how tunas are managed. Science 
and technical organisations such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(SPC) examine tropical tunas’ biology (movement patterns, reproduction) and 
exploitation rates in the WCPO. These research programmes provide data to 
inform fisheries and science managers and decision makers, including provid­
ing information on the status of tuna stocks. 
A significant sustainability issue of the WCPO tuna fishery is overfishing of 
bigeye tuna. Besides fishing that targets bigeye tuna, a significant concern to 
their conservation is the exploitation of skipjack by purse seiners and the sub­
stantial quantities of bycatch of juvenile bigeye tuna. Recent stock assessments 
of bigeye tuna estimate spawning biomass levels to be below sustainable levels 
(16 per cent of the predicted biomass in the absence of fishing) (Harley et al., 
2014). In order to rebuild bigeye tuna stocks, a reduction in both fishing mor­
tality of bigeye and skipjack fishing effort is recommended (Harley et al., 2014). 
Governing the global industrialisation of tuna fisheries 
The relationship between sustainable development and governance has occu­
pied the attention of researchers interested in understanding how to create 
conditions to enable societies and environments to flourish (Bulkeley et  al., 
2013; Jordan, 2008). For researchers interested in governance across differ­
ent scales or in relation to transboundary resources, this has led to a focus on 
interactive forms of governance (Ansell and Torfing, 2015; Bulkeley, 2005). 
Kooiman (1999; 2003) provides a theorisation of interactive governance that 
acknowledges the interdependence of actors in addressing societal problems 
and creating societal opportunities. Such an approach to governance focuses 
on interactions and relationships within particular contexts taking into account 
the diversity, complexity and dynamics of social, political and, we argue, eco­
logical systems. This allows for multiple dimensions of scale (e.g. spatial and 
temporal), a diversity of actors (state and non-state) and advances in science 
and knowledge production to be considered in how institutional arrangements 
configure marine socio-ecological systems (Adger et al., 2005; Bulkeley, 2005; 
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Campbell et al., 2016). In characterising interactive governance, Sørensen et al. 
(2015) distinguish cooperation, coordination and collaboration. Cooperation is 
characterised as involving the ‘exchange of ideas, knowledge and know-how’, 
coordination requires ‘mutual adjustments to reduce unintended consequences 
and create synergies’, while collaboration refers to longer-term and institu­
tionalised interactions in which ‘actors are committed to negotiate diverging 
interests and develop shared governance goals, implement such goals in prac­
tice, and possibly share resources to meet these goals’ (Sørensen et al., 2015: 
333). Cooperation, coordination and collaboration are evident in the attempts 
to govern tunas and manage scarcity within the WCPO. 
The ‘highly migratory’ nature of tuna species provided the impetus for 
cooperative, coordinated and collaborative approaches to regional governance 
(Hanich and Tsamenyi, 2010). The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation 
of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (also known as the Fish Stocks Agreement 
or United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)) and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), provide the governance 
framework to manage the high seas fisheries and protect the common herit­
age of humankind. In accordance with these agreements, five tuna Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) were established to encourage 
and promote cooperation among coastal states and fishing nations to ensure the 
sustainable use of tunas. 
There are two main RFMOs in the Pacific Ocean: the Inter-American­
Tropical-Tuna-Commission (IATTC) and the WCPFC. The tuna fishery 
encompassed by the WCPO Convention Area of the WCPFC (WCP-CA) 
is one of the last largest healthy commercially-fished stocks in the world. The 
WCFPC was established in 2004 as an initiative of PICTs to address economic, 
social, political and environmental concerns and to match biological scales with 
management scales (Hanich and Tsamenyi, 2010; Parris, 2010). The aim of the 
WCPFC is to foster the conservation and sustainable use of (migratory) fish 
stocks in the WCPO (Miller et al., 2014). This regional body complements 
other efforts to manage tuna fish stocks and enable sustainable development, in 
particular, the PNA and FFA. 
The WCPO is distinctive as a site of international cooperation because of 
the environmental and political challenges affecting tuna fisheries (Miller et al., 
2014). The large areal extent of the WCPO, the fugitive characteristics of 
tunas, the cross-scale movement of tunas between EEZs and the high seas, and 
the competing claims to tunas from PICTs and DWFN provide the context 
for steering collective action and decision-making (Campbell et al., 2016; Cash 
et al., 2006; Adger et al., 2005). The regional tuna governance arrangements 
and mechanisms enacted through the WCPFC coordinate management of 
social-ecological systems and establish the framework within which decisions 
regarding tuna management in the WCPO are made (Schultz et  al., 2015). 
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a mode of collaborative governance that brings together multiple stakehold­
ers, including the private sector and civil society, to enhance decision-making 
(Ansell and Gash, 2008; Vierros et al., 2015). 
PICTs, historical relationships and tuna fisheries development in 
the Pacific 
The economic and cultural importance of marine resources unites PICTs in 
terms of governance, economics and management; nevertheless, coastal states 
are highly diverse and range in economic, social, political and environmental 
status. Geopolitically, the uniqueness of Pacific Island states can be charac­
terised based on geographic size (land and EEZ) and location in the Pacific, 
their colonial pasts, status of sovereignty and level of dependency on natural 
resources (for tourism, tuna fisheries or mineral extraction). This heterogeneity 
presents challenges for regional transboundary resource management. 
Generally, many PICTs have a narrow resource base and limited access to 
markets, limited land for agriculture, poor soil and are vulnerable to extreme 
climatic events such as typhoons and droughts. Traditionally, subsistence life­
styles prevailed, and access to marine resources was, at least before the Second 
World War, plentiful (Doulman, 1987). Natural resources vary from agricul­
tural land that is relied upon by more than 50 per cent of the population for 
subsistence living to marine resources including minerals in the seabed. 
Tuna fishing became valued as a way for potential economic development 
and self-reliance in the 1980s with the emergence of UNCLOS in1982, which 
was seen as fundamental for supporting Pacific nations’ acquired independence 
(Doulman, 1987). The new regime extended countries’ EEZs out 200 nautical 
miles, resulting in PICTs controlling 38.5 million km2 of ocean. While inshore 
fisheries provided access for local communities to food, offshore fisheries gave 
opportunities for economic growth and development of international presence 
(both in markets and in political spaces), and continue to do so. 
Fishing nations operate within the EEZs of coastal states under various bilat­
eral and multilateral agreements. The US and Japan are two DWFNs that have
operated in the WCPO from the early 1900s, and have been leaders in the
industrialisation of tuna fishing in the region. In addition to modifications in gear
to suit the oceanographic environment, the US established tuna canneries in the
region and, later, home ports to shorten the supply chain and maximise effi­
ciency. For its part, Japan was instrumental in demonstrating the viability of the
year-round fishery and efficiencies with using fish aggregating devices (FADs). 
The presence of US home ports in the WCPO provided US vessels with 
opportunistic access to some of the more productive waters in the region. 
The agreement enabling this access arguably discounted the rights of the 
coastal states over tuna resources by allowing US vessels to roam freely in the 
WCPO (Gillet et al., 2002). The access afforded to the US was consolidated 
through the Treaty of Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific 
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into force in June 1988. The US Treaty is a multilateral agreement providing
‘broader cooperation’ and access to US purse seiners to most areas in the 
WCPO (including the 16 PICTs party to the Treaty),3 while creating devel­
opment opportunities for Treaty partners. The US Treaty provides subsidised 
free-ranging access to the WCPO in which the US pays reduced access fees. 
The ability to range over the WCPO is an advantage due to the nature of 
the purse seine fishery, which requires vessels to search schooling tuna over 
vast distances (Gillett et al., 2002). The increased use of FADs, and the influ­
ence of climatic variation (e.g. the shift westward with the weak La Niña 
period (1995–1996) to PNG and FSM, and movement eastward in 1999 to the 
Gilbert Islands, Phoenix Islands and Tuvalu) have also changed the geographies 
of tuna fishing by moving fishing effort to match where the fish are. 
The ever-increasing socio-economic demand for tuna products has led to 
the industrialisation of tuna fisheries whereby new technology, effort creep, 
increased capacity and development of relationships through multilateral 
agreements has enabled tuna fleets to venture into previously unfished areas of 
oceans and to increase fishing effort. Although tunas such as skipjack are fast 
growing, have high fecundity and are highly resilient relative to other tunas, 
fisheries expansion along with improvements in technology and the economic 
opportunities afforded by the fisheries have heightened concerns about marine 
resource scarcity. Moreover, concerns about the impacts of industrial fishing 
(and other anthropogenic impacts, such as climate change) on ocean ecosys­
tems persist, as do concerns regarding the effects on coastal state communities 
that rely on these resources. 
Multilevel governance in the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery4 
The complicated web of governance arrangements in the WCPO reflects 
the complex array of actors implicated in the tuna fisheries. Actors include 
governments of DWFNs and PICTs, international trading partners of trade 
agreements, fishing vessel owners and operators, tuna processors, distribu­
tors and markets, scientists, policy makers, environmental non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and, ultimately, the consumer. The four main levels of 
governance are international, regional, sub-regional and national (as shown 
in Figure 11.1). Each of these levels of governance is supported by additional 
multi-scalar organisations, frameworks and movements including NGO initia­
tives such as Pacific Oceanscapes.5 
Other regional governance arrangements in the WCPO include the FFA 
and PNA (Figure 11.2). The FFA comprises 17 member PICTs and was estab­
lished in 1979 in response to the deliberation of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. The FFA provides a forum for member 
countries to manage, conserve and optimise the use of tuna resources in their 
EEZs and beyond. The body seeks economic determinism and sovereignty 
through UNCLOS and the establishment of 200-mile EEZs. Over the past 
four decades, FFA has displayed a strong level of collaboration among PICTs 
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Figure 11.1 WCPO tuna fishery governance arrangements 
Source: authors 
and has enhanced the capacity of the region to manage their fisheries and to 
negotiate with DWFNs. Regional collaboration through FFA has been effec­
tive for assisting PICTs in exercising their sovereign fisheries management 
rights and ecosystem based fisheries management. However, it has also high­
lighted the Pacific Island region’s diversity and created some tension between 
PICTs who seek other goals. This led to the formation of additional sub­
regional groups such as the PNA, which governs tuna collectively within its 
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Figure 11.2 WCPO tuna fishery actors 
Source: authors 
The PNA was established in 1982 and comprises eight members. The ration­
ale for the establishment of the PNA was that more than 80 per cent of WCPO 
tuna fisheries resources were situated within eight of the 17 members of the 
FFA group. The PNA advocates the exercise of sovereign rights to realise the 
economic potential of tuna resources while ensuring sustainable use of tuna 
resources within members’ EEZs. The PNA have become a powerful group 
within the Pacific with respect to controlling the largest proportion of tuna 
resources. Included in their success is the development of the FSM Arrangement, 
which entered into force in 1995. Among its objectives were: optimisation of 
economic benefits from tuna fisheries; development of domestic fishing fleets 
and a move away from dependency on access fees from DWFNs (Aqorau and 
Bergin, 1997) by giving preferential access to PICTs’ vessels; the PNA Vessel 
Day Scheme, which sets overall limits on the number of days purse seine fishing 
vessels can be licensed to fish in PNA waters; the adoption of conservation and 
management measures (CMMs) prohibiting fishing in the high seas pocket clo­
sures and on FADs for three months of the year; and, the certified sustainability 
of the free school skipjack tuna fishery under the Marine Stewardship Council 
programme. FFA and PNA provide critical platforms for PICTs by promoting 
the coordination and negotiation of CMMs over multiple scales. 
The main international frameworks influencing tuna governance in the 
WCPO are the UNCLOS and UNFSA. Article 64 of UNCLOS requires 
coastal states and fishing nations to ‘cooperate directly or through appropriate inter­
national organisations with the view to ensuring conservation’. The emphasis on 
cooperation and identification of international organisations to facilitate con­
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growing concerns for global fisheries. Together, these agreements provide for 
the establishment of RFMOs6 as the key mechanism by which nation states can 
fulfil their international obligations for cooperation and conserving and manag­
ing transboundary fish stocks. 
UNFSA prompted coastal states and DWFNs within the WCPO to develop 
the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (September 2000) for 
the conservation and management of tuna stocks within the WCPO. This led 
to the establishment of the WCPFC, which entered into force in July 2004. 
The Convention also established a Secretariat, the Scientific Committee, the 
Northern Committee and the Technical and Compliance Committee to pro­
vide recommendations to the Commission on matters including monitoring, 
control and surveillance, conservation and management of the fishery. 
The objective of the WCPFC is to fulfil the broader conservation and
resource requirements to ensure the sustainable use of tunas across the WCPO.
The WCPFC is markedly different to other RFMOs since it covers both coastal
states’ EEZs and the high seas (Miller et al., 2014). As such, two distinctive insti­
tutional regimes exist. The first is a common-property regime based on shared
transboundary tuna that flow between Pacific Islands’ EEZs and controlled either
individually or collectively through regional or sub-regional organisations. The
second is an open access regime on the high seas that is accessible to any fishing
nation. A mechanism deployed by the WCPFC and enabled under UNFSA is
to pursue CMMs based upon the precautionary approach and the best available
scientific information. UNFSA specifies that CMMs are to be compatible over
high seas and nation states’ EEZs and gives member states of regional fisheries
bodies the mandate to board and inspect vessels on the high seas to ensure com­
pliance, and to provide for peaceful settlement of disputes (Miller et al., 2014). 
Each participant of the WCPFC represents multiple interests that broadly fit 
into security, trade, national (economic, social, political, environmental) and 
diplomacy interests. Key priorities of the WCPFC are to strengthen engagement 
through increased consistent dialogue, systematic and comprehensive strategic 
planning, and enhanced communication. A nation’s tuna fishery (domestic and 
international) involves stakeholders from industry (catchers), markets, supply 
chain, sub-regional groups (Figure 11.1) and their citizens (social, cultural, and 
economic). The interests of these groups are also often fragmented. For example,
catchers split into different gear type and target species catcher groups (i.e. 
purse seine, longline, pole and line, hand line) that have different needs and 
objectives that are often incompatible. 
At the national level, there are a number of ways that nation states engage in 
the WCPFC’s activities to further their interests. Each nation state represented 
in the WCPFC can be characterised by the following interests: 
x Fishing nation (distant water, coastal or Pacific Island state). 
x Target species and mode of fishing (principally purse seine or longline), 
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x Political, economic (e.g. canneries) and market interests (exporter/ 
importer). 
x Fisheries management policies and mainstream discourses likely to influ­
ence policy development. 
x Alliances (sub-regional groups, e.g. FFA, PNA). 
x Historical relationships with tuna fisheries and main Pacific connections. 
In some cases, the position of a specific delegation is heavily influenced or even 
dominated by a single stakeholder and a single economic or political interest 
(Hanich, 2011). In other cases, delegations may balance different, often com­
peting or contradictory economic and political interests of different stakeholder 
groups. For example, PNG, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, FSM and the Solomon 
Islands are loosely referred to as ‘purse seine/skipjack states’. FSM’s largest fish­
ery is the skipjack purse seine fishery; Japan has the highest volume of catch by 
flag for purse seines and 95 per cent of all tuna catch by FSM’s domestic fleet 
was skipjack caught by purse seine. Significant quantities of tuna are also landed 
in FSM for transhipping to canneries in Asia. 
The collaborative governance arrangements in the WCPO also provide 
opportunities for civil society engagement. Environmental NGOs (eNGOs) 
engage in the governance of tuna fisheries through advocating their agendas to 
multiple scales and levels of the fishery including the public, consumers, fish­
ers and government (both nationally and internationally). Key messages have 
included the need to sustain the fishery and reduce bycatch of endangered 
species, the need for marine protected areas and, more recently, the impera­
tive to ensure food security and development opportunities for small-island 
developing states (SIDS). A particular way in which eNGOs have engaged in 
the governance of WCPO tuna fishery is through advocating for sustainable 
procurement at the level of distribution (e.g. EU, US and Japanese markets). 
The US provides a good example of this and where eNGO advocacy has 
profoundly impacted the US tuna industry. By the 1960s, the shift towards 
the use of purse seine nets in the Eastern Tropical Pacific led to the inciden­
tal capture and mortality of an estimated 250,000–500,000 dolphins per year 
(Danaher and Mark, 2003). While efforts were made to reduce these numbers, 
such as the Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972), a considerable number of 
dolphins continued to be caught. In the late 1980s, a social movement, led by 
the eNGO Earth Island Institute, successfully changed this (Soule, 2009). In 
1988, biologist Sam LaBudde captured graphic footage of the incidental mor­
tality of dolphins on the tuna trawler Maria Luisa. This footage was later used 
by Earth Island Institute to leverage against the state to enforce the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and to tighten regulation. Further, Earth 
Island Institute used the footage to raise public awareness using major televi­
sion networks to air the controversial footage. This movement revolutionised 
the US market and in 1989 the Dolphin Protection Consumer Act was intro­
duced, followed with an announcement by Tony O’Reilly, owner of StarKist 
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of how eNGOs activities have made demonstrable change, to date there has 
been limited success in terms of influencing the implementation of sustainable 
policies to halt international tuna fisheries expansion, reduce bycatch across 
international waters and the high seas and otherwise improve sustainability in 
the transnational tuna fishery in the WCPFC. Moreover, NGOs face barriers 
that influence market and supply chains and drive WCPFC voting preferences. 
Barriers include duty free access, low costs of production (wages etc.) and 
intense competition (e.g. too many canneries operating worldwide). 
The diversity of players in the WCPO tuna fishery impacts decision-making
processes concerning the allocation of benefits and costs of the fishery. These
decisions involve balancing the sustainability and development of the fishery
such that it provides equitable allocation of catch to multiple players (historic
players and new entrants including PICTs wishing to develop their own fishery). 
Mechanisms to improve tuna sustainability and why they 
don’t work 
In response to the critical status of bigeye tuna, CMMs, such as WCPFC’s
CMM 2008–01 (high seas and FAD closures), were introduced to reduce fish­
ing pressure and allow more effective control over illegal fishing. The basis for
developing CMM 2008–01 was to ensure political and economic alignment
and it grew out of the PNA initiative to propose closures of the high seas.
CMM 2008–01 went into effect on 1 January 2010 and closed two high seas
pockets to purse seine fishing.7 Those advocating for high seas closures, such as
PNA members, argued that the benefits included accommodating the aspira­
tions of SIDS, while addressing issues of overfishing and overcapacity as well
as those of transhipment and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
Those actors against high seas closures were countries such as New Zealand
and the US, which have extensive purse seine vessel interests in the WCPO.
While CMM 2008–01 sought to reduce effort in these areas, a number of factors
undermined its success. First, exemptions were granted to SIDS and certain fish­
ing nations based on diplomatic and other pressures, and historical ‘friendships’.
The exemptions for SIDS allowed for development of their domestic fisheries
and can also be seen as an attempt to force DWFNs to fish in their EEZs and pay
for the resource rents (Parris, 2010). Second, purse seine pressure increased else­
where, under bilateral national agreements with PNA countries. For example,
while the high seas pocket closure (2010–2012) resulted in a substantial decline
in the domestic Philippines purse seine catch, the activities of Philippine flagged
vessels fishing in PNG under bilateral agreements increased (Miller et al., 2014). 
There has been considerable debate among the WCPFC, the Scientific
Committee and independent researchers over the efficacy of high seas closures
and whether they are effective at reducing effort and mitigating other issues such
as IUU. Indeed, the WCPFC has been criticised for slow and uneven progress
( Jollands, 2011). The ineffectiveness of CMM 2008–01 in reducing fishing effort
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fishery is attributed to the difficulties of consensus decision-making and differ­
ent interpretations regarding the role of the WCPFC. The FFA have sought
to assert their sovereign rights through the WCPFC and added depth to the
governance arrangements regulating access in member states’ EEZs. At the same
time, the WCPFC faces exceedingly complicated decisions regarding manage­
ment measures to reduce fishing mortality while ensuring maximisation of the
fishery profits and allowing development opportunities for PICTs. The unen­
forceability of resolutions, exemptions and the fact the Scientific Committee’s
information regarding the status of fish stocks is disregarded hamper the effec­
tiveness of the WCPFC. The politicisation of the decision-making process in
the context of multiple and competing interests means the WCPFC continually
defers difficult decisions regarding allocation and conservation measures. 
Conclusion 
Marine ecosystems are complex and require governance and institutional 
arrangements that work across multiple scales. Better management of fisheries 
across the globe today is attributable, in part, to the shift towards collabo­
rative forms of governance that engages stakeholders and interested parties. 
As this chapter has shown, governance of the WCPO tuna requires multi-
scalar coordination over multiple domains (environmental, political, biological, 
organisational and social) and cooperation among actors across multiple levels 
(local to international) (Hanich et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2014; Sørensen et al., 
2015). The complicated governance arrangements in the WCPO are made 
more complex, however, due to the varying membership of actors in the fish­
ery to different agreements: some are party to the UNFSA, WCPFC, FFA and 
PNA, but others are not. 
Regional and sub-regional governance of tuna in the Pacific has evolved for
over 30 years. Sub-regional collaborative arrangements, FFA and PNA, have
worked to strengthen the position of Pacific Island states. In particular, FFA
and the PNA seek to manage migratory fishes with the objective of maximising
economic benefits from tuna fisheries. For the FFA, the strong sense of solidarity
among PICTs to protect their sovereign rights facilitates their collaboration in
the WCPO and is an example of how PICTs have been able to negotiate com­
peting interests and develop shared governance goals (Sørensen et al., 2015). 
The WCPFC, as an RFMO, provides an important, though imperfect, part 
of the governance solution for tuna fisheries in the WCPO. The evolution of 
collaborative governance arrangements between DWFNs and PICTs, and the 
conflicts that manifest as DWFN effort increased, shaped how collaboration 
was understood, and have continued to influence the effectiveness of PICTs 
and DWFNs cooperation involving the conservation and optimal utilisation of 
tuna species in the region (Tarte, 2010). 
The multiple and competing interests represented within the WCPFC make 
it difficult to obtain uniformity in positions since decisions can be undermined by 
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Nevertheless, collaborative governance approaches in the WCPO have ena­
bled fisheries managers to address scarcity of tunas in the Pacific, while also 
building social capacities and capabilities in the region. The WCPFC provides 
an overarching institutional structure that brings PICTs and DWFNs together 
in an attempt to balance conservation and sustainable use of tunas when stakes 
are high, time is limited and decisions are made based on incomplete informa­
tion. In addition to these actors, regional collaborative forums have opened 
up a platform for eNGOs to advocate sustainable policy. Cooperation among 
members of the WCPFC has enabled better information about sustainability 
of tuna stocks to be collected and shared, which facilitates the optimal utilisa­
tion of tunas through trade and access. In developing shared governance goals 
and seeking to implement approaches to ensure the sustainable management 
of tunas, the WCPFC enabled the coordination among its members of com­
pliance and observer programmes across the network of countries to support 
more rigorous surveillance and compliance. 
In examining the shift towards regional governance in the WCPO through 
the WCPFC, this chapter has highlighted the challenges to managing fisheries 
where multiple claims of ownership to resources exist and must be reconciled 
with ambitions to utilise the fish and profit from such activities. Collaboration 
in this regard has magnified the complexities that exist at the sub-regional level 
and highlight those differing views held by DWFNs and PICTs. 
Notes 
1 As defined in the WCPFC’s Convention Text: Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of High Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (see 
https://www.wcpfc.int/convention-text). 
2 The Indian Ocean represents 17 per cent of the global catch, the Atlantic and Eastern 
Pacific Oceans represent 10 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. 
3 Australia, Cook Island s, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, 
Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Island s,Tonga,Tuvalu, US and Vanuatu. 
4 This section (and following sections) is based on empirical research of Jollands,V. 
(2011) It’s not about the fish: Multi-scalar Governance in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Auckland,Auckland, New Zealand. 
5 Oceanscapes is an initiative spearheaded by Pacific Islands Forum that involves a raft 
of participants including intergovernmental organisations, nation states and NGOs. 
The initiative seeks to protect, manage and sustain the cultural and natural integrity 
of the ocean for present and future generations and the broader global community. 
6 At present there are five tuna RFMOs: Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC). 
7 WCPFC replaced the closures at its 2012 meeting with a measure that temporar­
ily instituted input and output limits, observer coverage requirements, prohibited 
Philippines purse seine fishing in high seas pocket number 2 (Figure 11.2) and other 
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12 A world without scarcity?
 
Marcelle C. Dawson, Christopher Rosin 
and Navé Wald 
What should be very apparent at this point is that the availability—or perhaps 
more accurately the accessibility—of resources is a topic that attracts the atten­
tion of a wide range of professionals, scholars and activists. In the resulting 
discourse, global resource scarcity is often regarded as a catalyst for conflict; yet, 
paradoxically, such scarcity also underlies some of the most important inter­
national collaborations. While some natural resources are irrefutably essential 
for life and human survival, others are more important for livelihoods and 
economic prosperity. Some resources derive their significance and value from 
how difficult they are to ‘capture’ and control, while ‘market forces’ determine 
the worth of others. The fact that natural resources underlie existing concep­
tions of economic security and achievement makes the capacity to control their 
access and exploitation highly desirable. 
It is not hard to understand why this contested terrain of natural resources— 
when understood as a zero-sum game—pits key stakeholders against one 
another. Seen from the perspective of independent (and competitive) nation 
states, this situation points to an inevitable source of conflict especially in 
relation to those resources that are not contained within the undisputed juris­
diction of a single state. As discussed in this volume, the scarcity (perceived, 
created or real) of resources has the tendency to exacerbate the potential for 
conflict. Our intention in constructing this collection is not, however, to dwell 
on the inevitability of conflict; rather we suggest that the common desirability 
of and shared dependence on finite or limited resources can provide the impe­
tus for cooperation in the governance of their exploitation, with the potential 
for more sustainable practices. This objective is reflected in the structure of 
the book, with chapters in Part II introducing some of the tensions associ­
ated with resources that experience demand that exceeds current or estimated 
future supply, while, in Part III, our contributors introduce examples of over­
tures towards international collaboration as a potential response to some of the 
sources of friction highlighted in Part II. 
The chapters in this collection consider a range of social, political, envi­
ronmental and economic factors that are at play in the exploitation of natural 
resources. Scarcity enters the conceptualisation of resource exploitation as a 
  204 M. C. Dawson, C. Rosin and N.Wald 
confounding factor. Implicit in the dominant treatment of scarcity is the expec­
tation that increasing demand for resources (attributable to population growth, 
changing consumer preferences and insatiable human desires, for instance) 
will outpace supply and generate tensions around access to, and availability of, 
resources. The assumption that any gains by one group of resource users neces­
sarily involve a loss among others creates the circumstances in which conflict 
becomes inevitable. Amidst ongoing talk of ‘resource wars’ (Le Billon, 2015; 
Morelli and Rohner, 2015) and fear-mongering around the urgent need to 
grab resources before it is too late (Klare, 2012)—views that work in the favour 
of greedy corporations looking to profit from the manufacture of scarcity—we 
are witnessing the emergence of alternative perspectives, some of which echo 
Marxist conceptualisations of scarcity in their questioning of how resources 
come to be regarded as scarce in the first place. These kinds of perspectives— 
underpinned as they are by a desire to challenge power and injustice—ask 
such questions as, ‘Who has the power to capture a resource or determine 
its worth?’ ‘Whose interests are served by manufacturing the perception of 
scarcity?’ ‘Who stands to benefit from providing “solutions” to the “problem” 
of scarcity?’ In attempting to provide answers to these questions, some of the 
contributors to this book argue that resource scarcity is not always a matter 
of an actual shortage in the supply of the resource. In some cases, a resource 
may be physically abundant, but access to it is limited for a range of reasons. 
In many instances, unequal distribution of resources is shown to be connected 
to state and corporate collusion. Some of the chapters in this book show how 
ordinary people and civil society groups work to challenge government policy 
and business interests. Still others highlight collaborative efforts within and 
between regions and nations of the world aimed at mitigating unequal dis­
tribution of, and access to, natural resources. The contributions to this part 
show that various forms of intervention, including policy recommendations, 
institutional change, improved resource management, and modifying human 
behaviour and values, have the potential to alleviate tensions and alter the way 
in which scarcity is understood. The achievements remain, however, emergent 
and tenuous, being subject to the tensions of competition among states. 
The chapters in this volume contribute to our collective knowledge of 
issues pertinent to scarcity and natural resources. They depict diverse, contex­
tualised and nuanced cases where the complexity of needs is being unpacked. 
In this sense, the book contributes to the convergence thesis, which stipu­
lates the consolidation of different positions in the debate around scarcity of 
natural resources (Frerks, Dietz and van der Zang, 2014). But notwithstanding 
this convergence, Homer-Dixon’s (1999) typology of the debate’s main posi­
tions during the 1990s (neo-Malthusians, economic optimists, distributionists) 
can still be identified in the book’s different accounts. For example, the 
Marxist-inspired distributionist approach is evident in the chapters by Mehta, 
Lahiri-Dutt and Hill, and it is usually associated with a more critical view of 
scarcity as a political social construct. The chapter by Lindström, Granit and 
Rosner, in contrast, has a stronger inclination towards economic optimism, 
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where regional cooperation can mitigate the uneven physical distribution of a 
natural resource. In this sense, readers of the book can identify different ele­
ments of these various approaches, and appreciate how these are manifested 
within different contexts. 
The interdisciplinary background of the book’s contributors shifts the focus 
of the analysis beyond narrow theoretical treatments of international relations 
and resource diplomacy to broader examinations of the practicalities of coop­
eration in the context of competition and scarcity. Combining the insights of 
a range of social scientists, including sociologists, geographers, historians and 
political scientists, with those of engineers, ecologists, physicists and marine 
scientists—many of whom work as ‘resource practitioners’ outside the con­
text of the university—has yielded refreshing insights. Tackling the question 
of global resource scarcity in this way has highlighted the tensions between 
‘thinking/theory’ and ‘doing/practice’, which so often plague the process of 
social change. Indeed, the authors’ contributions raise important questions 
about the ways in which a change in thinking can lead to changes in behav­
iour. Recognising that environmental loss or degradation is a loss for all and 
that there are sufficient resources to cater for everyone’s needs, but not eve­
ryone’s ‘greeds’ or excesses, lies at the heart of behavioural and policy change. 
In other words, conceived of in terms of a negative- or positive-sum game, 
resource politics have the potential to shift onto a terrain where allocation and 
access are determined by factors other than economic gain. While this may 
sound overly optimistic, possibly even naïve, evidence suggesting a linear rela­
tionship between scarcity and conflict is unconvincing. It denies the socially 
constructed nature of scarcity and undermines the ability of humans to develop 
alternatives that do not have economic prosperity as the ultimate objective. If 
controlling and monopolising a valued resource is seen as one possible response 
to ending the ‘problem’ of scarcity, can we think of alternatives that remove 
the impetus to compete? In other words, can we ultimately eliminate scarcity? 
Answering this question involves a thorough re-examination of human values 
and a deeper engagement with what the social, political and economic philoso­
phies of ‘degrowth’ and buen vivir (roughly translated as ‘the good life’) could 
mean for sustained human existence on planet earth. 
Rather than offering solid—and incontestable—conclusions, we believe the 
contributions to the book provide for a loosening of the definition of scarcity. 
In doing so, they open a space for discussions of resource exploitation that 
move beyond the strictures of competitive nation states to the conceivability of 
collaboration and cooperation. Thus redefined, it is possible to eliminate scar­
city from the arena of allocation and access and more appropriately apply it to 
those situations in which an absolute and immediate scarcity can be met with 
the necessary resources to avoid humanitarian catastrophe. The suggestion that 
more cooperative conceptions of resource use are possible is, of course, not a 
novel one. In the Introduction, we already identified research focused on the 
potential for resources to facilitate peaceful relations where tensions exist in 
other interactions, with environmental peacebuilding being perhaps the most 
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ambitious. The interventions of our contributors suggest, however, that this 
collaboration can perform a broader and at the same time deeper role of rea­
ligning society’s apparent infatuation with scarcity. 
We remain fully convinced that collaboration is a potential (and highly desir­
able) response to resource scarcity. The contributions to this book demonstrate 
the already emergent collaborations around such essential, vital and potentially 
scarce resources as water, food, energy and marine resources. The tenuous 
nature of these achievements reminds us, however, of the continued need for 
dialogue among the diverse actors, disciplines, ontologies and epistemologies 
of resources and scarcity. Such dialogue should obviously involve reflections 
on peace building and incorporate the socioecological relations inherent to 
nexus frameworks. But they should not be limited to these framings, if such 
boundaries fail to account for the variety in representations of scarcity—some 
of which are so apparent in the chapters in this book. In the end, rather than 
solid, indisputable conclusions, we emphasise the need for continued engage­
ment among those interested in and concerned with the relations of resource 
exploitation—and an engagement that acknowledges the insight to be gained 
from the distinctive representations of scarcity. 
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